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RAPE, FEMINISM, AND THE WAR ON CRIME 
Aya Gruber* 
Abstract: Over the past several years, feminism has been increasingly associated with 
crime control and the incarceration of men. In apparent lock step with the movement of the 
American penal system, feminists have advocated a host of reforms to strengthen state power 
to punish gender-based crimes. In the rape context, this effort has produced mixed results. 
Sexual assault laws that adopt prevailing views of criminality and victimhood, such as 
predator laws, enjoy great popularity. However, reforms that target the difficulties of date 
rape prosecutions and seek to counter gender norms, such as rape shield and affirmative 
consent laws, are controversial, sporadically-implemented, and empirically unsuccessful. 
After decades of using criminal law as the primary vehicle to address sexualized violence, 
the time is ripe for feminists to reassess continued involvement in rape reform. This Article 
cautions feminists to weigh carefully any purported benefits of reform against the 
considerable philosophical and practical costs of criminalization strategies before making 
further investments of time, resources, and intellect in rape reform. In advancing this caution, 
the Article systematically catalogues the existing intra-feminist critiques of rape reform and 
discusses reasons why these critiques have proven relatively ineffective at reversing the 
punitive course of reform. The Article then crafts a separate philosophical critique of pro-
prosecution approaches by exposing the tension between the basic tenets of feminism and 
those animating the modern American penal state. Finally, it discusses why purported 
cultural and utilitarian benefits from rape reform cannot outweigh the destructive effect 
criminalization efforts have on feminist discourse and the feminist message. The Article 
concludes that feminists should begin the complicated process of disentangling feminism’s 
important stance against sexual coercion from a criminal justice system currently reflective 
of hierarchy and unable to produce social justice. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Over the past several years, feminism has become increasingly 
identified with crime control and the prosecution of men who commit 
offenses against women. Some feminist scholars have begun to express 
grave concern that “a punitive, retribution-driven agenda” now 
constitutes “the most publicly accessible face of the women’s 
movement.”1 Twenty-six years ago, feminist scholar Catharine 
MacKinnon exposed the theoretical incongruity between feminism and 
the “liberal”2 protection of women’s rights through police power.3 She 
                                                     
1. Dianne L. Martin, Retribution Revisited: A Reconsideration of Feminist Criminal Law Reform 
Strategies, 36 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 151, 158 (1998). 
2. I use the term “liberal” not in its colloquial form to signify a person with left-leaning views, 
but to describe the philosophy that there are “autonomous spheres of family, civil society 
(economy), and state” each with “natural” conditions. Wendy Brown, Finding the Man in the State, 
18 FEMINIST STUD. 7, 17 (1992) [hereinafter Man in the State]. Liberalism constructs the state “both 
to protect citizens from external danger and to guarantee the rights necessary for commodious 
commerce with one another.” Id. 
3. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist 
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 644 (1983) [hereinafter Toward a Feminist Jurisprudence]. 
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observed, “The liberal state coercively and authoritatively constitutes the 
social order in the interest of men as a gender, through its legitimizing 
norms, relation to society, and substantive policies.”4 Despite 
MacKinnon’s insistence that only radically social, as opposed to liberal, 
strategies adequately address rape, most feminists took her basic 
message5 as a call to legal arms against rapists.6 
The United States is one of the most punitive nations on earth.7 Fear 
of crime constitutes a meaningful part of Americans’ everyday lives and 
exerts significant influence on how Americans live.8 As the United 
States became more and more punitive, feminists hopped on the 
bandwagon by vigorously advocating reforms to strengthen the 
operation of criminal law to combat gendered crimes. Today, many 
associate feminism more with efforts to expand the penal laws of rape 
and domestic violence than with calls for equal pay and abortion rights.9 
The zealous, well-groomed female prosecutor who throws the book at 
“sicko” sex offenders has replaced the 1970s bra-burner as the icon of 
women’s empowerment.10 Indeed, many regard criminal law reform as 
one of feminism’s greatest successes.11 
                                                     
4. Id. 
5. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for 
Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 534 (1982) (“Without a change in the very norms of sexuality, the liberation 
of women is a meaningless goal.” (quoting Susan Sontag, “The Third World of Women,” Partisan 
Review 40 no. 2 (1973): 180–206, esp. 188)). 
6. See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE 
FAILURE OF LAW 25 (1998) [hereinafter UNWANTED SEX]; Corey Rayburn, To Catch a Sex Thief: 
The Burden of Performance in Rape and Sexual Assault Trials, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 437, 
443 (2006) (noting MacKinnon’s influence on criminal rape reforms). Of course, I am not 
suggesting that MacKinnon’s was the only voice motivating early rape reform efforts. See infra 
notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
7. See Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 913 (2007) 
(observing that “the United States leads the world by imprisoning 750 people out of every 100,000 
citizens, while almost every European country ranges between 100 and 200”). 
8. See Jonathan Simon, Crime, Community, and Criminal Justice, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1415, 1416–
17 (2002) [hereinafter Crime, Community, and Criminal Justice] (“[B]y far the larger portion of 
people actively governed by crime are not criminal-law violators but persons affirmatively seeking 
to protect themselves and their families from crime.”). 
9. Cf. Symposium, Battered Women & Feminist Lawmaking: Author Meets Readers, Elizabeth M. 
Schneider, Christine Harrington, Sally Engle Merry, Renée Römkens, & Marianne Wesson, 10 J.L. 
& POL’Y 313, 344 (2002) (querying whether “the feminist social movement [is] to be remembered 
for its influence on criminal law”). 
10. For example, Law & Order: Special Victim’s Unit (NBC television) airs almost continuously 
in syndication and features an attractive, slim female prosecutor, who is particularly driven to 
combat sex crimes, and is always more involved with “women’s” issues than any other legal actor 
in the show. See Diane Klein, Ally McBeal and Her Sisters: A Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis 
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Feminists’ feelings of victory are certainly understandable, given the 
widespread implementation of rape and domestic violence reforms and 
the massive shift in mindset on gendered crimes during the late twentieth 
century. Society moved from viewing domestic violence as legitimate or 
private to regarding batterers as among the lowest forms of criminals.12 
Rapists, especially those who violently rape children or strangers (as 
opposed to dates, wives, or acquaintances), are widely considered 
predatory monsters deserving of the most brutal forms of punishment.13 
Nonetheless, for all the vitriol lodged against certain perpetrators of 
gendered crimes, feminist policies that challenge popular gender 
constructions and accepted views of criminality are not so well-liked. 
Even as they vehemently condemn sadistic abusers, many continue to 
deem other forms of coercive domestic control noncriminal and even 
acceptable.14 Rape shield and affirmative consent laws, which I will 
refer to as “realist reforms,” attempt to shelter date rape trials from 
gender stereotypes. However, these have proven unpopular and 
empirically ineffective.15 Although reformers secured widespread 
legislative adoption of rape shield laws, such laws are riddled with 
exceptions, enforced sporadically, and remain controversial. Affirmative 
                                                     
of Representations of Women Lawyers on Prime-Time Television, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 259, 
278, 284 (1998) (observing that female prosecutors are overrepresented on television when 
compared to female civil attorneys, and discussing the appeal of show Law & Order’s Claire 
Kincaid character who “display[s] aggression against criminals, competitiveness against defense 
attorneys, dedication to her job, and at least some degree of emotional detachment” as well as 
“sensitiv[ity] to witnesses and co-workers, and self-sacrific[e]”); Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good 
Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 355 n.4 (2001) (asserting that 
society views characters like the female prosecutors on Law & Order and NYPD Blue as heroic and 
even “saintly”). 
11. E.g., Paula Finley Mangum, Note, Reconceptualizing Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence: 
Prosecution Use of Expert Testimony on Battering, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 593, 593 (1999) 
(asserting that defining domestic violence as a criminal act rather than private conduct “is one of the 
great achievements of feminism”); see Rose Corrigan, Making Meaning of Megan’s Law, 31 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 267, 302 (2006) (observing “perceived success of feminist rape law”). 
12. See infra notes 315–20 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 321–26 and accompanying text. 
14. Compare infra note 319 (cataloging men’s responses expressing disdain for domestic 
batterers) with PlanetPsych.com, Men and Women Define Domestic Violence Differently,  
http://www.planetpsych.com/zPsychology_101/domestic_violence.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2009) 
(reporting that the majority of male respondents did not find nonviolent domestic control to be 
abuse). 
15. See David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1199 (1997) (“[R]eforms have generally had little or no effect on the 
outcomes of rape cases . . . .”); see infra notes 242–43 and accompanying text. 
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consent is nearly universally rejected by judges and legislatures, and the 
concept of requiring a “yes” before sex continues to engender public 
disdain.16 For decades, the women’s movement has made enormous 
investments in criminal law, and it is now time to examine critically the 
world feminist crime reform created.17 
Feminists hoped enlisting state prosecutorial power would improve 
the lives of individual women and change norms about female sexual 
agency, male dominance, and courtship behavior. Unfortunately, that is 
not what happened. Although general criminal prosecutions have 
increased significantly, date rapes continue to be underreported and 
underprosecuted.18 Some scholars even note the phenomenon of young 
women embracing retrograde notions of feminine mystique.19 By 
adopting a prosecutorial attitude, which largely conceives of rape (and 
crime in general) as a product of individual criminality rather than social 
inequality, the feminist rape reform movement strayed far from its anti-
subordination origins and undermined its own efforts to change attitudes 
about date rape. The feminist effort to send society messages about 
gender equality through criminal law was drowned out by the din of 
American criminal justice’s ever-louder declaration of the war on crime. 
This Article asserts that given the philosophical tension between 
criminal punishment and feminism, the problematic politics of the 
current American criminal justice system, the limited potential of rape 
laws to shape gender norms, and the effects of criminal rape law on 
women victims, feminists should be extremely wary of further 
entanglement with the penal system.20 It exhorts feminists to commence 
a discursive shift and consciously distance scholarly dialogue about and 
political strategies to counter sexual violence from arguments and 
                                                     
16. See infra notes 297–300 and accompanying text. 
17. See Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 830 (2007) [hereinafter 
Feminist War] (arguing now is the “critical point, when feminists should redirect their efforts 
toward challenging structures that subordinate not only women but other disadvantaged 
minorities”). 
18. See infra note 243 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra notes 287–94 and accompanying text. 
20. See Feminist War, supra note 17 (asserting that feminists should no longer support mandatory 
prosecution programs and the concept of forced separation); cf. Karen Engle, Feminism and its 
(Dis)contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 778, 804 
(2005) (discussing negative effects on women’s agency of international criminal rape prosecutions 
in Balkans as preface to “reconsider whether increasing the number of convictions for sex crimes 
should be a central goal of international feminist advocacy”). 
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strategies that strengthen the American penal state.21 Part I provides a 
brief history of rape reform, concentrating on doctrinal changes that 
culminated in rape shield and affirmative consent laws. This Part also 
sketches early feminist theorizing on rape. Part II surveys feminist 
literature on sexual violence and distills four primary critiques of rape 
reform from within feminist theory. Part III provides a new theoretical 
critique of the alliance between feminism and the criminal justice system 
as it currently exists. Part IV examines the limitations on realist rape 
reform’s ability to change cultural norms given the structure of the 
reforms, current state of gender relations, and prevailing discourse on 
criminality. It also challenges the argument, often central to feminists’ 
continued reform efforts, that reforms “work” by helping individual 
female victims. Part V opines that after balancing the theoretical 
conflicts, the potential of realist reforms to change norms, and the effects 
of the laws on individuals, feminists should self-consciously turn away 
from strategies and theories that broaden the reach of criminal law. 
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF CRIMINAL RAPE LAW REFORM 
Tracing the history of rape reform in the United States has been done 
with great care and eloquence elsewhere,22 and accordingly this 
discussion will not encompass all of the legal issues regarding rape. 
Rather, it will trace some of the most visible contributions of feminists 
to rape law reform as a starting point for further analysis. 
A. Early Reforms Eliminated Formal Prosecution Barriers 
Criminal rape laws, of course, existed for decades prior to feminist 
intervention in the latter half of the twentieth century. According to 
some experts, the criminalization of rape was never about female 
empowerment. Rather, in late-nineteenth- to early-twentieth-century 
                                                     
21. See Panel Discussion, Men, Women and Rape, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 152 (1994) 
[hereinafter Rape Panel] (noting that focus on criminal law obscures that feminism’s goal “is an end 
to sexual violence and not maximum incarceration” (remarks of Prof. Robin West)); see also Crime, 
Community, and Criminal Justice, supra note 8, at 1416 (discussing “governing through crime”). 
22. See generally Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual 
Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51 (2002) [hereinafter Chastity 
Requirement] (discussing history of chastity requirement in rape law); Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest 
and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373 (2000) (chronicling marital 
rape laws); Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women’s Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
359 (1993) [hereinafter Rape, Violence, and Women’s Autonomy] (discussing historical connections 
between rape law and racial discrimination). 
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America, rape law was part of the larger state effort to police sexuality in 
general,23 entrench male domination over women through chastity and 
ownership paradigms,24 and enforce white racial supremacy.25 During 
this era, the law of rape incorporated the paradigm of a pathological 
stranger, prototypically a black man, lurking in the shadows, ready to 
violently assault the presumed-chaste (white) woman.26 White men, by 
contrast, had a virtual license to rape, as the law required “true” victims 
to be ultimately innocent ladies who would rather fight to the death than 
give up their virginity.27 Owing to these paradigms, black men became 
primary targets of rape prosecutions (officially),28 and lynchings (less 
officially).29 For this reason, some of the earliest progressive objections 
to rape law were that they were overenforced, not underenforced.30 
                                                     
23. See generally Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1 (1998) (contending that 
rape law existed as a quasi-defense for women who had engaged in unwanted prohibited sex and 
was always part of the state’s larger effort to constrain sexual autonomy). 
24. See Alice Ristroph, Sexual Punishments, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 139, 179 (2006) 
(“[R]ape law was used to police the sexual—to police virginity, chastity, and monogamy—and to 
police through the sexual—to enforce gender and racial hierarchies as well as codes of public 
morality.”). 
25. Angela Harris quotes nineteenth-century suffrage activist Ida B. Wells, who observed how 
“white men used their ownership of the body of the white female as a terrain on which to lynch the 
black male.” Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
581, 600 (1990) [hereinafter Race and Essentialism] (quoting IDA B. WELLS, SOUTHERN HORRORS: 
LYNCH LAW IN ALL ITS PHASES (1892)). Thus, Harris observes that for many black women, rape 
has come to “signif[y] the terrorism of black men by white men, aided and abetted, passively (by 
silence) or actively (by ‘crying rape’), by white women.” Id. at 599. Therefore, rape law not only 
reflected the racist assumption of black male sexual savagery but also the “patriarchal idealization 
of white womanhood.” Id. at 600. Of course, “as a legal matter, the experience of rape did not even 
exist for black women.” Id. at 599. 
26. See id. at 600; see also Rape, Violence, and Women’s Autonomy, supra note 22, at 365 
(noting “[t]he image of Black men as a constant threat to the virtue of white womanhood”). 
27. See Aviva Orenstein, Special Issues Raised by Rape Trials, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585, 1587 
(2007) [hereinafter Special Issues] (“Traditionally, successful rape allegations involved a virtuous, 
ideally virginal woman, who is attacked by a creepy stranger.”). 
28. See, e.g., State v. Jefferson, 28 N.C. (6 Ired.) 305, 305–06, 309 (1846) (upholding defendant’s 
conviction for rape despite consensual sex and the victim’s admission that she had allowed 
defendant “to put his hands on her in a free and familiar manner”). 
29. See Susan A. Bandes, Child Rape, Moral Outrage, and the Death Penalty, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 17, 28 (examining historical lynching and death sentences for black accused 
rapists); see also Rape, Violence, and Women’s Autonomy, supra note 22, at 366 (“Black men’s 
supposed propensity to rape white women became the pretext for thousands of brutal lynchings in 
the South.”). The case of Emmet Till, a black teenager who was lynched for whistling at a white 
woman, has become symbolic of the connection between the social construction of rape and racial 
subordination. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 2012 (2008) 
(discussing Till’s case and noting that his murderers were acquitted). 
30. See, e.g., IDA B. WELLS, SOUTHERN HORRORS: LYNCH LAW IN ALL ITS PHASES (1892). 
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Concern over the deployment of strong rape laws to oppress minority 
men led the Model Penal Code’s drafters to craft defense-friendly 
provisions31 that many feminists and progressives believe underpunish 
rape.32 
Sexist gender norms were woven into the very fabric of rape law in 
the form of iniquitous obstacles to prosecution such as resistance33 and 
corroboration34 requirements. Outside of race-based prosecutions, in 
which the chastity and veracity of white victims were virtually 
presumed, these rules tended to privilege rape defendants.35 The 
requirement that a woman resist to the “utmost”36 was the doctrinal 
reflection of the gender norm creating a chaste woman/sex object 
dichotomy. Pursuant to this norm, a proper lady exercises no sexual 
                                                     
31. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1985) (preserving marital exemption, privileging 
acquaintance rapists, and requiring rape to involve compulsion by “force or by threat of imminent 
death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain, or kidnapping,” administration of intoxicants, or 
unconsciousness); id. § 213.1 cmt. 3 (1980) (discussing racial history of rape law). 
32. See Vera Bergelson, Conditional Rights and Comparative Wrongs: More on the Theory and 
Application of Comparative Criminal Liability, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 567, 580 n.44 (2004) (calling 
rape provisions of Model Penal Code (MPC) “outdated” and “embarrassing”). See generally 
Deborah W. Denno, Why the Model Penal Code’s Sexual Offense Provisions Should Be Pulled and 
Replaced, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 207 (2003) (offering comprehensive criticism of MPC rape 
provisions). 
33. The law required the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the rape 
complainant resisted the rape to the “utmost” as part of its case-in-chief. E.g., Kinselle v. People, 
227 P. 823, 825 (Colo. 1924); People v. Geddes, 3 N.W.2d 266, 267 (Mich. 1942); State v. Hunt, 
135 N.W.2d 475, 479 (Neb. 1965); Holmes v. State, 505 P.2d 189, 191 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972); 
Purpero v. State, 208 N.W. 475 (Wis. 1926); State v. McClain, 149 N.W. 771, 771 (Wis. 1914) 
(“[T]here must be the utmost resistance by the woman by all means within her power.” (citing 
Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536 (Wis. 1906))). 
34. This requirement prevented prosecutions for rape in the absence of specific corroborating 
physical evidence, typically injury. Michelle J. Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint 
Requirement, Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 
84 B.U. L. REV. 945, 956–60 (2004) [hereinafter Prompt Complaint] (discussing history and citing 
cases on corroboration). 
35. See Richard Klein, An Analysis of Thirty-Five Years of Rape Reform: A Frustrating Search 
for Fundamental Fairness, 41 AKRON L. REV. 981, 983–90 (2008) (noting these laws “made it quite 
difficult to convict even the guilty”). For example, under the resistance requirement, if a rape victim 
did not resist to the utmost, even a stranger who used force or weapons would be acquitted. See, 
e.g., People v. Scott, 95 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Ill. 1950) (overturning conviction of violent stranger 
rapist for lack of resistance); State v. Willie, 422 So. 2d 1128 (La. 1982) (applying resistance 
standard to paradigmatic rape but finding standard met). There is the well-known case of a victim 
who awoke in the middle of the night to a knife-wielding stranger demanding sex. See Ross E. 
Milloy, Furor Over a Decision Not to Indict in a Rape Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1992, at A30. 
Fearing AIDS, she convinced her attacker to wear a condom. Id. Later, a grand jury refused to 
indict, and jurors explained they believed she consented. Id. 
36. See supra note 33. 
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agency, inside or outside of marriage; displays no sensuality in dress or 
demeanor; and goes to great lengths to protect her delicate 
womanhood.37 As many have observed, a real woman is unlikely to 
satisfy such stringent criteria, and thus finds herself recast as a purely 
sexual individual.38 The woman who fails to resist forcefully the taking 
of her all-important, heavily guarded sexuality, or, even better, virginity, 
immediately transforms from Madonna into whore.39 
This dual objectification is necessary for the maintenance of male 
sexual privilege. If every woman is ultimately chaste, there will be no 
women fit for casual, pre-marital sex. There must accordingly be a 
category of women who constantly and freely give sex with little or no 
right to refuse. Today, these are Girls Gone Wild40—perpetually sexual 
beings with neither inclination nor right to deny sex.41 Minority and 
lower class women have historically occupied (and often continue to 
occupy) this position.42 Black women, for example, had no right to claim 
rape because of racist beliefs about their very nature as “sexual 
                                                     
37. See Chastity Requirement, supra note 22, at 53 (observing rape law’s “informal, though 
powerful, normative command that women maintain an ideal of sexual abstinence”). 
38. See Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 
387, 405 (1984) (“The double standard divides females into two classes—virgins and whores, ‘good 
girls’ whose chastity should be protected and ‘bad girls’ who may be exploited with impunity.”). 
39. See Chastity Requirement, supra note 22, at 54 (noting requirement that women refrain from 
extramarital sexual behavior in order to be protected against rape “by someone other than her 
husband”). 
40. Girls Gone Wild is a video series featuring drunken young women—think college girls on 
spring break—flashing various body parts. The cheerful commercials, which feature cruise-
reminiscent Calypso music and a “happy guy” narrator, pervade late night television. The franchise, 
insiders say, makes its parent company, Mantra, about $40 million a year. Claire Hoffman, Joe 
Francis: ‘Baby, give me a kiss,’ L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2006, (Magazine), at 16, available at http:// 
www.latimes.com/features/magazine/west/la-tm-gonewild32aug06,0,2664370.story. Girls Gone 
Wild is an amazing phenomenon because of its mainstream nature. In 2007, USA Today mentioned 
the series as among the twenty-five trends that shaped America over the past quarter century, along 
with ethnic diversity and the aging population. 25 Trends That Changed America, USA TODAY, 
Mar. 26, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/top25-trends.htm. 
41. One reporter describes Girls Gone Wild’s “Spring Break 2005: Anything Goes!” video: 
“Women in bikinis giggle as they stare into the camera and explain just how wild their vacations are 
getting: group showers, oral sex in bars with strangers, topless dancing. One girl, surrounded by her 
friends, explains, ‘I’m ready and willing, and I’m a dirty slut.’” Hoffman, supra note 40, at 18. 
42. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, 
Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 85 (1999) (“[T]he construction 
of black women as promiscuous causes jurors in sexual assault prosecutions to doubt black 
women’s credibility . . . .”); cf. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, 
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1274 (1991) 
(observing that black women who bring rape claims against black men are often vilified in the black 
community because of the belief that rape laws are oppressive to black men). 
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savages.”43 At the same time, men desire official relationships with 
women who are not sexual savages—chaste (or today relatively chaste) 
ladies.44 
Reporting45 and corroboration46 requirements, which erected formal 
barriers to prosecution by placing specific credibility burdens on 
complainants,47 also legally cemented the chastity paradigm. The law 
presumed the rape complainant to be untruthful unless the prosecution 
presented evidence independent of her testimony,48 typically evidence of 
serious injury.49 Such laws also reflected the related caricature of the 
lying vindictive shrew.50 The vindictive shrew image assumes that 
women are jealous, desire to make men suffer for leaving or mistreating 
them, and fabricate the specific crime of rape51 as revenge.52 Taken 
                                                     
43. BELL HOOKS, AIN’T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 52 (1981); see also Chastity 
Requirement, supra note 22, at 68–69 (“Women of other races, slaves, indentured servants, and 
Native Americans, as well as ‘outsiders’ such as ‘rebellious women,’ were . . . by definition 
unchaste . . . .”); Race and Essentialism, supra note 25, at 599 (“[R]ape laws were seldom used to 
protect black women against either white or black men, since black women were considered 
promiscuous by nature.”). 
44. Today, men may not require virginity, but they still balk at the idea of marrying a “slut.” See 
Chastity Requirement, supra note 22, at 56 (noting persistence of “[r]etrograde notions of sexual 
propriety”). 
45. See Prompt Complaint, supra note 34, at 954–77 (discussing history and law of requirement). 
46. See, e.g., Allison v. United States, 409 F.2d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (stating that “no person 
may be convicted of a ‘sex offense’ on the uncorroborated testimony of the alleged victim”); 
Franklin v. United States, 330 F.2d 205, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (requiring corroboration because of 
the “danger of a fabricated rape”); State v. Garza, 191 N.W.2d 454, 457 (Neb. 1971) (requiring 
corroboration); People v. Masse, 156 N.E.2d 452, 453 (N.Y. 1959) (same). 
47. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 48 S.E. 180, 181 (Ga. 1904) (“The accused should not be convicted 
upon the woman’s testimony alone, however positive it may be . . . .”). 
48. See, e.g., Allison, 490 F.2d at 449 n.10 (“[T]he danger of a fabricated rape is of greater 
magnitude than the danger of erroneous identification.”); Strickland v. State, 61 S.E.2d 118, 121 
(Ga. 1950) (stating that corroboration “furnish[es] the jury a criterion for ascertaining” credibility). 
49. See Klein, supra note 35, at 986. This requirement had a major impact on rape reporting and 
prosecution. See Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 
1365, 1370 n.38 (1972) (discussing 1969 study of New York City, which had strict corroboration 
requirement, where there were 18 convictions out of 1085 rape arrests (citing Lesley Oelsner, Law 
of Rape: ‘Because Ladies Lie,’ N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1972, at E5)). 
50. See SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 369 (1975) 
(observing “the cherished male assumption that female persons tend to lie”); Mary I. Coombs, 
Telling the Victim’s Story, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 277, 282 (1993) (noting pervasive myth of lying 
complainant). 
51. See, e.g., ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 6 (1999) 
[hereinafter CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM] (stating that robbery “victim’s identification of the 
defendant alone results in conviction” while rape “victim’s truthfulness is almost always 
challenged”); John Dwight Ingram, Date Rape: It’s Time for “No” to Really Mean “No,” 21 AM. J. 
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together, these laws confined rape to a violent attack on a chaste woman, 
ideally a virgin, by a stranger whom she resists, resulting in her severe 
injury.53 While other forms of sexual coercion may have been considered 
less than ideal, they were certainly not criminal. 
The intensely chauvinistic parameters of rape law were not lost on 
feminists, and in the 1970s and 1980s, “second-wave”54 feminist 
activists engaged in concerted efforts to reform rape law and educate the 
public about sexual assault stereotypes.55 Not all feminist scholars 
intervening in the rape issue started from the same theoretical or 
practical base. Notable commentators, such as Susan Brownmiller, 
Catharine MacKinnon, and Susan Estrich, espoused different 
perspectives on the sexual violence issue. Brownmiller emphasized the 
violent nature of rape in the hopes of convincing society that coerced sex 
was a “real” crime to be taken seriously.56 This led to the much-
                                                     
CRIM. L. 3, 7 (1993) (observing that robbery victims’ credibility is not tested like rape victims’). 
52. See Ingram, supra note 51, at 7 (observing “a widespread belief that the female gender is rife 
with spiteful shrews who often falsely accuse men of sexual attacks”) (internal quotations omitted). 
The existence of the “shrew myth” helps enable society to discount rapes as rare occurrences. 
Duncan Kennedy observes that “[r]arity is important” because “unless cases are rare it is hard to 
sustain the notion that they are ‘abnormal’ and pathological” and “it is hard to sustain the view that 
they play no significant structural role in the relations between ‘normal’ men and women.” Duncan 
Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing and the Eroticization of Domination, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
1309, 1322−23 (1992) [hereinafter Sexy Dressing]. 
53. Another “old” rape law that reflected and entrenched sexist norms was the marital 
exemption—the formal legal bar to the prosecution of spousal rape. See, e.g., Wales v. Miner, 89 
Ind. 118, 125 (Ind. 1883) (“As against the rights of the husband, the wife is incapable of consenting 
to her seduction.”). Feminists have not been so successful at eradicating this antiquated law. See 
Hasday, supra note 22, at 1375 (reporting that most state legislatures have preserved the exemption 
“in some substantial manifestation” and “courts have not invalidated state laws protecting marital 
rape”). 
54. Second-wave feminism describes a set of feminist ideas resulting in law reform (i.e. rape law, 
sexual harassment law, domestic violence law, abortion law) at a particular point in time, 
specifically the early 1960s through late 1980s. See Jane E. Larson, Introduction: Third Wave—Can 
Feminists Use The Law To Effect Social Change In The 1990s?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1252, 1252 n.1 
(1993) (“The term ‘Second Wave’ is used to refer to the second broad-based feminist movement in 
the history of the United States, beginning in the late 1960s.”). Thus, both the “liberal feminism” 
and “dominance feminism” views, see infra note 129 and accompanying text, can be considered 
second-wave feminist views. 
55. See CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS REVOLUTION AND 
ITS IMPACT 20 (1992) (explaining that beginning in the early 1970s, rape reform “quickly became a 
key item on the feminist agenda” and describing women’s groups’ lobbying efforts); see also infra 
note 65. 
56. BROWNMILLER, supra note 50, at 377 (asserting that rape should be “placed where it truly 
belongs, within the context of modern criminal violence and not within the purview of ancient 
masculine codes”). 
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publicized feminist maxim that “rape is a crime of violence.”57 In this 
view, rape is not a product of men’s natural sexual desires but a 
manifestation of a criminal’s deviant desire for power and control over 
the victim. This argument analyzes the rape issue from a liberal 
standpoint,58 perceiving the problem as the state’s non-recognition of 
women’s right to be free from coerced sex.59 Catharine MacKinnon’s 
“dominance feminism” conceived sexual assault as a product of the 
ubiquitous operation of patriarchy and male domination in gender 
relationships, particularly sexual ones.60 Under MacKinnon’s theory, 
curbing rape was not just a matter of using state power to enforce 
women’s right to be free from sexual violence but required a radical 
overhaul of the very structure of the state and society.61 Susan Estrich 
adopted a theory that lies philosophically between liberal and dominance 
feminism. She did not espouse a global view of patriarchy as did 
MacKinnon, but neither did she simply call for formal equality of rape 
                                                     
57. Although Brownmiller, like MacKinnon, was particularly concerned with how male power 
structures sexuality, for example, BROWNMILLER, supra note 50, at 15 (maintaining that rape has 
played the “critical function” of a “conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all 
women in a state of fear”), her basic message has been understood as establishing that rape is a 
crime of violence. See Ristroph, supra note 24, at 139 n.3 (“Several commentators trace the claim 
that rape is violence and not sex to Susan Brownmiller.”); see also Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes 
Against the Heart: Recognizing the Wrongs of Forced Sex, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 845, 909 (2002) 
(“Over the last generation, many reformers have argued that rapists are motivated by anger and a 
need to assert power, rather than sex.”). 
58. See supra note 2 (defining “liberalism”). 
59. See Morrison Torrey, Feminist Legal Scholarship on Rape: A Maturing Look at One Form of 
Violence Against Women, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 35, 38 (1995) (observing that “liberal 
feminism” shaped rape reform in the “classic liberal ideology of privacy, autonomy, and individual 
choice”). One of the criticisms of the “rape is violence” approach is that it led to the law’s singular 
focus on particularly violent offenders rather than social gender norms that predicate sexual 
coercion. See Rape, Violence, and Women’s Autonomy, supra note 22, at 362 (“If rape is violence as 
the law defines it (weapons, bruises, blood), then what most men do when they disregard women’s 
sexual autonomy is not rape.”); Christina E. Wells & Erin Elliott Motley, Reinforcing the Myth of 
the Crazed Rapist: A Feminist Critique of Recent Rape Legislation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 127, 154 
(2001). 
60. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 49 
(1987) [hereinafter FEMINISM UNMODIFIED] (“[T]he organized expropriation of the sexuality of 
some for the use of others defines the sex, woman.”). See generally Toward a Feminist 
Jurisprudence, supra note 3. In this view, rape is not just an effect of patriarchy but the principle 
expression of male domination of women. Id. 
61. See Rape, Violence, and Women’s Autonomy, supra note 22, at 370 (“MacKinnon 
demonstrates that the pervasive effect of male dominance makes it impossible to say definitively 
that some of women’s sexual relations with men (called sex) are ‘free’ and others (called rape) are 
‘coerced.’”). 
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and other crimes.62 Estrich’s project consisted of exposing various 
“myths” like that of the chaste lady, sex object, and vindictive shrew that 
underlay the operation of rape law.63 In Estrich’s view, eliminating the 
bias produced by rape myths required more than just formal equality 
between rape and other crimes—it required specific protective 
measures.64 
Although not all feminists viewed rape the same way and proposed 
solutions ranging from modest to radical, they converged on the 
necessity to eliminate the legal barriers that formally differentiated rape 
from other crimes. Spurred on by feminists, liberals, and prominent 
female politicians, courts and legislatures began to systematically 
eliminate resistance and corroboration requirements.65 Some courts 
noted explicitly how the resistance requirement reflected an inaccurate 
view of the actual psychology of rape victims and created risks of 
serious injury.66 Other states abandoned the doctrines by statute or court 
ruling.67 Eradication of the formal obstacles helped produce significant 
legal and social changes regarding rape.68 
As a legal matter, eliminating the prosecution obstacles put stranger 
rapes involving force on the same footing as other violent crimes.69 The 
current law rarely permits, and modern juries rarely support, acquittal of 
a violent stranger rapist because there is no physical resistance or 
                                                     
62. See generally Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986) [hereinafter Rape]. 
63. See id. at 1090; Susan Estrich, Palm Beach Stories, 11 LAW & PHIL. 5, 11 (1992); see also 
Morrison Torrey, When Will We be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape 
Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1025 (1991) (cataloging “classic rape myths”). 
64. See Rape, supra note 62, at 1181–84. 
65. See Leigh Bienen, Rape Reform Legislation in the United States: A Look at Some Practical 
Effects, 8 VICTIMOLOGY 139, 139 (1983) (“Changes in the legal definition of the crime of rape, with 
their accompanying statutes directed at limiting the admissibility of evidence regarding the prior 
sexual history of [the] victim at trial, were enacted in response to vigorous, nationally co-ordinated 
lobbying by feminists.”). See generally Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 
1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 962–68 (1998) [hereinafter Reviving Resistance] (discussing evolution 
and eventual abolition of resistance requirement, including reformers’ roles); Prompt Complaint, 
supra note 34, at 964–75 (discussing movement to abolish corroboration). 
66. See, e.g., People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 118–19 (Cal. 1986). 
67. See, e.g., Arnold v. United States, 358 A.2d 335, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (eliminating 
corroboration requirement); People v. Frye, 255 P.2d 105, 107 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953) (same). 
68. See Rape, supra note 62, at 1092, 1179 (observing that after abolition of formal requirements, 
victims of stranger rapes were treated as “real” victims). 
69. See Beverly J. Ross, Does Diversity in Legal Scholarship Make a Difference?: A Look at the 
Law of Rape, 100 DICK. L. REV. 795, 854 (1996) (noting that rape reforms primarily benefited 
“victims of stranger rapes”). 
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corroboration.70 Consent is seldom used to excuse a stranger rape, the 
preferred defense being mistaken identity.71 As a social and political 
matter, feminist efforts to recast stranger rape as a crime rather than a 
manifestation of legitimate (white) male privilege likely played a part in 
the profound shift of public opinion on sexual assault issues.72 Today, 
stranger rapes are considered paradigmatic crimes perpetrated by 
monstrous criminals.73 Politicians and the media championed a string of 
legal innovations to incapacitate, separate, and express society’s moral 
outrage at sex offenders.74 Early feminist and legal efforts thus 
“succeeded” at bringing the strong arm of the government down on 
“true” rapists. 
B. Realist Rape Reforms Address De Facto Sexism in Rape Trials 
While eliminating formal legal barriers to prosecution and publicizing 
the violent nature of rape did much to shape society’s condemnation of 
paradigmatic rape, it did less to advance the cause of “nonparadigmatic” 
victims—victims of rapes without physical injuries, victims acquainted 
with defendants, and victims in sexual professions.75 This is because 
                                                     
70. See supra note 68 and infra note 71. 
71. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 15, at 1272 n.487 (asserting that the usual defense to 
stranger rape is misidentification). 
72. See infra note 334 (discussing link between feminism and victims’ rights movement). 
73. See Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence in Rape 
Trials, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 663, 679 (1998) [hereinafter No Bad Men] (“[S]tranger rapes are 
perceived to be prototypical . . . .”); Pillsbury, supra note 57, at 865 (“The traditional paradigm of 
rape remains that of the stranger attack, of a man lurking in the dark . . . who grabs an unsuspecting 
female, takes her to a remote location, and violently attacks her.”). 
74. One undeniable face of rape reform is the series of laws subjecting sex offenders to 
registration requirements, residency restrictions, and civil commitment. All U.S. states have enacted 
sex offender registration statutes. See People v. Ross, 646 N.Y.S.2d 249, 250 n.1 (1996) (listing 
registration statutes). Many have instituted residency and work restrictions. See ALA. CODE § 15-
20-26 (2000) (prohibiting sex offenders from living or working within 2000 feet of school or 
childcare facility); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2009) (prohibiting sex offenders from residing within 
1000 feet of childcare facility, school, or area where minors congregate); OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 590 
(2003) (prohibiting sex offenders from residing within 2000 feet of educational institutions). One 
commentator notes, “In the Miami area, such laws ban [sex offenders] from living within 2,500 feet 
of schools, playgrounds and other places where children might gather. The tiny bridge encampment 
[under a causeway], home to between 15 and 30 men on any given night, is one of the few places in 
the booming metropolis the paroled offenders can legally live.” Jim Loney, Nowhere to Go, Miami 
Sex Offenders Live Under Bridge, REUTERS, Feb. 5, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/domesticNews/idUSN0515234320080205. The Supreme Court upheld indefinite civil 
commitment of sexually violent offenders in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997). 
75. Even reform laws do not completely address these issues. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 41 
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such complainants face largely de facto obstacles to prosecution created 
by lingering sexist norms.76 Although in modern times even an unchaste 
woman or vindictive shrew will be believed if raped by a stranger or 
terribly injured, rape myths still profoundly influence nonparadigmatic 
rape trials.77 People continue to believe that women who dress and 
behave in sexual ways deserve to be raped.78 Today, respected media 
commentators show no hesitation in slinging bafflingly sexist attacks at 
high profile rape complainants: Kobe Bryant’s accuser was no more than 
a “mountain trash slut,”79 and the Duke complainant just a lying “crypto-
                                                     
M.J. 890, 894 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1995) (holding evidence of prior prostitution relevant); Casey v. 
State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (noting that trial court allowed defense to 
“focus[] upon [complainant’s] purportedly low moral character as a stripper”); see infra notes 364–
68 and accompanying text. 
76. See FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 60, at 5 (noting that rape is “as allowed de facto as [it 
is] prohibited de jure”); VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 204 (1986) 
(maintaining that jurors incorporate public’s rape myths). 
77. Andrew E. Taslitz, Forgetting Freud: The Courts’ Fear of the Subconscious in Date Rape 
(and Other) Cases, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 145, 155 (2007) [hereinafter Forgetting Freud] (“[E]ven 
the most well-meaning, ‘feminist’ jurors may find that they have reasonable doubt about 
the . . . rape case . . . if the tale told fits cultural stories about ‘sluttish women.’”). 
78. See KATHLEEN A. BOGLE, HOOKING UP: SEX, DATING, AND RELATIONSHIPS ON CAMPUS 109 
(2008) (performing a qualitative study of sexual behavior on college campuses and finding that men 
labeled seductively-dressed women “easy” or “stupid”); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Writing and Reading 
About Rape: A Primer, 66 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 979, 995 n.58 (1993) (citing survey in which thirty-
eight percent of men and thirty-seven percent of women indicated a seductively dressed woman is 
partly responsible for rape); Mark A. Whately, Victim Characteristics Influencing Attributions of 
Responsibility to Rape Victims: A Meta-Analysis, 1 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 81, 91 (1996) 
(discussing studies in which respondents assigned more blame to provocatively dressed victims). 
79. Conservative radio commentator Michael Savage informed his approximately six million 
listeners that Kobe Bryant’s accuser was a “19-year-old mountain trash slut,” and forbade his callers 
to refer to her as anything other than “the Rocky Mountain Trash.” Andrew Billen, The Savage 
Voice of an Angry America, TIMES (London), Sept. 2, 2003, at 14, available at http:// 
www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/article1154449.ece. Kobe Bryant, a famous basketball 
player for the Los Angeles Lakers, was accused of rape by the front desk clerk at his Colorado 
hotel. Bryant at first denied the sexual encounter, but admitted to consensual sex when police 
requested blood and semen samples. Kirk Johnson, As Accuser Balks, Prosecutors Drop Bryant 
Rape Case, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2004, at A18. During the pretrial phase of proceedings, there were 
a number of leaks of confidential material, including Bryant’s police interview and information 
about the complainant, including her identity. The latter precipitated death threats and scathing 
internet indictments of her character. See Lauren Johnston, Kobe Accuser Reveals Identity, 
CBSNEWS, Oct. 15, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/10/05/national/main647384.shtml. 
Perhaps most damaging to the complainant, the trial judge provided to the press the transcript of a 
closed hearing in which defense experts speculated that the complainant had multiple sex partners 
during the week of the encounter and had sex with another partner after the alleged rape but before 
going to the police. Associated Press, Kobe Judge Releases Sealed Transcripts, FOXNEWS.COM, 
Aug. 2, 2004, http://origin.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,127851,00.html. At that hearing, the judge 
ruled that he would admit into evidence the complainant’s prior sexual history. Id. The defense also 
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hooker.”80 Chastity ideals persist even in our highly sexualized Girls 
Gone Wild society.81 Co-eds still widely justify their open sexual 
                                                     
sought to introduce evidence of the complainant’s mental health history, including two prior suicide 
attempts. Id. The complainant eventually asked prosecutors to terminate the prosecution as she 
pursued a civil case. The prosecutor remarked, “The victim has informed us, after much of her own 
labored deliberation that she does not want to proceed with this trial. For this reason, and this reason 
only, the case is being dismissed.” Johnson, supra. After the dismissal, Bryant remarked, “I now 
understand how [the complainant] feels that she did not consent to this encounter.” Id. The parties 
reached a confidential settlement less than a year later. Associated Press, Suit Settlement 
Ends Bryant Saga, MSNBC, Mar. 3, 2005, http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/7019659/. 
80. The Situation with Tucker Carlson (MSNBC television broadcast Apr. 11, 2006), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12285620/ (statement of Tucker Carlson). The “Duke Lacrosse 
Case” was a widely publicized case in which one of two black women, who had been hired to strip 
at a party for the largely white, elite university’s lacrosse team, accused three undergraduate 
lacrosse players of rape. See, Susan Hanley Kosse, Race, Riches & Reporters—Do Race and Class 
Impact Media Rape Narratives? An Analysis of the Duke Lacrosse Case, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 243, 
268–72 (2007). To call the case “ugly” would be an understatement, as media vilified both the 
players as white privileged jock-thugs and the complainant as a low-class “ho.” Id. The case 
illuminated the long-simmering racial and political tensions of the area, as some area citizens 
expressed horror at reports of the team’s use of racial slurs and one team member’s email stating of 
the African American women, “i [sic] plan on killing the bitches as soon as the [sic] walk in and 
proceeding to cut their skin off while cumming in my duke issue spandex,” while others considered 
District Attorney Mike Nifong’s pursuit of the case as pandering to his African American voter 
base. Peter J. Boyer, Big Men on Campus, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 4, 2006, http:// 
www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/09/04/060904fa_fact?currentPage=all. During the course of the 
investigation, Nifong recused himself from the case amidst charges of ethics violations. The 
prosecutor’s office eventually dropped the charges, citing the complainant’s lack of consistency in 
recounting the event, botched identification procedures, and the fact that the semen found on 
complainant did not match any of the lacrosse players. Lara Setrakian, Charges Dropped in Duke 
Lacrosse Case, ABC NEWS, Apr. 11, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/US/LegalCenter/ 
story?id=3028515&page=1. Supporters of the team saw the dismissal as not only proof that the 
three accused were innocent, but also as a total exoneration of team behavior and practices and 
confirmation that the accuser was no more than a lying loose woman. See Liza Porteus, North 
Carolina Attorney General: Duke Lacrosse Players Victims of ‘Tragic Rush to Accuse,’ 
FOXNEWS.COM, April 12, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,265481,00.html (quoting 
former coach as stating that he was proud of team and that they deserved an apology). In an unusual 
development, Nifong was found guilty of ethics violations and disbarred. Staff, Nifong Faces 
Contempt Charge, THE NEWS & OBSERVER.COM, Jul 26, 2007, http://www.newsobserver.com/ 
news/crime_safety/story/68441.html. The accused men, who have since graduated from Duke 
University, have filed numerous state and federal claims against the University, city, police, and 
now-bankrupt Nifong. Associated Press, Nifong Reports to Jail; Exonerated Duke Lacrosse Players 
Seek $30 Million Settlement, FOXNEWS.COM, Sept. 7, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/ 
0,2933,296017,00.html. 
81. See supra text accompanying note 40. The Girls Gone Wild phenomenon is not one of sexual 
agency, but rather one of women reinforcing the sex object caricature in exchange for the fleeting 
benefits of momentary fame, attention, and popularity. One seventeen-year-old who wanted to 
spend her first moments as an adult disrobing for Girls Gone Wild explained, “You want people to 
say, ‘Hey, I saw you.’ Everybody wants to be famous in some way. Getting famous will get me 
anything I want. If I walk into somebody’s house and said, ‘Give me this,’ I could have it.” 
Hoffman, supra note 40, at 40. A twenty-one-year-old “girl gone wild” observed, “Anybody enjoys 
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communication or activity by overconsumption of alcohol that induced 
them to act in a manner inconsistent with gender paradigms.82 
In addition, the vindictive shrew myth continues to pervade 
nonparadigmatic rape trials, leading jurors to require evidence of 
corroboration despite elimination of the formal requirement.83 Some 
contend that the belief that women lie about rape is no more than a 
“Bayesian” conclusion based on empirical evidence, and is not a product 
of sexism.84 Nonetheless, the statistics on false rape accusation widely 
vary85 and “[a]s a scientific matter, the frequency of false rape 
                                                     
the attention. T-shirts, hats—we got all the accessories. If you do it, you do it. You can’t complain 
later. It’s almost like your 15 minutes of fame.” Id. 
82. The popular claim, “I was so drunk—I acted totally unlike myself,” is scrutinized on many 
college student web forums. “The Student Room” proclaims itself “the UK’s largest and fastest 
growing student community.” TheStudentRoom.co.uk, About Us, http://www.thestudentroom.co.uk/ 
wiki/About_TSR (last visited Sept. 18, 2009). One Student Room poster poses the question, “Is ‘I 
was so drunk’ an acceptable excuse for slutty behavior?” Posting of “Toomanymanz” to 
http://www.thestudentroom.co.uk/showthread.php?t=946635 (June 17, 2009, 21:56) (last visited 
Sept. 18, 2009). Of course, the very framing of the question suggests the position that sexual 
behavior is condemnable. In any case, the answers range between indicating “yes” and stating that 
drunkenness should not be an excuse for “bad” behavior. One poster states, “If you’re slutty when 
drunk it means that deep down you’re a slut, no matter how nice you are sober.” Posting of 
“Jelephant” to http://www.thestudentroom.co.uk/showthread.php?t=946635 (June 17, 2009, 22:09). 
However, quite a few posters also maintain that women should not have to excuse sexual behavior. 
Id. (other postings on the same page of the website). Another website, “College Candy,” hosts a 
similar discussion entitled “Being Drunk Makes Everything OK.” College Candy, Being Drunk 
Makes Everything Okay, http://collegecandy.com/2009/06/13/being-drunk-makes-everything-ok/ 
(last visited Sept. 18, 2009). One poster, “Courtney,” opines, “People who use alcohol as an excuse 
are just plain stupid. Grow up. The alcohol doesn’t make you do anything, it is your terrible morals 
and slutty ways which make you a vile piece of filth.” Posting of “Courtney” to 
http://collegecandy.com/2009/06/13/being-drunk-makes-everything-ok/ (June 13, 2009). 
83. CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM, supra note 51, at 7 (maintaining that despite elimination of 
requirement, juries still demand corroboration); see also Klein, supra note 35, at 1049 (noting that 
jurors want more than victim’s word). 
84. See, e.g., Edward Greer, The Truth Behind Legal Dominance Feminism’s “Two Percent False 
Rape Claim” Figure, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 947, 948–49 (2000) (arguing that rape reform agenda 
might be reasonable if false reporting were rare, but because it is frequent, feminist rape efforts “are 
truly destructive”). Bayesian theory posits that conditional probabilities can be calculated 
mathematically. See James Joyce, Bayes’ Theorem, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2003), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bayes-theorem/#3. I use 
“Bayesian” as a description of the “logic” that, for example, fear of African Americans is a 
necessary and non-racist consequence of probabilistic reasoning about blacks and crime. Jody D. 
Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary 
Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 790–91 (1994). 
85. Reports range from finding false rape claims to be surprisingly rare to astoundingly frequent. 
Compare BROWNMILLER, supra note 50, at 387 (noting that only two percent of rape claims are 
false), with Eugene J. Kanin, False Rape Allegations, 23 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 81, 84 (1994) 
(reporting study of small town in which forty-one percent of “disposed” rape cases involved victim 
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complaints to police or other legal authorities remains unknown.”86 
Continued adherence to the shrew myth is bolstered by the media 
publicizing cases of false reporting, in which accused date rapists play 
the role of folk heroes—innocent boys tragically charged by vindictive 
women.87 Today, typing “false rape accusations” into Google will 
produce far more articles with headlines screaming that false reporting is 
an “alarming national trend” than articles targeted toward dispelling the 
myth.88 
                                                     
recantation). The FBI reported in 1997 that eight percent of rapes were “unfounded.” FED. BUREAU 
OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 26 (1997), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/Cius_97/97crime/97crime.pdf [hereinafter FBI CRIME REPORT]. 1997 was 
apparently the last time the FBI reported statistics for “unfounded” rapes. See Fed. Bureau of 
Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2009). 
“Unfounded” does not mean “false,” but only that police decided the case was not pursuable, a 
decision that itself could be influenced by gender stereotypes. See Prompt Complaint, supra note 
34, at 985–86 (“[P]olice may think a rape claim is false or unfounded if the victim had a prior 
relationship with the attacker, used drugs or alcohol at the time of the attack, lacked visible signs of 
injury, delayed notifying police, did not have a rape exam, blames herself for the rape, or did not 
immediately conceive of the assault as a rape.”). 
86. Prompt Complaint, supra note 34, at 986. Tellingly, there are few, if any, reports comparing 
rape recantation rates with recantation rates in similar non-rape cases. See, e.g., FBI CRIME REPORT, 
supra note 85, at 26 (reporting only “unfounded” rate for rape cases). 
87. During Kobe Bryant’s trial, the courthouse parking lot boasted “cars festooned with balloons 
of Lakers’ purple and gold. Fans wore Kobe jerseys and cheered his name as he stepped out of a 
sport utility vehicle to enter the courthouse.” Tim Dahlberg, Kobe Leads in Court of Public 
Opinion, NBCSPORTS, Aug. 7, 2003, http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/3074434/print/1/displaymode/ 
1098/. Even scholars indulge in such characterizations. See, e.g., Dan Subotnik, Copulemus in Pace: 
A Meditation on Rape, Affirmative Consent to Sex, and Sexual Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 847, 
848 (2008) (“I never want to see a man’s life devastated through a bad rap from some vindictive 
woman.”). Consider one incident at the College of William & Mary in 2006, where a female student 
reported she was raped during a sorority party. Richael Faithful, Assault Gets Even Uglier, CAMPUS 
PROGRESS, Oct. 10, 2006, http://www.campusprogress.org/features/1210/assault-gets-even-uglier/ 
index.php. The prosecutor declined to pursue the case for insufficient evidence, although the school 
found the male guilty of sexual misconduct in disciplinary proceedings. Id. After his expulsion, 
anonymous flyers went up all over campus addressed to the victim stating, “I know what you did 
last semester” and urging her to tell the “truth.” Id. In response to student feminists’ call to wear red 
in support of sexual abuse survivors, a student publication urged students to wear blue in support of 
“truth.” Id. The student publication sided with the man, posted personal details about the woman 
online, including her home address, and put up flyers announcing “Rape Case Blown Open.” Id.; 
see also Andrew Petkofsky, At W&M, Some Say Too Much Detail, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, 
Feb. 19, 2006, at B1; Letters to the Editor, THE FLAT HAT ONLINE (February 24, 2006), 
http://flathat.wm.edu/2006-02-24/story.php?type=2&aid=15 (last visited Sept. 2, 2009) (on file with 
author). 
88. The first several hits on a Google search for the keywords, “false rape accusation” performed 
in September 2009, included “FOXNews.com - False Rape Accusations May Be More Common 
Than Thought”; “GlennSacks.com [-] Research Shows False Accusations of Rape Common”; 
“Ananda Answers - An alarming national trend – False Rape Allegations”; and “Salon Newsreal [-] 
Who says women never lie about rape?” No websites on the first page involved establishing false 
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Feminists recognized that nonparadigmatic rapes were 
underreported89 and underpunished90 because the date rape trial had 
become known as a locus of victim trauma and embarrassment,91 more 
concerned with reinforcing myths than determining consent or force.92 
Moreover, prevalent stereotypes affected judges’ management of cases 
and caused juries to unfairly acquit either because they mistakenly 
concluded there was consent or believed the victim deserved it.93 As a 
consequence, feminists advocated changes in the rape law that would 
reflect the reality of stereotyping and subtle sexism, despite the apparent 
achievement of formal equality.94 
                                                     
rape reporting as a myth. One website went as far as saying, “False allegations [of rape] are the 
feminists’ ‘Silver Bullet,’ making feminism, an abomination before God, responsible directly for 
most of our excess prison population.” The Christian Party, One Third of the World’s Prison 
Population, http://www.christianparty.net/prison.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2009). 
89. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 10–15 (1987) [hereinafter REAL RAPE]; SHANNON M. 
CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2004, 10 (2005), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/cv04.htm (stating only thirty-six percent of sexual assaults are 
reported to police); Lita Furby, Mark R. Weinrott & Lyn Blackshaw, Sex Offender Recidivism: A 
Review, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 27 (1989) (stating fewer than ten percent are reported); Paul 
Marcus & Tara L. McMahon, Limiting Disclosure of Rape Victims’ Identities, 64 S. CAL L. REV. 
1020, 1049–50 (1991) (“[R]ape remains the most underreported crime within the criminal justice 
system.”); Tracy Wilkinson, Violence Against Women Pervasive, Panel Told, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 
1990, at B4 (discussing Los Angeles study finding that only three percent report rape or attempted 
rape). 
90. See, e.g., GARY LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
SEXUAL ASSAULT 61 (1989) (finding that 11.8% of rape reports resulted in conviction); Deborah 
Fineblum Raub, Sure, People are Aware of Rape, Especially Now. But . . ., ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT 
& CHRON., Apr. 15, 1999, at 1C (citing 1993 finding that two percent of reported rapes result in 
conviction). 
91. See Rape, supra note 62, at 1094 (arguing that rape cases put victim on trial); see also 
SEDELLE KATZ & MARY ANN MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VICTIM: A SYNTHESIS OF 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 198–99 (1979) (discussing trauma of trial for rape victim). See generally 
VERNON R. WIEHE & ANN L. RICHARDS, INTIMATE BETRAYAL: UNDERSTANDING AND 
RESPONDING TO THE TRAUMA OF ACQUAINTANCE RAPE 32 (1995). 
92. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Holtzman) (“Since rape trials 
become inquisitions into the victim’s morality, not trials of the defendant’s innocence or guilt, it is 
not surprising that it is the least reported crime.”); Megan Reidy, The Impact of Media Coverage on 
Rape Shield Laws in High-Profile Cases: Is the Victim Receiving a “Fair Trial”?, 54 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 297, 299 (2004) (asserting that “defense attorneys, in an effort to exonerate their clients, 
challenge rape victims’ testimony and credibility through an attack on the victims’ sexuality”). 
93. See Kim Lane Scheppele, The Re-Vision of Rape Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1095, 1104–13 
(1987) (reviewing SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE: HOW THE LEGAL SYSTEM VICTIMIZES WOMEN 
WHO SAY NO (1987)) (discussing judges’ construction of facts in light of rape myths); see also 
Rape, supra note 62, at 1177–79 (discussing juries’ focus on acquaintance of victim to defendant, 
corroboration, and victim precipitation). 
94. See Klein, supra note 35, at 985 (distinguishing between reforms eliminating “barriers to 
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Reformers pushed for transformation in two main areas of the law: 
evidentiary prohibitions (shield laws) and actus reus standards. These 
laws are well covered in the legal literature, so an extended discussion is 
not necessary here.95 Generally, rape shield laws create specific rules 
prohibiting the defense from presenting evidence of complainants’ past 
sexual conduct or “precipitation” evidence, like dress,96 but most laws 
contain significant exceptions.97 Reformers argued that shield laws 
would not only lessen victim discomfort,98 but also prevent juror sexism 
from influencing verdicts.99 They contended that without shield laws, 
                                                     
conviction” and those addressing “jury prejudice”); Special Issues, supra note 27, at 1599 (“[R]ape 
shield counteracts unfair prejudice arising from . . . sexist conclusions based on the woman’s 
activities, dress, or sexual history.”). 
95. See generally Chastity Requirement, supra note 22; Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims 
in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 794–98 
(1986); John Lausch, Stephens v. Miller: The Need to Shield Rape Victims, Defend Accused 
Offenders, and Define a Workable Constitutional Standard, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 346, 348 (1995) 
(discussing rape shield laws); Frank Tuerkheimer, A Reassessment and Redefinition of Rape Shield 
Laws, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1245, 1246 (1989). See also, e.g., UNWANTED SEX, supra note 6; David P. 
Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 409 (2000) (affirmative consent laws); Joshua 
Dressler, Where We Have Been, and Where We Might Be Going: Some Cautionary Reflections on 
Rape Law Reform, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 409, 427 (1998); Kenneth W. Simons, The Conceptual 
Structure of Consent in Criminal Law, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 577, 589 (2006). 
96. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412(a) (excluding evidence that victim “engaged in other sexual 
behavior” and evidence of “victim’s sexual predisposition”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 21B 
(1983) (prohibiting “[e]vidence of the reputation of a victim’s sexual conduct” and “[e]vidence of 
specific instances of a victim’s sexual conduct”). See also, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(c)(1) 
(West Supp. 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022 (West 2000); KY. R. EVID. 412 (West 2001); ME. R. 
EVID. 412 (West 2000); MD. CODE ANN., ART. 27, § 461A (LexisNexis 2000) (current version at 
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-319 (West 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21B (West 
2000); MO. ANN. STAT. § 491.015 (West 1996); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 2004); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8C-4 (1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2412 (West Supp. 2000); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-67.7 (1996) (rape shield statutes). See 
generally Chastity Requirement, supra note 22, at 81–86 (describing and categorizing rape shield 
statutes). 
97. For example, most shield laws permit the introduction of past sexual conduct evidence 
relevant to identity. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-37-4-4 (1981) (allowing admission of sexual conduct 
evidence showing “some person other than the defendant committed the act”). Many also 
incorporate catch-all provisions that allow the introduction of otherwise prohibited evidence 
whenever a judge deems it highly corroborative of consent. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-
86F (West 1994); D.C. CODE § 22-3022 (2001); HAW. R. EVID.412 (LexisNexis 2000); 725 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-7 (West Supp. 2000); IOWA CT. R. 412 (West 2001); MISS. R. EVID. 412 
(West 2000); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 1992); N.D. R. EVID. 412 (West 2001); 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.210 (Supp. 1996–1998); TENN. R. EVID. 412 (West 2000); TEX. R. EVID. 
412 (West 2001); UTAH R. EVID. 412 (Lexis 2000). 
98. See Special Issues, supra note 27, at 1599 (noting that rape shield sought to “spar[e] women 
humiliation and trauma”). 
99. See Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold 
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jurors would acquit because of distaste for the victim’s lifestyle, the 
belief that her behavior entitled the defendant to sex,100 or a mistaken 
perception that past consent implies present consent.101 
The second major reform involved reconstituting actus reus standards 
for the crime of rape.102 Reformers courted significant controversy by 
seeking to reorient the trial from a focus on whether there was force or 
consent103 to the question of the victim’s language (whether she said 
“no” or “yes”).104 Without such reforms, jurors are free to choose what 
                                                     
Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1889 n.191 (1998) (maintaining that shield 
laws “promote accurate decisionmaking”). 
100. See Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape Law, 
110 Harv. L. Rev. 563, 589 (1997) [hereinafter Motivational Evidence] (“[W]hen the law says rape, 
many juries don’t care.”); Special Issues, supra note 27, at 1599 (contending that rape shield 
counters “the rape myth that the victim ‘asked’ to be raped”). 
101. See Galvin, supra note 95, at 799 (“[T]he mere fact that the complainant has previously 
engaged in consensual sexual activity affords no basis for inferring consent on a later occasion.”). 
But see Aya Gruber, Pink Elephants in the Rape Trial: The Problem of Tort-Type Defenses in the 
Criminal Law of Rape, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 203, 234 (1997) [hereinafter Pink 
Elephants] (arguing that it should be up to juries to “hear the evidence and arguments and decide 
what weight to give the evidence and which inferences to draw”). 
102. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(a)(1) (1997) (prohibiting nonconsensual 
intercourse); id. 13, § 3251(3) (1998) (defining consent as “words or actions by a person indicating 
a voluntary agreement to engage in a sexual act”); In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992) 
(redefining forcible rape as sexual intercourse without affirmative consent). See generally Stephen 
J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2151, 2180–84 (1995) 
[hereinafter Feminist Challenge] (advocating affirmative consent). 
103. Feminists criticized rape laws that only prohibited forcible sex as permitting rape whenever 
the rapist used psychological force, implied force, subtle coercive tactics, or relied on his size and 
demeanor as inducement. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Titus, 556 A.2d 425 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) 
(reversing conviction of defendant who psychologically coerced thirteen-year-old daughter into sex 
because of lack of physical force). As a result of reform efforts, many jurisdictions moved from an 
external force to a nonconsent standard, either through revisions of criminal codes, see, e.g., 
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410(a) (1996) (defining sexual assault as “sexual penetration with another 
person without consent”), or changes in judicial interpretation of “force,” see, e.g., In re M.T.S., 609 
A.2d at 1270 (arguing for interpretation of “force” as nonconsensual touching and noting “[c]urrent 
judicial practice” of defining “physical force” as “any degree of physical power or strength”) 
(internal quotations omitted). See Robin Charlow, Bad Acts in Search of a Mens Rea: Anatomy of a 
Rape, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 272–76 (2002) (observing possibility of interpreting force statute 
as prohibiting nonconsensual sex). 
104. See REAL RAPE, supra note 89, at 102 (“‘Consent’ should be defined so that no means no.”); 
Feminist Challenge, supra note 102, at 2181 (1995) (arguing that consent should mean “affirmative 
permission clearly signaled”); see, e.g., In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1266. Of course, affirmative 
consent laws have garnered considerable criticism. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 35, at 1015 
(contending that affirmative consent laws “go against the very core of our concept of criminal 
responsibility”). In response to a change in British law, George McAuley, chairman of the UK 
Men’s Movement, stated, “It means men will have to get a consent form signed, dated and 
countersigned in triplicate before they make love. This legislation is deliberately designed to put 
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kinds and amounts of evidence support an inference of consent or 
nonconsent.105 Reformers pushed for actus reus formulations that would 
reduce juror ability to focus on irrelevant and prejudicial evidence as 
part of the consent inquiry.106 According to feminists, defining rape as 
sex in the absence of affirmative consent107 produces two benefits. First, 
it defines consent as communication, thereby eliminating jurors’ ability 
to consider precipitating or past sexual conduct.108 Second, it places the 
burden of communication properly on the person desiring the sex.109 
In addition to encouraging reporting and producing more accurate 
verdicts, feminists hoped that realist reforms, like earlier reforms, would 
affect social attitudes about sex and rape. They would send the general 
message that nonparadigmatic rape is a “real” crime that the state should 
take seriously.110 Reformers expected the criminal law to shape a new 
culture valuing female sexual agency and counseling restraint and 
respect in sexual relationships.111 Part IV will analyze whether realist 
reforms have fostered social change and produced net utility for rape 
victims. First, however, it is important to contextualize any norming 
                                                     
more men behind bars.” Kristy Walker, Sex With a Woman Who is Drunk May Soon Be Rape, 
DAILY MAIL ONLINE, June 17, 2007, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-462614/Sex-woman-
drunk-soon-rape.html. 
105. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding verbal 
protestations not dispositive). 
106. Milder reforms created a presumption of nonconsent whenever the victim expressed a “no.” 
See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-17 (2003) (establishing “No Means No” law); United States v. 
Carr, 18 M.J. 297, 302 (C.M.A. 1984) (disallowing reasonable mistake of consent defense when 
victim said “no”); Commonwealth v. Lefkowitz, 481 N.E.2d 227, 232 n.1 (Mass. App. 1985) 
(Brown, J., concurring) (“‘No’ must be understood to mean precisely that.”); see also Donald 
Dripps, After Rape Law: Will the Turn to Consent Normalize the Prosecution of Sexual Assault?, 41 
AKRON L. REV. 957, 976 (2008) [hereinafter After Rape Law] (noting possibility of “statute that 
punishes sex in the face of expressed refusal”). While such reforms did not succeed in shifting the 
burden of communication to the person desiring sex (versus the person opposed), they prevented 
jurors from engaging in “no means yes” analysis. See Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 
11 LAW & PHIL. 127, 141 (1992) (contending that “the ‘no means yes’ discounting of women’s 
expressed interest has been with us for some time”). 
107. See UNWANTED SEX, supra note 6, at 271 (asserting that only “clearly communicated” 
permission “should ever count as consent”); Feminist Challenge, supra note 102, at 2181. 
108. See In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1274 (characterizing affirmative consent as response to old 
law that put victim on trial). 
109. See UNWANTED SEX, supra note 6, at 271; Feminist Challenge, supra note 102, at 2181 
(analogizing person who desires sex to surgeon who must get permission before bodily invasion). 
110. See REAL RAPE, supra note 89, at 104 (proposing realist reforms “to announce to society 
that these actions are not to be done and to secure that fewer of them are done” (quoting H.L.A. 
HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 6 (1968))). 
111. See infra note 344 and accompanying text. 
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potential of rape reform by weighing it against collateral problems 
created by utilizing criminal law. The following two Parts thus critically 
assess feminist reformers’ collective choice to engage criminal law as 
the primary mechanism for achieving social change in the area of sexual 
assault. 
II. EXISTING FEMINIST CRITIQUES OF CRIMINAL RAPE LAW 
As the rape reform movement started to garner political power and 
effect legal change, self-reflecting feminists began to note the many 
tensions between criminalization strategies and feminism’s general goals 
of ending women’s subordination, dismantling hierarchy, and seeking 
distributive fairness.112 As a result, feminist unity against sexualized 
                                                     
112. Of course, there are a variety of feminist theories, which often prescribe different means for 
addressing gender inequality. Thus “liberal feminism,” see supra notes 2, 57–58 and accompanying 
text, is philosophically distinct from “dominance feminism,” see supra notes 58–60 and 
accompanying text, and the theories are sometimes described as conflicting. Compare infra note 
129 and accompanying text (describing liberal feminism) with infra notes 131–32 and 
accompanying text (discussing dominance feminism). There is also a third identifiable school 
termed “cultural feminism,” associated with the scholarship of Carol Gilligan and Robin West, 
which advocates legal responsiveness to women’s unique voices, characteristics, and values. See, 
e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 13 (1988) [hereinafter Jurisprudence and Gender]; see Bridget J. Crawford, 
Toward a Third-Wave Feminist Legal Theory: Young Women, Pornography and the Praxis of 
Pleasure, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 99 (2007) (describing schools of feminism); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Feminism and Legal Theory, 101 HARV. L. REV. 826, 827 (1988) (discussing the “basic” strands of 
feminism). There are also feminist theories that critique the limitations of these prominent second 
wave philosophies. For example, women of color scholars have developed critical race feminist 
perspectives that question mainstream feminism’s essentialism and marginalization of women of 
color. See, e.g., Race and Essentialism, supra note 25. Post-feminists, sex-positive feminists, and 
queer theorists critique mainstream feminism’s bipolar construction of gender, assumptions about 
“female” views of sexuality, and diminution of lesbian issues. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER 
TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990); JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: 
HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM (2006) [hereinafter SPLIT DECISIONS]; Ian 
Halley, Queer Theory by Men, 11 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 7, 17 (2004) [hereinafter Queer 
Theory by Men]. 
Moreover, not all feminist theorists ascribe the same meaning to terms like “fairness” and 
“subordination.” As a consequence, I use the terms “feminism” and “feminist philosophy” in the 
loosest sense to describe the values and first principles upon which many feminists converge. These 
principles include securing women’s autonomy, eliminating unfair economic distributions between 
men and women, diminishing gender stereotypes, elevating women’s social status, and countering 
unjust private and public infringements on female liberty and bodily integrity. See Kellye Y. Testy, 
Capitalism and Freedom—for Whom?: Feminist Legal Theory and Progressive Corporate Law, 67 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 94 (2004) (asserting that “what unifies feminist legal thought is that it 
centers on an analysis of the use and distribution of power, seeking to articulate both a normative 
vision of equality and human flourishing for society as well as a critique of structures of 
subordination, particularly for women, that impede those values”); cf. JUDITH GRANT, 
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violence has not led to homogeneous support of criminal rape laws. 
Rather, the variety of critical assessments of rape law from within 
feminist scholarship exemplifies the richness of feminist theory. In the 
past several years, more and more feminist theorists have begun to decry 
that “feminism has become identified with state-allied regulatory power 
over sexuality.”113 Some, like me, denounce the “subsumption of the 
feminist movement into the state’s goal of managing undesirables.”114 
Post-feminist scholar Janet Halley adopts a critical approach to the 
development of a phenomenon she calls “governance feminism.”115 
Governance feminism refers generally to the “quite noticeable 
installation of feminists and feminist ideas in actual legal-institutional 
power,” which often manifests as a substantive project that “emphasizes 
criminal enforcement” and “speaks the language of total prohibition.”116 
For progressives like feminists, there is always a certain feeling of 
discomfort when a subordinated group turns to state police power to 
achieve equality.117 American criminal law historically enforced and 
entrenched racial, gender, and socio-economic hierarchies,118 such that 
criticizing and dismantling oppressive criminal laws has been a central 
facet of many antisubordination agendas.119 As a result, there is little 
                                                     
FUNDAMENTAL FEMINISM: CONTESTING THE CORE CONCEPTS OF FEMINIST THEORY 51–53 (1993) 
(observing that Marxist feminists and radical (dominance) feminists may view the cause of 
patriarchal oppression differently, material resource limitation versus lived status inequality, but 
converge on the core concept of the oppressive patriarchy). See also infra note 234 and 
accompanying text (noting feminism’s commitment to fair distribution). 
113. Judith Butler, Against Proper Objects, in FEMINISM MEETS QUEER THEORY 14 (Weed & 
Schor, eds. 1997). 
114. Feminist War, supra note 17, at 825. 
115. Janet Halley et. al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to 
Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance 
Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335, 340–42 (2006) [hereinafter International Responses to 
Rape]. 
116. See id. at 340–41. 
117. Historically, women’s groups have been vocal opponents of criminal prosecution, being the 
ill-fated subjects of morality-policing and legal restraints on bodily integrity. See Naomi Cahn, 
Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the Dilemmas of Criminalization, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 817 
(2000) (discussing how criminal laws limited women’s control over their bodies); see also Elizabeth 
Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women’s Movement, 61 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 589, 637 (1986) (describing feminist efforts in 1970s to counter abortion 
criminalization and articulate abortion rights as a fundamental principle of liberty). 
118. See supra notes 23–32 and accompanying text (asserting that rape law entrenched racial and 
gender hierarchies). 
119. Cf. Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223 (2007) (more 
generally advocating selective decriminalization and the streamlining of criminal codes as the 
solution to problems associated with criminalization). 
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controversy among progressives when minority groups fight against 
laws that criminalize miscegenation,120 prohibit gay sexual relations,121 
or make immigrants perpetual criminals.122 
The issue becomes far more complicated, however, when minority 
groups call for reforms to remedy, not the overenforcement of criminal 
laws against minority defendants, but the underenforcement of criminal 
laws involving minority victims.123 Certain scholars of color, notably 
Professor Randall Kennedy, highlight how systemic underenforcement 
of criminal law is a form of oppression. Kennedy asserts that “the 
principal injury suffered by African Americans in relation to criminal 
matters is not overenforcement but underenforcement . . . .”124 However, 
while increased policing of crimes against minorities may achieve a state 
closer to formal equality for victims, there is a real question of whether it 
furthers the group’s empowerment overall.125 Many regard the decision 
to seek group justice through increased criminal penalties as conflicting 
both philosophically and practically with the goal of 
antisubordination.126 
                                                     
120. See Rachel H. Moran, Loving and the Legacy of Unintended Consequences, 2007 WIS. L. 
REV. 239, 262 (noting that for “racial reformers,” the Loving v. Virginia decision, which struck 
down criminal law banning interracial marriage, “represents the dismantling of the final and most 
resistant feature of Jim Crow”). 
121. Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1137 (2004) (contending that 
“for lesbians and gay men,” the Lawrence v. Texas decision, which struck down anti-sodomy 
criminal law, “is a breakthrough”). 
122. See Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and “Aliens”: Privacy Expectations and the Immigration Raids, 
41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081, 1087 (2008) (objecting to “the proliferation of local anti-immigrant 
ordinances that make it illegal for undocumented immigrants to loiter in public spaces, occupy 
housing, procure employment, or conduct business transactions”). 
123. Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1717 (2006) 
(observing that “scholarly concerns with systemic unfairness . . . tend to revolve around the criminal 
system’s harshness and overextensions, not its laxity”). 
124. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 19 (1997). Some maintain that law 
reform is the answer—that the best solution to the dilemma of under-policing and over-policing of 
crime involving African Americans is “to infuse criminal enforcement with a dose of self-conscious 
egalitarianism.” William J. Stuntz, Essay, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1801 
(1998). This assumes, however, that there is a real possibility of achieving such egalitarianism and 
that such efforts will not serve to legitimate the flawed system. 
125. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African 
American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1280 (2004) (stating that Randall Kennedy’s 
position fails to account adequately for effects of increased criminalization on black communities). 
See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal Justice and Black Families: The Collateral Damage of 
Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1005, 1007 (2001). 
126. Sally Kohn, Greasing the Wheel: How the Criminal Justice System Hurts Gay, Lesbian, 
Bisexual and Transgendered People and Why Hate Crime Laws Won’t Save Them, 27 N.Y.U. REV. 
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Thus, feminists who instinctually see their role as fighting against the 
state and its maintenance of patriarchy lament that feminism is now 
publicly and politically associated with gender crime control.127 Because 
feminist critiques of gender crime enforcement are still emerging,128 the 
various positions are not as clearly delineated as other positions of intra-
feminist debate—for example, the tension between liberal and 
dominance feminism on the role of rights discourse.129 As a 
consequence, the feminist critiques of rape reform must be culled from 
bits and pieces of commentary in the feminist literature. This Part 
reconstructs and analyzes four main objections to rape criminalization 
and the responses thereto. 
Despite such critiques, the trajectory of feminist rape reform 
continues toward increased punitiveness.130 One possible reason is that 
these critiques exist at a high level of abstraction and are mired in classic 
feminist dilemmas,131 such as the dilemma between treating women as 
free agents and understanding the constraints of subordination,132 as well 
as the tension between encouraging sexuality and discouraging sexual 
abuse.133 Exposing the limited efficacy of the existing critiques at 
                                                     
L. & SOC. CHANGE 257, 260 (2001) (contending that hate crime legislation “actually reinforces such 
discrimination by actively adopting legal structures premised on the concept of social hierarchy”). 
127. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 1, at 158. 
128. Recent feminist articles questioning the feminist-criminal law alliance include: Engle, supra 
note 20; Feminist War, supra note 17; International Responses to Rape, supra note 115; Jeannie 
Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2 (2006). 
129. See Rosalind Dixon, Feminist Disagreement (Comparatively) Recast, 31 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 277, 279–85 (2008) (laying out common feminist debates and observing that dominance 
feminists reject liberal feminists’ belief that equal rights can remedy gender subordination, given the 
existence of patriarchy). 
130. See Adele M. Morrison, Queering Domestic Violence to “Straighten Out” Criminal Law: 
What Might Happen when Queer Theory and Practice Meet Criminal Law’s Conventional 
Responses to Domestic Violence, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 81, 93 (2003) (noting in 
domestic violence context that “[o]nce efforts to enlist the law in the fight against domestic violence 
became successful” criminal law “essentially took over anti-domestic violence efforts”). 
131. Other reasons for feminist reformers’ continued embrace of the criminal law include: “(1) 
[T]he fact that many of such reformers are prosecutors as well as feminists and thus have already 
de-problematized the question of state power, and (2) [S]uccess is addictive.” Feminist War, supra 
note 17, at n.338. 
132. See infra notes 149–52 and accompanying text. See generally Kathryn Abrams, From 
Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 (1999) 
(critiquing application of liberal notions of autonomy to women given existence of systematic 
subordination). 
133. See infra notes 157–67 and accompanying text; see also Robin West, Desperately Seeking a 
Moralist, 29 Harv. J.L. & Gender 1, 20–30 (2006) [hereinafter Desperately Seeking] (noting 
theoretical tensions between sex-positive theorists’ critique of victimhood as stifling sexual 
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focusing feminism away from increased prosecution sets the stage for 
Part III, which articulates a new critique of feminist criminalization 
stemming from the particular political and sociological characteristics of 
the current American criminal justice system. This critique enables 
feminists to weigh the potential of criminal rape law to further gender 
equality against problems posed by criminal law, not in the abstract, but 
as a matter of the current socio-political reality. First, let us turn to the 
most salient existing feminist critiques of criminal rape reform. 
A. Criminal Rape Laws Negatively Affect Female Agency 
One common feminist concern over the feminist-police power 
alliance is that a nearly exclusive focus on the criminal system as the 
remedy for sexual assault detrimentally affects women’s agency. Some 
theorists object that rape reform’s myopic focus on women as victims 
runs counter to a thick view of female autonomy.134 The agency critique 
manifests in conservative and progressive forms. The more conservative 
strain of the agency argument is often espoused by essayists135 and men 
opposed to dominance feminism.136 It criticizes rape law for rendering 
women unable to understand their own behavior and lifestyle choices as 
preconditioning sexual abuse and for failing to equip women to engage 
in self-contained sex crime prevention.137 Conservative critics maintain 
that affirmative consent law stands at the pinnacle of paternalism 
because it assumes women are incapable of expressing their true 
desires.138 This “pull yourself up by the bootstraps” argument essentially 
                                                     
autonomy, dominance feminists’ skepticism of constructed “desire,” and liberal feminists concept 
that sex must be consensual). 
134. See Melanie Randall, Domestic Violence and the Constitutional Construction of “Ideal 
Victims”: Assaulted Women’s “Image Problems” in Law, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 107, 154 
(2004) (“We need, among other things, theoretical frameworks of violence in women’s lives which 
are more focused on women’s strengths, resilience, and resistance as a way to correct the 
pathologizing and stigmatizing discourses which construct women as damaged, helpless, and 
irrational victims . . . .”). 
135. See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 304, 305 (1995) [hereinafter Sex Wars Redux] (noting such a critique is primarily 
set forth by essayists Camille Paglia, Naomi Wolf, and Katie Roiphe and evidences “antipathy 
toward feminist activists”). 
136. See, e.g., Subotnik, supra note 87, at 848. 
137. For example, Paglia’s answer to gender based harassment is simply to “deal with it.” 
CAMILLE PAGLIA, SEX, ART AND AMERICAN CULTURE 53 (1992). See Sex Wars Redux, supra note 
135, at 330 (“Roiphe and Paglia, who cast a skeptical eye on claims of pervasive sexual domination, 
propose that women respond to instances of sexual coercion with vigorous individual resistance.”). 
138. See, e.g., KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR & FEMINISM ON CAMPUS 62 
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posits that minorities and society are harmed by minorities’ self-
perception as perpetual objects of oppression.139 It seems somewhat 
inappropriate, however, to call this conservative agency argument 
“feminist”140 because the argument seeks to downplay the pervasiveness 
of subordination and encourage women to work within the status quo. 
There is another, more progressive, feminist agency argument that 
criticizes reforms that install the criminal law as “a coercive entity” in 
women’s lives.141 Like the conservative agency argument, it criticizes 
discourse that characterizes female rape victims, not simply as 
individuals to whom something bad has happened, but as perpetually 
“ruined” women who must forever bear witness to their victimhood.142 
Moreover, critics point out that women’s general self-perception as 
constant potential victims of rape143 effectively limits the range of their 
autonomous actions.144 A socially constructed but deeply internalized 
fear of sexual crime victimhood has served to constrain women’s 
movement through the world—what we do, what we say, where we go, 
how we live—arguably to the benefit of men’s interests.145 This is what 
                                                     
(1993) (arguing that affirmative consent “proposes that women, like children, have trouble 
communicating what they want”); Subotnik, supra note 87, at 847 (critiquing affirmative consent as 
“fueled by the notion that contemporary women can’t say ‘no’”). 
139. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roadmap: Is the Marketplace Theory for Eradicating 
Discrimination a Blind Alley?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 215, 245 (1998) (criticizing view of affirmative 
action that “leave[s] people of color with little protection, requiring them to pull themselves up by 
their bootstraps, something not even white immigrants managed to accomplish unaided”). 
140. See supra note 112 (defining common feminist goals). 
141. Christine O’Connor, Domestic Violence No-Contact Orders and the Autonomy Rights of 
Victims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 937, 961 (1999). 
142. See Engle, supra note 20, at 813 (criticizing feminists who advocated treating wartime rape 
in Bosnia as genocide for portraying rape as “a fate worse than death”). 
143. See M.P. Koss, Scope, Impact, Interventions and Public Policy Response, 48 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 1062, 1062 (1993) (asserting that “uniting all women is the fear of rape”). 
144. See Roxanne Lieb et al., Sexual Predators and Social Policy, 23 CRIME & JUST. 43, 49 
(1998) (“Fear of sexual assault is an influential aspect of women’s psychology and often leads 
women to make adjustments in the kinds of activities they engage in and in their perceptions of 
situations.”). 
145. Martha Chamallas explains, “Many women believe that they can avoid rape (or at least 
lessen the odds of being raped) provided they do not ‘assume the risk.’ In this way, patriarchal 
norms about the way women should behave (particularly that women should be passive, modest, 
and under male protection) are reproduced and reenacted, even by those who claim not to embrace 
the ideology.” Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and 
Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 786 (2001). 
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some scholars term the “disciplinary” function of male abuse of 
women.146 
It is unlikely, however, that individual instances of sexual abuse are 
enough to cause women to modify their behavior out of fear of rape. 
There must be a medium that translates individual cases of rape to 
women’s general understanding of abuse as part of their existence and 
affecting their behavioral choices. The focus on criminalization and 
victimhood provides this medium.147 The characterization of sexual 
abuse as a problem of crime victimhood rather than one of gender norms 
has created a world in which “behind gated fences, bolted doors, and 
barred windows,” women voraciously consume magazines that “lure us 
with images of women’s bodies as fungible, fragmented things to be 
taken and used at will.”148 
There is, however, a real dilemma between vindicating female agency 
and recognizing conditions of subordination. On one hand, portraying 
women as incapable of communicating sexual choice or battered spouses 
as eternally damaged is not empowering to women. On the other hand, 
the discourse of victimhood publicizes that gendered crimes are wrongs 
the government has an obligation to address.149 To solve this object-
versus-agent dilemma, some modern feminists embrace a theory of 
constrained agency.150 They note that women must constantly navigate 
the space between idealized autonomous liberality and the oppressive 
conditions of subordination.151 Law must therefore simultaneously treat 
                                                     
146. See Sexy Dressing, supra note 52, at 1329–36. 
147. See Simon, Crime, Community, and Criminal Justice, supra note 8 (asserting that the 
massive American criminal system has created a governance regime that orders citizens’ life 
choices). 
148. Cheryl B. Preston, Significant Bits and Pieces: Learning from Fashion Magazines about 
Violence against Women, 9 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 72, 73 (1998) [hereinafter Fashion Magazines 
and Violence]. 
149. See Sex Wars Redux, supra note 135, at 375 (“Women may assert their divergence from 
unremitting victimization, but only at the risk of being assimilated to the autonomous subject who 
does not require, or requires considerably less, legal intervention.”); Jennifer Nedelsky, 
Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 9–10 
(1989) (proposing construction of language that reflects both individual and social aspects of 
women’s experiences). 
150. See Sex Wars Redux, supra note 135, at 354 (recognizing that “women suffer systematic 
oppression in which sexualized domination by men plays a crucial role” but noting “the possibility 
of resistance”). 
151. See Tracy Higgins, Why Feminists Can’t (or Shouldn’t) be Liberals, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1629, 1632 (2004) (recognizing that “under conditions of gender inequality, assumptions about 
choice and responsibility are not politically neutral”); see also Peter Margulies, Identity on Trial: 
Subordination, Social Science Evidence, and Criminal Defense, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 45, 139 
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women as agents capable of making meaningful decisions but also seek 
to address the context of gender subordination in which women’s 
choices are made.152 
Despite these autonomy concerns, feminists continue to pursue 
criminalization as the preferred remedy to sexual violence. One reason 
may be that the conservative strain of the agency argument has been 
most visible, making left feminists wary of anti-victimhood arguments 
generally.153 Alternatively, some feminists may believe that the benefits 
from rape and abuse criminalization outweigh any negative effects on 
agency.154 Regarding constrained agency, some feminists remain hopeful 
that the criminal law might punish rape and abuse without relegating 
women survivors to the status of objectified child-like victims.155 Thus, 
even feminists persuaded by autonomy arguments might still opt for 
criminal law solutions in the hope that the criminal law can be changed 
from within. Unfortunately, a critical analysis of the current American 
criminal system, undertaken in the next Part, will reveal that the benefits 
of rape reform do not necessarily outweigh the costs to agency, and the 
current criminal system necessarily condemns women to the status of 
either passive, damaged victim or autonomous agent responsible for 
rape.156 
                                                     
(1998) (observing that constrained agency accounts “recognize[] that subordinated groups show 
initiative and imagination, yet also recognize[] the challenges posed by subordination”). 
152. See Randall, supra note 134, at 142–43 (suggesting that law shift inquiry away from battered 
women’s constrained responses to eliminating the barriers to their ability to prosecute). 
153. See Sex Wars Redux, supra note 135, at 332 (noting “popular” agency argument has 
“conservative political valence” that can be seen as “blaming victims of sexual aggression for their 
own injuries”). 
154. Cf. Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic 
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1850 (1996) (arguing in domestic violence context that 
preventing further battering of women is more important than respecting victims’ choices). 
155. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 998–99 
(1991) (suggesting, not that feminists abandon state power, but that feminists seek ways to develop 
a right to privacy that simultaneously protects women but recognizes appropriate limits on state 
intervention). 
156. See infra notes 203–21 and accompanying text; cf. O’Connor, supra note 141, at 960 (stating 
in abuse context that “criminal intervention policies are most concerned with providing safety 
through punishment of perpetrators, and therefore are less attentive to differentiating the needs of 
individual domestic violence victims”). 
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B. Criminal Rape Laws Negatively Affect Female Sexuality 
Another critique of the criminalization of rape is that the feminist 
focus on the crime of rape has actually served to entrench moralistic 
chastity norms and foster an unhealthy female view of sex. Katherine 
Franke cautions feminists to be wary of pursuing policies that “nourish[] 
a theory of sexuality as dependency and danger at the expense of a 
withering positive theory of sexual possibility.”157 “Sex-positive” 
theorists assert that rape reformers’ emphatic insistence that women 
view sex nearly exclusively as a hazard emphasizes sexual passivity, 
decreases sexual autonomy, and has thwarted the development of 
theories of female sexuality.158 In addition, feminism’s resolute focus on 
eradicating questionable (if not all) sex as if it were a virus denies 
women sources of pleasure.159 Sexual pleasure is in many ways socially 
constructed, and women often idealize the image of a relentless sexual 
pursuer singularly attuned to her secret driving passion for sex, despite 
her ardent protestations.160 Sex-positivists are rightly concerned that an 
overcriminalization of sexual “coercion” is difficult to distinguish from 
repressive chastity norms and morality policing. 
Like agency arguments, sex-positive theories are steeped in feminist 
dilemma. Although it is true that women should not view sex as 
resolutely negative, there is a real danger that the sex-positive argument 
has potential to go further than critiquing rape laws’ effect on women’s 
sexuality and move into the realm of justifying sexual abuse. If 
feminism’s principle normative project is to counter women’s 
subordination, then it must at some level recognize that coercive, 
nonconsensual, or unpleasant sex (specifically, the type of sex that leads 
women to feel raped) is not a preferred state of affairs.161 As a 
                                                     
157. Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 181, 208 (2001). 
158. See Sex Wars Redux, supra note 135, at 311 (noting argument that “the subordination of 
pleasure to a virtually exclusive focus on identifying and preventing danger deprived women of a 
resource vital to self-understanding and resistance”). 
159. See Dixon, supra note 129, at 318–19 (“Sex-positive feminist theory points to the capacity 
of legal reforms aimed at protecting women from dangers such as rape, domestic violence, or 
inequality in the workplace to ultimately strengthen repronormative ideologies or increase the 
constraints experienced by women in their pursuit of sexual and political agency.”). 
160. See Camille Paglia, Madonna—Finally, a Real Feminist, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1990, at A39 
(asserting that “‘No’ has always been, and always will be, part of the dangerous, alluring courtship 
ritual of sex and seduction”). 
161. However, this first principle is not itself beyond question or post-modern objection. Indeed, 
consent can also reinforce and hide the operation of hierarchy. See generally William N. Eskridge, 
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consequence, feminism is simply not so relativistic as to question 
whether or not coerced sex is “bad.” Nonetheless, some argue that 
sexual coercion may be linked to pleasure in various ways.162 However, 
in a feminist normative hierarchy, the sexual pleasure generated by the 
existence of coerced sex must yield to the female-empowering benefits 
of eradicating sexual violence.163 
Some sex-positive theorists reject the normative first principle of 
women’s empowerment and substitute a different first principle of de-
gendered sexual freedom.164 While this may be a valid theoretical 
project, it seems distinctly non-feminist in the sense that it places the 
satisfaction some people receive from being coerced or acting out 
misogynistic sexual practices on the same level as the value all women 
receive from dismantling misogyny.165 Moreover, as much as sex-
positivists rightly warn rape reformers not to underestimate women’s 
love of sex, in all its usual and unusual forms, sex-positivists must be 
sure not to order their normative conclusions by the overestimation of 
women’s (and men’s) desire for sex.166 Even if it were possible to 
divorce sex from the various social inequities animating it, like all 
                                                     
Jr., The Many Faces of Sexual Consent, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 47 (1995) (asserting that the 
consent standard’s antisubordination potential is limited by its assumptions of liberal 
individualism). What I mean by encouraging “consensual” sexual relations is encouraging 
interactions that reflect women’s equal rather than subordinate status. 
162. See Queer Theory by Men, supra note 112, at 17 (asserting that “in the eroticization of 
domination we experience the unspeakable thrill of encountering our own metaphysical and 
experiential dissolution”). 
163. See Desperately Seeking, supra note 133, at 4–5 (arguing that Halley’s “interpretive 
construct” is to “assume no harm” of sex no matter the circumstances); see also Mary Anne Franks, 
Book Note, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 257, 263 (2007) (reviewing JANET HALLEY, SPLIT 
DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM (2006)) (criticizing Halley for 
being “unwilling to articulate harm in any other way other than a lost or missed opportunity for 
pleasure”). 
164. See Queer Theory by Men, supra note 112, at 10 (“Feminism is a project in quest for 
women’s point of view, which, because it is already constituted as its subordination, is not only a 
profoundly deferred but also a deeply problematic starting place.”). 
165. Of course, a true post-modernist might not be bothered by this at all. Halley, for example, 
criticizes the very basis of feminism in prioritizing female (f) over male (m) and “carrying a brief 
for f.” See SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 112, at 4–5, 17–20. 
166. See Franks, supra note 163, at 257 (asserting that Halley “presume[s] [the] good of 
undifferentiated, decontextualized, and dehistoricized bodily pleasures”). One could imagine a 
normative project that, in polar opposition to hedonists and sex-positivists, views civilized 
progression as moving toward asexual Schopenhauerian asceticism, much in the way some penal 
theories claim that evolution in criminal law consists of moving away from blood lust, vengeance, 
and the “thrill” of punishment. See, e.g., James Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFFALO 
CRIM. L. REV. 85 (2004). 
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human experiences, sex can produce the highest ecstasy, the lowest 
forms of self- and other-hatred, mild pleasure, mild pain, contentment, 
resentment, or nothing at all.167 In the end, the disconnect may be that 
mainstream feminists who believe that sex-positivism downplays the 
harm of rape have largely overlooked sex-positive theorists’ important 
warning that moralistic chastity ideals continue to animate rape 
criminalization and concepts of rape victimhood. 
C. Criminal Rape Laws Abridge Civil Liberties 
The next progressive concern over feminism’s association with 
criminal law involves the ostensible conflict between realist rape reform 
and defendants’ civil rights.168 Scholars have noted the apparent 
hypocrisy of liberal feminists who tout women’s rights while 
simultaneously supporting policies that weaken constitutional guarantees 
to criminal defendants. One scholar explains that “by and large feminists 
express empathy and concern for the rights of criminal defendants. . . . 
Feminists, who champion empathy and connectedness, may logically 
conclude that they must extend that same ethic of care to criminal 
defendants.”169 To be sure, there is something unsettling about a group 
concerned primarily with women’s civil rights being the very people 
behind policies that test the limits of constitutionality in the criminal 
trial.170 
The dilemma for progressive feminists is that permitting the 
introduction of all defense-favorable evidence protects the defendant 
from the unmitigated police power of the state, but it also allows 
defendants to exploit unfair hierarchies. Thus, feminists who defend 
                                                     
167. Compare Dressler, supra note 95, at 429 (“[S]exual contact ordinarily is a pleasurable event 
that humans generally seek rather than avoid.”) with Leo Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave?, 43 
OCTOBER 197, 197 (1987), reprinted in AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS, CULTURAL ACTIVISM 197 
(Douglas Crimp ed., 1996) (“There is a big secret about sex: most people don’t like it.”). 
168. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the 
Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1794–96 (1992) 
[hereinafter Beyond Rape Essay]; Douglas N. Husak & George C. Thomas III, Date Rape, Social 
Convention, and Reasonable Mistakes, 11 LAW & PHIL. 95, 112 (1991); David S. Rudenstein, Rape 
Shield Laws: Some Constitutional Problems, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1976); Alexander Tanford 
& Anthony Boachio, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544, 
554 (1980); Shawn J. Wallach, Rape Shield Laws: Protecting the Victim at the Expense of the 
Defendant’s Constitutional Rights, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 485 (1997). 
169. Aviva Orenstein, “MY GOD!”: A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception to 
the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. 159, 196 (1997). 
170. See Pink Elephants, supra note 101 (discussing feminist-civil libertarian dilemma). 
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realist reforms argue that defendants’ rights in the context of a rape trial 
are not neutral. Rather, preserving the rape defendant’s right to bring in 
all evidence convincing to the jury allows the defense to capitalize on 
rape myths and juror prejudice.171 Feminist critics of liberalism use rape 
law as an example of the limits of rights discourse. These critics argue 
that civil libertarians, by protecting defendants’ rights from feminist 
reforms, treat rape cases like “any other” criminal case and divorce them 
from their specific cultural context.172 Allowing defendants’ due process 
rights to trump rape shield and affirmative consent laws in fact enables 
rape defendants to gain an exceptional advantage by capitalizing on 
sexist social attitudes.173 Liberal feminists reconcile the civil liberties 
dilemma by asserting that such reforms do not abridge civil liberties 
because they focus the jury on proper relevant evidence as opposed to 
irrelevant and prejudicial evidence.174 
D. The Criminal System is Culturally and Structurally Inconsistent 
with Feminism 
The final feminist concern over criminalization is a meta-critique of 
the culture and structure of the criminal system and its incongruence 
with feminist precepts and goals.175 bell hooks describes the criminal law 
and its culture as the very embodiment of “the Western philosophical 
notion of hierarchical rule and coercive authority,” which serves as the 
“foundation” of male domination of women.176 Indeed, the current 
criminal justice system focuses nearly exclusively on punishing 
criminals and virtually ignores forgiveness, victim healing, elimination 
of socio-economic predicates of crime, and victim social services.177 
While some recent innovations in criminal law involve collective 
decision-making through restorative justice programs and mediation 
initiatives, the criminal law is traditionally and primarily structured as an 
                                                     
171. See supra notes 96–101 and accompanying text. 
172. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing cultural context of rape trial). 
173. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text (explaining how social attitudes decrease 
probability of rape conviction). 
174. See supra notes 99–101. 
175. See Mari J. Matsuda, Crime and Affirmative Action, 1 GEO. J. OF GENDER, RACE & JUST. 
309, 319 (1998) (stating that “the criminal justice system is a primary location of racist, sexist, 
homophobic, and class-based oppression in this country”). 
176. BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 118 (1984). 
177. See Martin, supra note 1, at 153 (maintaining that criminal law’s purpose is to “control the 
‘dangerous classes’ and to perpetuate and replicate existing power”). 
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adversarial power struggle in which there is a bad criminal and a good 
victim.178 Thus, feminists argue that the epistemology of the criminal 
system, specifically the focus on right versus wrong and winners versus 
losers, makes it inherently inhospitable to investment with social nuance 
and understanding.179 
Given this conception of criminal law, cultural feminists worry that it 
is oxymoronic, if not hypocritical, for rape reformers to attempt to make 
the world more woman-friendly by utilizing a system quintessentially 
“male” in origin.180 The structural concern is that the criminal law is 
inherently incapable of being more woman-friendly.181 Prosecutorial 
discretion combined with state actors’ drive to win leads law enforcers 
to abandon “loser” cases, which often involve sexual and racial minority 
victims.182 Elizabeth Iglesias observes that “the tenuous nature of legal 
strategies that expect to eliminate rape by reforming the criminal justice 
apparatus,” can be explained by the fact that “rape processing practices 
are embedded in a network of discretionary decisions, [in which] legal 
                                                     
178. Stephen Schulhofer explains that the binary view of good and evil inherent in modern 
penology creates a trial atmosphere in which jurors seek to discover the “real” victim. Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, The Trouble with Trials; the Trouble with Us, 105 YALE L.J. 825, 853–54 (1995) 
[hereinafter Trouble with Trials]. Of course, “[t]he unworthy, such as ‘bad’ mothers, ‘bad’ girls, and 
unruly youth, are never real victims . . . .” Martin, supra note 1, at 158. 
179. See Martin, supra note 1, at 155 (observing that given its individualistic retributive ethic, the 
criminal system “is anything but transformative”); see also Lynne Henderson, Without Narrative: 
Child Sexual Abuse, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 479, 508 (1997) (asserting that feminist intervention 
is thwarted by “epistemological and narrative assumptions upon which the criminal law is 
grounded”). 
180. See Man in the State, supra note 2, at 24 (describing displays of police power as 
“masculinist”). 
181. See Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic 
Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1675–76 (2004) (noting feminist view of state as “the 
embodiment of institutionalized male power over women, manifested in practice by the disinterest 
of law enforcement, prosecutors, and the courts in stopping male violence against women”). 
182. See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 16–17 (1998) (contending that “because prosecutors play such a dominant 
and commanding role in the criminal justice system through the exercise of broad, unchecked 
discretion, their role in the complexities of racial inequality in the criminal process is inextricable 
and profound”); see also Kay L. Levine, The New Prosecution, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1125, 
1177 (2005) (discussing the reluctance of prosecutors to work with “difficult” victims). In addition, 
attempts to bring in evidence of contextual subordination are often written off as “abuse excuses.” 
See Lynne Henderson, Co-opting Compassion: The Federal Victims’ Rights Amendment, 10 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 579, 588 (1998) [hereinafter Co-opting Compassion] (noting that such attempts 
are seen as “manipulative ploy[s]” to avoid responsibility). 
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agents will enforce the culturally dominant narratives of race and 
sexuality.”183 
There are, however, a couple of problematic issues with these meta-
level criticisms. First, many feminists would take exception with the 
concepts that there are distinctly “male” and “female” cultures and that 
adversarial processes are quintessentially “male.”184 Liberal feminists 
might contend that an adversarial system that vindicates women’s rights 
could in fact be very useful. Dominance feminists like MacKinnon assert 
that adversarial processes and police power can be utilized by feminists 
so long as they counter the patriarchy.185 More troubling is that both the 
cultural and structural arguments consider criminal law to be a fixed 
entity. However, criminal structure can change over time; and thus, 
despite the system’s apparent drawbacks, feminists might continue to 
work within the criminal system in the hopes that feminist efforts will 
help it progress.186 Alternatively, feminist reformers might reject 
wholesale the contention that criminal law is inherently anti-feminist 
because accepting the contention would necessitate total and perpetual 
abandonment of a potentially useful legal structure.187 
Casting oneself into the waters of the above debates may leave a 
feminist hopelessly adrift between surrendering women to the power of 
the state and abandoning women to private abusers.188 The remainder of 
                                                     
183. Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Rape, Race, and Representation: The Power of Discourse, Discourses 
of Power, and the Reconstruction of Heterosexuality, 49 VAND. L. REV. 869, 890 (1996) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
184. There is the potential that insisting on the existence of a special feminine culture, see 
Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 112, can essentialize female experience in a way that 
disadvantages women who belong to other subordinated groups. For this reason, women of color 
scholars and queer theorists are particularly wary of cultural feminism. See Race and Essentialism, 
supra note 25, at 602–04 (describing how cultural feminist claims about womanhood operatively 
exclude black women); SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 112, at 59–79 (criticizing cultural feminism as 
both descriptively essentialist and normatively “female supremacist”). 
185. See Man in the State, supra note 2, at 31 (“[M]asculinist state power . . . is something 
feminists may be able to exploit and subvert . . . in order to strategically outmaneuver its 
contemporary ruses.”). 
186. See generally Aya Gruber, Navigating Diverse Identities: Building Coalitions Through 
Redistribution of Academic Capital, An Exercise in Praxis, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1201 (2005) 
(noting possibility that structures of subordination can be broken down from within). 
187. Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and 
Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 988 (2007) (suggesting that progressives 
formulate strategies for “redefining the boundaries of legal reform and making visible law’s broad 
reach” rather than abandoning law). 
188. See Man in the State, supra note 2, at 26 (observing that state power “is often all that stands 
between women and rape, women and starvation, women and dependence upon brutal mates, in 
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this Article is intended to break the stalemate. It argues that given the 
current political characteristics of the American criminal system, any 
perceived promise of criminal justice to further feminism is a false 
promise. In one sense, understanding the criminal system’s problems 
and limitations may leave feminists feeling defeated because they will 
have to turn away from a system, flawed as it may be, that welcomed 
them.189 In another sense, however, this Article’s intervention is more 
hopeful than some of the pre-existing critiques of criminalization. It does 
not contend that criminal law can never be transformative, but merely 
asserts that given the larger philosophies currently animating it, the  
criminal law does not provide a meaningful avenue of feminist change at 
the present time.190 
III. CRIMINALIZATION STRATEGIES SUPPORT 
CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
The current American criminal justice system is intimately tied to a 
philosophical program and set of social norms highly antithetical to 
feminism. Criminal law scholars and civil libertarians widely criticize 
what they see as the devolution of American criminal justice.191 Over the 
last several decades, incapacitating and vengeance-based ideologies, 
couched in terms of “deserved retribution,” have flourished. Beginning 
with the Nixon Administration, the United States has waged several 
“wars” on crime,192 sentences have uniformly increased,193 and being 
                                                     
short, women and unattenuated male prerogative”). 
189. See Feminist War, supra note 17, at 819 n.328 (observing that success of criminalization 
efforts may have been “addictive” to feminists). 
190. But see Lobel, supra note 187, at 988 (disapproving critical exits from the law). 
191. See Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801, 1839 (1999) 
(maintaining that retributive rhetoric in modern America “has tended to sponsor extreme policies 
and practices that thoughtful retributivists themselves might well renounce”). 
192. Although Nixon launched the first war on crime, see Annual Message to the Congress on the 
State of the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 8, 12 (Jan. 22, 1970), the anti-crime political platform rose to 
ultimate prominence during Ronald Reagan’s campaign for presidency. Criminals, particularly drug 
dealers and users, became the very essence of what was wrong with liberal America (along with 
Reagan’s other enemy, welfare mothers). See infra notes 198, 203 and accompanying text. 
193. During the tough-on-crime era, indeterminate sentencing gave way to sentencing guidelines, 
which uniformly increased sentences. See Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal 
Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1247 (2005) (stating that conservatives saw 
determinate sentencing as way to control lenient sentencers); see also Frank O. Bowman, III, Mr. 
Madison Meets a Time Machine: The Political Science of Federal Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 235, 246 (2005) (characterizing sentencing guidelines as “one-way upward ratchet”). 
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tough on crime has become a sure-win platform on both sides of the 
political aisle.194 The tough-on-crime philosophy that overtook America 
was not a singular phenomenon, divorced from a larger political and 
economic program, but a distinct part of a neoliberal195 paradigm of 
rampant individualism, minimization of government services, and 
unconstrained capitalism.196 The anti-distributive political strategy 
spring-boarded from dissatisfaction with New Deal and Great Society 
welfarism,197 hit a fever pitch during Reagan’s presidency,198 and 
continues to reign today.199 The term “neoliberal” signifies more than 
just economists’ dissatisfaction with “embedded liberalism”200 and 
                                                     
194. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Victims’ Rights in California, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 197, 
203 (1992) (observing how politicians are “obsessed” with maintaining “tough on crime” media 
image). 
195.  “Neoliberalism” signifies the constructivist project of imbuing market values with a 
normative quality that prescribes specific modes of individual action. See Wendy Brown, Neo-
liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy, 7 THEORY & EVENT 1, 6 (2003) [hereinafter Brown, 
Neo-liberalism]. 
196. See Feminist War, supra note 17, at 749 (examining relationship between tough-on-crime 
ideology and conservative economic and social agenda); Angela P. Harris, From Stonewall to the 
Suburbs? Toward a Political Economy of Sexuality, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1539, 1542 
(2006) (maintaining that neoliberalism constructs “a sentimentalized vision of the innocent yet 
victimized, taxpaying, suburban good citizen and attacking that citizen’s purported enemies—
reliably, queers, liberals, feminists, and blacks”). 
197. See Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal 
Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 803 (2003) (observing that “in the 1970s, amidst 
global economic changes that confounded standard Keynesian policy prescriptions and amidst a 
white backlash against government support for racial equality, a well-funded neoliberal movement 
coalesced to position efficiency more firmly against equity”). 
198. Reagan stated: 
Individual wrongdoing, [liberals] told us, was always caused by a lack of material goods, 
and underprivileged background, or poor socioeconomic conditions. And somehow . . . it 
was society, not the individual, that was at fault when an act of violence or a crime was 
committed. Somehow, it wasn’t the wrongdoer but all of us who were to blame. Is it any 
wonder, then, that a new privileged class emerged in America, a class of repeat offenders 
and career criminals who thought they had the right to victimize their fellow citizens with 
impunity. 
Ronald W. Reagan, President of the United States, Remarks at the Annual Conference of the 
National Sheriff’s Association in Hartford, Connecticut (June 20, 1984), http:// 
www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/publicpapers.html. See also G.O.P. Testimony on 
Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1968, at 20 (quoting then-governor Reagan as stating: “It is time to 
restore the American precept that each individual is accountable for his actions”). 
199. See Ahmed A. White, Capitalism, Social Marginality, and the Rule of Law’s Uncertain Fate 
in Modern Society, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 759, 819 (2005) (noting the “hegemonic reign of neo-
liberalism over American politics of the past several decades”). 
200. John Ruggie coined this phrase to describe the economic “compromise” in the era of the 
post-World War II period until the financial crises of the 1970s. He states that the term was 
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rejection of Keynesian precepts.201 It describes a moral directive in 
which considerations of nuance, inequality, and social conditions must 
necessarily yield to reductionist dichotomies of public-versus-private 
and right-versus-wrong. Scholars explain that the neoliberal philosophy 
configure[s] morality entirely as a matter of rational deliberation 
about costs, benefits, and consequences. In so doing, it also carries 
responsibility for the self to new heights: the rationally calculating 
individual bears full responsibility for the consequences of his or 
her actions no matter how severe the constraints on this action, 
e.g., lack of skills, education, and childcare in a period of high 
unemployment and limited welfare benefits.202 
Over the last several decades, the political rhetoric of crime and 
punishment has gone hand in hand with the trenchant argument against 
public welfare.203 Horrendous criminals became the perfect straw men, 
invaluable as examples of why there should be “no tolerance” for 
                                                     
“intended to convey the manner by which the capitalist countries learned to combine the efficiency 
of markets with the broader values of community that socially sustainable markets themselves 
require.” JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, GLOBAL MARKETS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: THE PROSPECTS 
FOR CONVERGENCE IN GLOBAL LIBERALISM AND POLITICAL ORDER: TOWARD A NEW GRAND 
COMPROMISE? 23 (Bernstein & Pauley, eds. 2007). Embedded liberalism thus “moderat[ed] the 
volatility of transaction flows across borders and provid[ed] social investments, safety nets, and 
adjustment assistance—but all the while pushing international liberalization within a framework of 
multilateral principles, norms, and institutions.” Id. at 23–24. Unlike the neoliberal international 
markets of today, however, embedded liberalism was premised on the concept that the international 
economy was subject to the arms-length bargaining of governments. Today, however, “markets and 
firms have gone increasingly global, threatening to leave behind merely national social bargains.” 
Id. at 24. 
201. Keynesian economics is generally thought of as a departure from classical economics’ 
obsession with market freedom. Keynes hypothesized that efficiency could be achieved through 
government interventions that both increased social welfare and controlled the demand for goods. 
See YUVAL P. YONAY, THE STRUGGLE OVER THE SOUL OF ECONOMICS 10–11 (1998). 
202. Brown, Neo-liberalism, supra note 195, at 6. There is a sense of irony, however, in that 
neoliberals often reject the retributive basis for punishment as a matter of principle, favoring instead 
a determination of whether the given criminal law is “efficient.” But the neoliberalist program in the 
Reagan era was made palatable to the public specifically by configuring privatization and 
“individualist” criminal law as an issue of moral fault. Anti-welfare and anti-rehabilitation programs 
were not popular because they were efficient in a macro sense, they were popular because lazy 
welfare queens and evil criminals were at fault. See Feminist War, supra note 17 (asserting that 
Reagan’s economic and political philosophy was sold to the public through images of iconic victims 
and criminals). 
203. Reagan’s favorite examples of the failure of welfarism were “enemy” drug dealers and lazy 
“welfare queens.” See, e.g., Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or 
Why the “War on Drugs” was a “War on Blacks,” 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381, 386 (2002) 
(discussing Reagan’s “rhetorical strategy”); “Welfare Queen” Becomes Issue in Reagan Campaign, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1976, at 51. 
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people’s “poor excuses.”204 The image of the entirely culpable and 
irredeemable criminal allowed society to feel comfortable with ever 
harsher punishments while denying any responsibility for the root causes 
of crime.205 The effort to garner support for an anti-welfare paradigm by 
publicizing drug dealers and lazy welfare mothers strategically exploited 
perpetually simmering racial, class, and ethnic biases.206 Indeed, the 
public may embrace government programs that benefit true “citizens,” 
but will abhor “hand-outs” to racial and socio-economic “others.”207 
                                                     
204. See Brown, Neo-liberalism, supra note 195, at 6 (observing that under neoliberalism “a 
‘mismanaged life’ becomes a new mode of depoliticizing social and economic powers and at the 
same time reduces political citizenship to an unprecedented degree of passivity”). The ultimate 
poster child for “no tolerance” was Willie Horton, a convicted murderer who committed kidnapping 
and rape while out on a forty-eight-hour furlough in Governor Michael Dukakis’s state. Horton took 
center stage during Dukakis’s bid for presidency against George H.W. Bush and played no small 
part in his decisive defeat. See David Lauter, Crime Issue Becoming Election Battleground, L.A. 
TIMES, June 13, 1988, at Part I, 18. 
205. Markus Dirk Dubber, The Victim in American Penal Law: A Systematic Overview, 3 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 3, 9 (1999–2000) (noting how sentimental identification with victim allows society to 
avoid ethical question of punishment); Feminist War, supra note 17, at 809 (discussing how 
criminal law attributes social problems to “a distinct group of wicked people,” such that “once these 
persons are managed, the problem is solved”). 
206. Martin Gilens observes: 
Although blacks represent only 37% of welfare recipients, perceptions of black welfare 
mothers dominate whites’ evaluations of welfare and their preferences with regard to 
welfare spending. Thus, the ‘unspoken agenda’ of racial imagery appears to be more 
important in shaping public understanding of welfare than are explicit debates over welfare 
reform that are cast in race-neutral language. 
Martin Gilens, “Race Coding” and White Opposition to Welfare, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 593, 602 
(1996). See also Nunn, supra note, 203, at 390 (“For the constituency the Reagan Administration 
was trying to reach, it was easy to construct African Americans, Hispanics, and other people of 
color as the enemy in the War on Drugs.”). 
207. See Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 790, 
795 (2007) (observing that “[g]overnmental assistance is not treated as welfare when the recipients 
are considered to be blameless” but “racial stereotypes assigned to blacks, namely being ‘lazy, 
criminal, [and] irresponsible,’ . . . make it harder for blacks than for whites to be viewed as 
blameless”); Gilens, supra note 206, at 601 (conducting study and concluding that “racial 
considerations are the single most important factor shaping whites’ views of welfare”). A similar 
tactic has recently emerged from those opposed to universal healthcare. While one of the most 
publicized myths is that the elderly will be judged by “death panels,” in fact demonizing potential 
recipients has been perhaps the more effective way to undermine reform. One poll tracing the 
declining popularity of reform revealed that a substantial minority of respondents believed the death 
panel myth, while a majority expressed concerns that healthcare benefits would be given to “illegal 
aliens.” See Mark Murray, NBC Poll: Misperceptions Abound on President’s Health Overhaul 
Initiative, MSNBC.COM, Aug. 18, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32464936/ns/politics-
white_house/. In fact, none of the proposals in Congress involve benefits to undocumented 
immigrants. Id. 
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Thus, conservative law makers’ and politicians’ efforts to entrench 
neoliberal individualist values created a specific sociological discourse 
of criminality and victimhood. Today, politicians who describe 
themselves as “tough on crime” routinely hyperbolize the danger of 
crime to average Americans208 and exploit conscious and subconscious 
race, class, and gender biases to marshal support for ever harsher, ever 
more invasive criminal policies.209 Elected officials and media 
commentators have constructed the criminal as an inhuman bogeyman210 
or autonomous young minority male, who feels no remorse and has no 
“excuse” for the crimes he commits.211 The complement to the criminal 
caricature is the depiction of the pristine innocent victim, preferably a 
young white female, subjected to violent murder or rape.212 These 
images allow “ordinary” members of society to distance themselves 
from criminals and feel comfortable with the amassing of state punitive 
power.213 
The political importance of the innocent victim icon has propelled the 
victims’ rights movement into a powerful lobby with a critical voice in 
the justice system.214 States have widely adopted victims’ bills of 
                                                     
208. One politician, who supported the Child Safety Act of 2005 as necessary to “stop the 
epidemic of violence and sexual abuse against our children,” compared the dangers of offenses 
against children to the then-recent devastation of Hurricane Katrina. He stated, “[T]his past week, 
we have been reaping the destruction of a hurricane that brought the wind and rain and flooding of a 
natural and national disaster. But we have been for years reaping the greater destruction of a 
hurricane that continues to bring the wind, rain, and floods of the effects of child predators on 
America.” 151 CONG. REC. H8074, H8077 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 2005) (Statement of Rep. Poe). 
209. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. S12894, S12896 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2007) (Statement of Rep. 
Ensign) (calling on federal government to “help the States prosecute and incarcerate people who are 
here illegally, undocumented criminal aliens who are here illegally who are wreaking havoc on 
communities around the United States”). 
210. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. H916 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2002) (remarks of Rep. Green) (stating 
that Two Strikes and You’re Out Child Protection Act is “simply about taking these sick monsters 
off the streets . . . to try to end the cycle of horrific violence that is every parent’s nightmare”). 
211. See Co-opting Compassion, supra note 182, at 586–87 (contending that to society 
“[d]efendants are subhuman; they are monsters,” and “[a]lternatively, the image of the criminal is 
the ominous, if undifferentiated, poor, angry, violent, Black, or Latino male”). 
212. See id. at 584 (observing that victims are “‘blameless,’ innocent, usually attractive, middle 
class, and white” persons subjected to “particularly brutal homicides”). 
213. See Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as 
the Law’s Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 144 (1987) (observing that society can 
distance itself from social problems, particularly racism, by inventing a “great public wilderness of 
other”). 
214. See Aya Gruber, Victim Wrongs: The Case for a General Criminal Defense Based on 
Wrongful Victim Behavior in an Era of Victims’ Rights, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 645, 653–60 (2003) 
[hereinafter Victim Wrongs] (discussing impact of victim’s rights movement on American criminal 
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rights,215 and victims’ rights proponents have been instrumental in the 
passage of tough-on-crime legislation.216 The movement, however, does 
not embrace all victims unconditionally, but rather constructs 
victimhood in a very specific way. Victims are necessarily passive 
objects upon whom criminal acts were imposed.217 A proper victim bears 
absolutely no responsibility for the crime, abides by all social mores, and 
always seeks closure through harsh punishment of the offender.218 
Victims’ rights rhetoric disfavors victims who advocate mercy,219 does 
not tolerate victims who are criminals,220 and supports policies, like the 
death penalty, despite their discrimination against certain victims.221 
This politically-cemented view of crime and victimhood makes it 
practically impossible for feminists to bestow the concept of sex crime 
victimhood with appropriate nuance to recognize constrained agency.222 
                                                     
system). 
215. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 2.1; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 8.1; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 
9402 (2001). According to the National Center for Victims of Crime, every state has a “set of legal 
rights for crime victims in its code of laws.” See The National Center for Victims of Crime, Issues: 
Victim’s Bill of Rights, http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx?dbName=DocumentViewer& 
DocumentID=32697 (last visited Sept. 27, 2009). 
216. See Vik Kanwar, Capital Punishment as “Closure”: The Limits of a Victim-Centered 
Jurisprudence, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 231 (2001–2002) (noting trend of laws 
named after sentimentalized “white female children” victims “who constitute the public’s preferred 
image of a ‘victim’”). 
217. See Feminist War, supra note 17, at 777 (arguing that tough on crime ideologies “deny the 
larger social context of crime by treating victims as the passive objects”); see also MARKUS DIRK 
DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF VICTIMS’ RIGHTS 194 (2002) 
(observing prevalence of “helpless” victim image). 
218. See Feminist War, supra note 17, at 777 (noting view that victims must exhibit “righteous 
anger at every turn”). 
219. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Narrating Pain: The Problem with Victim Impact Statements, 10 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 17, 28 (2000) (noting that victims’ rights movement cannot tolerate 
“narratives in which victims’ families can exercise mercy, kindness, or forgiveness”). 
220. See Kanwar, supra note 216, at 231 (observing that victims’ rights rhetoric disqualifies “the 
most severely affected victims of violent crime, sexism and racism (e.g., prostitutes or teenage black 
males in the juvenile justice system)”). 
221. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1987) (citing “Baldus Study” which 
revealed that murders involving white victims and black defendants disproportionately resulted in 
the death penalty). Diane Clements, president of the victims’ rights group “Justice for All,” stated of 
the Supreme Court’s decision banning juvenile executions, “I think it’s disgraceful and outrageous 
for the Supreme Court to say that 16- and 17-year-olds are somehow different and somehow less 
culpable than adults . . . . Even a 5-year-old knows right from wrong.” Mark Hansen, Ruling May 
Spur New Death Penalty Challenges, 3 No. 9 A.B.A. J. E-REP. 1 (Mar. 4, 2005). 
222. See supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text (discussing “constrained agency”); see also 
Sex Wars Redux, supra note 135, at 370 (asserting that feminists should press for “contextuality” in 
characterizations of rape victims). 
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The binary relationship is between the absolutely culpable criminal 
(agent) and wholly innocent victim (object). As manifested in the law of 
rape, the complainant may be a “true” victim if she was the object of a 
violent attack by a monstrous stranger rapist.223 However, if she 
exercises any agency in the encounter, such as being on a date, she is 
disqualified from the category of innocent victim and is instead cast as 
the agent who precipitated date rape.224 This particular view of rape 
victimhood allows society and the government to ignore the social 
predicates of rape and sexual subordination. If the rape victim is 
described as an object of a violent stranger rapist, the full responsibility 
for the crime can be placed on the criminal agent. If the victim is viewed 
as an agent, she is wholly responsible for her mistakes. 
The current dialectic of criminality and victimhood counsels that 
crime is a problem of individual criminal pathology and not social 
hierarchy.225 In this way, the criminal system obscures the economic and 
sociological conditions of rape226 and relieves “pressure on the 
government and society to remove the constraints on women’s 
agency.”227 Criminal law’s unitary concern with victimhood and 
criminality absolves “[o]thers in a position to predict and prevent rape” 
and presumes immunity for “those who create an ideological system that 
makes rape possible.”228 By engaging in the “false dichotomy” of agency 
and victimhood, the criminal law has the effect of decontextualizing rape 
from the larger issue of gender inequality.229 
In addition to being anti-progressive, the neoliberal ideology is 
distinctly anti-feminist.230 It is the very philosophy that discounts 
                                                     
223. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text (noting paradigmatic nature of stranger 
rapes). 
224. See supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text (discussing victim precipitation). 
225. Sexy Dressing, supra note 52, at 1321 (asserting that it is easy to support tough rape laws 
when “the only losers are a pathological subclass of men”). 
226. See infra notes 398–99 and accompanying text (discussing the socio-economic predicates of 
rape); cf. Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape Victims and Comparative Fault, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1478–83 (1999) (observing that concentration on risky victims and immoral 
defendants ensures ordinary citizens bear no costs of rape and have no incentives to prevent it). 
227. Feminist War, supra note 17, at 813. 
228. Mari Matsuda, On Causation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2195, 2202–03 (2000). 
229. See ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 75 (2000) 
(noting the “fundamental inadequacy of either victimization or agency . . . to capture the complexity 
of struggle in women’s lives” and asserting that this “false dichotomy leads to problematic 
extremes”). 
230. Margaret Thornton and Joanne Bagust observe how neoliberalism is hostile to feminism on 
another front, stating that “neo-liberalism and the corporatization of universities [have] induced a 
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women’s failures to break glass ceilings as preference choices231 and 
sees claims of sexism as poor excuses for lack of merit (i.e. market 
worth).232 Experts also contend that the neoliberal backlash to social 
welfare had the dramatic effect of feminizing cheap labor globally. 
Starting in the 1980s, corporate profit maximization strategies, combined 
with cuts in welfare, created a workforce of women willing to engage in 
irregular and informal employment for low wages and no benefits.233 
Thus, the anti-distributive characteristics of neoliberalism and the 
current criminal system are clearly ideologically dissonant with 
feminism’s “commitment to a more egalitarian distributive structure and 
a greater sense of collective responsibility.”234 Moreover, the belief that 
criminals are inherently worse than ordinary people is strikingly similar 
to the idea that women are inherently weaker than men and consequently 
incapable of occupying high status positions.235 Finally, the current 
criminal system’s sociological assumptions about female passivity and 
objectified status are at odds with the feminist goal of securing 
agency.236 As a consequence, even if it is theoretically possible for 
feminists to use the threat and execution of criminal punishment to 
positively affect women’s equality, it does not follow that they should do 
it now. 
The historical moment in which American feminist reformers find 
themselves is one where criminal law and incarceration has for at least 
                                                     
turning away from feminism and diversity” toward “subjects that facilitate the market.” Margaret 
Thornton & Joanne Bagust, The Gender Trap: Flexible Work in Corporate Legal Practice, 45 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 773, 811 (2007). 
231. See, e.g., Lawrence H. Summers, President, Harvard Univ., Remarks at NBER Conference 
on Diversifying the Science & Engineering Workforce (Jan. 14, 2005), http://www.president. 
harvard.edu/speeches/summers_2005/nber.php (attributing lack of top women scientists to “taste 
differences between little girls and little boys”). 
232. See Lisa Philipps, Taxing the Market Citizen: Fiscal Policy and Inequality in an Age of 
Privatization, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 118 (2000) (asserting that neoliberalism “intensifies 
and denies the problem of gendered social inequalities” by attributing them to “private ordering,” 
which is “natural and non-political”). 
233. See Valentine M. Moghadam, Globalization and Transnational Feminist Networks (or How 
Neoliberalism and Fundamentalism Riled the World’s Women), in CRITICAL GLOBALIZATION 
STUDIES 351 (Richard P. Appelbaum & William I. Robinson, eds., 2005). 
234. Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1181, 1184 (1994). 
235. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (“Man is, or should be, woman’s 
protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female 
sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.”). 
236. See supra notes 217–19, 222 and accompanying text. 
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three decades been the most acceptable form of government action.237 
This philosophy has devastating effects on the most subordinated 
segments of society.238 The feminist movement’s continued calls for 
more and harsher punishment of gendered crimes in this era of 
vengeance and victims’ rights makes it complicit in a neoliberal system 
that undermines women’s equality and economic health and retards 
equality generally.239 As a result, it seems that “feminist ideas and 
credibility are being appropriated to strengthen an apparatus that . . . 
should be dismantled.”240 
Rather than begin the painful process of disentanglement from 
criminal law, feminists might simply wish to stick it out and do their 
best working within an imperfect system.241 It is possible that over time, 
rape shield and affirmative consent laws will send enough of a gender 
equality message to change prevailing cultural beliefs about sexual 
behavior. Perhaps realist rape laws have produced and will continue to 
produce significant benefits for individual rape victims. However, the 
less utility rape reforms produce, the less justified feminists are in 
supporting them, given the many philosophical inconsistencies between 
feminism and American criminal justice. The next Part examines 
criminal rape laws’ norming potential and effect on individual rape 
victims. 
                                                     
237. See Jonathan Simon, From a Tight Place: Crime, Punishment, and American Liberalism, 17 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 853, 854 (1999) (asserting that crime control was one of the few forms of 
government action George H. W. Bush and Ronald Reagan found ideologically defensible). 
238. See Jonathan Simon, Megan’s Law: Crime and Democracy in Late Modern America, 25 L. 
& SOC. INQUIRY 1111, 1143–44 (2000) (observing that “the salience of crime is establishing new 
relations in terms likely to exacerbate racism [and] promote inequality”); William J. Stuntz, 
Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1970–72 (2008) (arguing that criminal system has 
produced massive inequality). 
239. See generally Erin Edmonds, Mapping the Terrain of Our Resistance: A White Feminist 
Perspective on the Enforcement of Rape Law, 9 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 43 (1992) (arguing it is 
theoretically unsound for feminists to support system infested with racial injustice). 
240. Martin, supra note 1, at 153. 
241. Feminists will likely have great difficulty with and suffer significantly over turning away 
from what is popularly considered a great feminist achievement and a true feminist legacy. 
Nonetheless, I believe that “[feminist] strategies and demands should continually be re-examined in 
the light of experience of law and legal practices.” Carol Smart & Julia Brophy, Locating Law: A 
Discussion of the Place of Law in Feminist Politics, in WOMEN-IN-LAW: EXPLORATIONS IN LAW, 
FAMILY AND SEXUALITY 18 (Julia Brophy & Carol Smart, eds., 1985). 
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IV. RAPE REFORM HAS PRODUCED LIMITED BENEFITS 
It is generally accepted, even among feminists, that realist reform has 
not proven practically successful.242 Rape is still widely underreported, 
and victims continue to be doubly traumatized by trial.243 Nevertheless, 
feminist reformers might still hope that changes in rape law will further 
the slow and steady transformation of culture over time. In addition, 
reformers passionate about helping individual victims contend that the 
answer to the apparent ineffectiveness of rape reform is engaging even 
more deeply in criminalization efforts. This Part discusses the norming 
potential of rape reform244 and its value to individual victims in turn. 
                                                     
242. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 15, at 1199 (surveying data and concluding that reforms 
“have generally had little or no effect on the outcomes of rape cases”); see, e.g., SPOHN & HORNEY, 
supra note 55, at 160 (finding that “the legal changes had limited effects on reports of rape and the 
processing of rape cases”); Wallace D. Loh, Q: What Has Reform of Rape Legislation Wrought? A 
Truth in Criminal Labeling, 37 J. SOC. ISSUES 28 (1981) (study concluding that rape reform had 
virtually no effect on law enforcement); Kenneth Polk, Rape Reform and Criminal Justice 
Processing, 31 CRIME & DELINQ. 191, 193–94 (1985) (study finding California’s rape law reforms 
had little effect). But see Stacy Futter & Walter R. Mebane, Jr., The Effects of Rape Law Reform on 
Rape Case Processing, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 72, 105 (2001) (twenty-year, multi-
jurisdictional study showing that broadened definitions of rape led to increase in reports of “actual 
rape,” meaning “forcible rape that police believe are well-founded”). 
243. See Ilene Seidman & Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda for the Next Thirty Years 
of Rape Law Reform, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 467, 467–68 (2005) (noting lack of data that “rape 
reform laws have deterred the commission of rape, increased its prosecution, or increased 
conviction rates”). Rates of sexual assault appear to have remained high. See Alan M. Gross et al., 
An Examination of Sexual Violence Against College Women, 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 288, 
292 (2006) (study finding that twenty-seven percent of surveyed college students reported unwanted 
sexual contact). It is, however, difficult to determine exactly how prevalent date rape is because of 
variances in data collection and reporting. For example, although the above-mentioned study 
demonstrates that over a quarter of college women report unwanted sexual contact, the Department 
of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics reports a dramatic decrease in rape rates from 1973 to 2005 
(although a dramatic increase between 2005 and 2007). See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, Sept. 10, 2006, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/rape.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 
2009). But these statistics involve “forcible” rape. See id. 
244. Social norms are informal rules of behavior that, without the threat of legal sanction, compel 
compliance with their dictates. As Robert D. Cooter explains, “The fact that a law was enacted 
provides a reason for citizens to do what it requires. Similarly, the fact that a norm was internalized 
provides a reason for the decisionmaker to do what it requires.” Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized 
Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1661 (1996). 
Rape, Crime, and Feminism 
627 
A. Rape Reform Has Limited Potential to Change Norms Regarding 
Date Rape 
Identifying the precise relationship between criminal prohibitions and 
social norms245 is a complicated if not impossible task.246 Some believe 
that criminal laws do and should merely reflect prevailing norms.247 
Others adhere to criminal law reform’s potential to change culture by 
eliminating or modifying existing laws, like those that reflect unfair 
hierarchies, or enacting new laws to transform values through negative 
incentives.248 The idea is that if enough people refrain from engaging in 
certain conduct because they fear police power, over time that conduct 
will become taboo and refraining from doing it will be part of society’s 
culture.249 In addition, criminal law has the expressive potential to shape 
social views by positively declaring a practice unacceptable.250 
The effectiveness of law at shaping norms, however, may depend 
upon how much the particular law deviates from current social practice. 
The use of police power to force people to abandon accepted norms may 
be seen as illegitimate and thus produce backlash.251 Such laws may also 
                                                     
245. Of course, identifying what is an accepted cultural norm is a complicated enterprise, 
especially in a country composed of a multitude of cultures and subcultures. See Elaine M. Chiu, 
Culture in Our Midst, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 231, 235–36 (2006) (noting the difficulty of 
ascertaining the dominant American culture). 
246. Some assert that history demonstrates that over long periods of time legal systems and social 
norms tend to progress. However, social progress over decades or centuries is rarely a linear process 
and often faces significant structural obstacles. There are often times in which legal systems and 
social norms return to modes society had largely written off as archaic and outmoded. Moreover, 
attempting to discern the relationship between a particular law and a state of affairs decades later 
seems like an exercise in futility. A very regressive law, for example, might produce a backlash that 
over time results in a very progressive status quo. Robert Post explains, “[W]e repeatedly find that 
the question of how law ought to respond to cultural conflict is deeply dependent upon the specific 
nature, content and history of proposed legal interventions, as well as their likely consequences.” 
Robert Post, Law and Cultural Conflict, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 485, 508 (2003). See also Chiu, 
supra note 245, at 234 (noting the complex relationship between criminal law and culture). Thus, 
without commenting on the more complex issue of the development of norms over time, this Article 
looks at the likely effect of rape reform on culture now and in the near future. 
247. See, e.g., PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 10 (1965) (arguing that law is 
legitimate because it enforces “the invisible bonds of common thought”). But see Chiu, supra note 
245, at 232 (rejecting claim that the “law merely serves as enforcement of the common decency, 
propriety and morality of that culture”). 
248.  See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text. 
249. See supra note 110. 
250. See generally JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF 
RESPONSIBILITY 100 (1970) (discussing “symbolic significance” of punishment). 
251. See Bryden, supra note 95, at 409 (commenting that “law can help to change folkways, but 
 
Washington Law Review Vol. 84:581, 2009 
628 
be subject to non-enforcement and jury nullification.252 Theorist Dan 
Kahan suggests that, given the reality of “sticky norms,” criminal law 
should “gently nudge” rather than “shove through” new norms.253 Thus, 
criminal prohibitions should be only slightly more progressive than 
prevailing norms, such that police power will tip the cultural scale.254 
According to this view, radical reforms too far from the status quo are 
doomed to fail and may even strengthen the disfavored norms.255 
On the other hand, reforms that are too modest or conform too closely 
to the status quo may end up reinforcing rather than changing the 
dominant culture.256 As prominent feminist Deborah Rhode observes, 
“[T]o allow what now appears politically palatable to establish [the 
feminist] agenda is to doom it from the outset.”257 Nonetheless, Kahan’s 
observations about “sticky norms” provide a starting point for analyzing 
whether realist rape reform has or can change sexual courtship attitudes 
and practices. The first step is to examine the current state of norms. The 
second step is to discern precisely which messages will filter out into 
and be understood by society, given these norms. The sections below 
consider the norm-shaping efficacy of realist rape reform in light of both 
existing gender customs and the views of criminality and victimhood 
discussed in Part III. 
                                                     
also . . . folkways can nullify law” and thus “the timing of a reform is critical”). 
252. See Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 607, 607 (2000) (discussing “sticky norms” problem that “occurs when the prevalence 
of a social norm makes decisionmakers reluctant to carry out a law intended to change that norm”). 
253. Id. at 608 (maintaining that “norms stick when lawmakers try to change them with ‘hard 
shoves’ but yield when lawmakers apply ‘gentle nudges’”). 
254. See id. at 609 (asserting that a “gentle nudge” can “initiate a process that culminates in the 
near eradication of the contested norm and the associated types of behavior”); see also Beyond Rape 
Essay, supra note 168, at 1805 (“When the law seeks to change social attitudes, lighter penalties 
increase the probability that juries will convict.”). 
255. See also After Rape Law, supra note 106, at 958 (asserting jurors will not punish what “elite 
opinion regards as a serious crime” but “popular opinion regards as nature taking its course”). Some 
even consider radicalism in criminal law morally unacceptable. See, e.g., Meredith J. Duncan, Sex 
Crimes and Sexual Miscues: The Need for a Clearer Line Between Forcible Rape and 
Nonconsensual Sex, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1087, 1112 (2007) (“It is wrong to use the strong 
arm of the criminal law to impose rules intended to change societal or cultural attitudes when doing 
so transforms conduct that many members of the community would regard as, at most, unreasonable 
into one of the worst kinds of criminal offenses.”). 
256. See infra note 420 and accompanying text. 
257. Rhode, supra note 234, at 1192. 
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1. Prevailing Gender Norms Restrict Rape Reform’s Expressive 
Value 
Asking about the current state of women’s equality elicits wildly 
different sentiments ranging from “the law favors women over men” to 
“women still live in socio-economic bondage.” Although a common 
sentiment is that women have “come a long way baby,”258 many 
feminists have started to question whether we are slipping back.259 In 
general, theorists have observed an acute backlash against the feminism 
of the seventies and the ideal of formal equality of men and women in all 
aspects of life.260 The depressed state of feminism as a popular concept, 
                                                     
258. This sentiment, made popular in what many now see as ironic Virginia Slims cigarette ads, 
is commonly expressed by those in speeches touting how much progress women have made socially 
and professionally. See, e.g., Karin Crump, We’ve Come a Long Way Baby, 70 Tex. B.J. 261 (2007) 
(discussing how litigation culture has progressed from “a decade ago” when female lawyers were 
regularly called “bulldogs with lipstick”); Sarah Duckers, The First Woman Juror in Texas, 45-FEB 
HOUS. LAW 38 (2008) (asserting that considering Texas had its first woman juror in 1954, “we’ve 
come a long way, baby”). One scholar notes that the phrase “we’ve come a long way, baby” was the 
“anthem of the 1980s.” G. Kristian Miccio, Giles v. California: Is Justice Scalia Hostile to Battered 
Women?, 87 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 93, 94 (2009). 
259. See Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 21, 22 (1999) [hereinafter Patriarchy and Inequality] (“Real [gender] equality 
appears to be an ever-receding chimera.”); Harold P. Southerland, “Love for Sale”–Sex and the 
Second American Revolution, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 49, 119 (2008) (contending that men 
“are still unapologetically reaping the benefits of a paternalistic world which they created” and true 
change “will require a considerable reorientation of traditional thinking along with a transformation 
in the way men think of themselves and their roles”); Maureen Dowd, What’s a Modern Girl to 
Do?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005 (Magazine), at 52, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2005/10/30/magazine/30feminism.html?_r=2&pagewanted=1; cf. Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Our Other 
Reproductive Choices: Equality in Sex Education, Contraceptive Access, and Work-Family Policy, 
56 EMORY L.J. 941, 947 (2007) (noting current popularity of gender regressive abstinence-only 
educational programs). 
260. See Linda L. Ammons, Dealing with the Nastiness: Mixing Feminism and Criminal Law in 
the Review of Cases of Battered Incarcerated Women—A Tenth-Year Reflection, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 891, 910 (2001) (noting that “[t]oday some view even the label feminist as something akin to a 
four-letter word”); Ann Bartow, Some Dumb Girl Syndrome: Challenging and Subverting 
Destructive Stereotypes of Female Attorneys, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 221, 222–23 (2005) 
(“Feminism as a social construct has been blamed for promulgating terrorism, ruining sexual 
relationships, causing road rage and traffic congestion, and undermining healthy families.”). Some 
account for the popular rejection of feminism by asserting that second-wave feminists’ exhortation 
that women should be more like men was simply unpalatable to a large number of women. See 
Crawford, supra note 112, at 120 (explaining that young women, so-called “third-wave feminists” 
embrace being “girlie”). Others maintain that feminist insistence on a radical assault on the 
ubiquitous patriarchy caused mainstream Americans to reject their politics as simply too left of 
center and even mock feminists as inflexible, judgmental “feminazis.” See Klein, supra note 35, at 
1004 (observing that critics of affirmative consent react with “[o]utrage, shock, disbelief, and 
mockery”). 
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moreover, appears to be accompanied by a stagnation or even regression 
of gender norms.261 As mentioned in Part I, many in society still adhere 
to chastity ideals and believe rape myths.262 Moreover, there are 
accepted courtship rituals still widely considered normal that in fact 
predicate rape.263 
It is well documented that men, especially young men, are barraged 
with messages that sex is the ultimate objective of private interactions 
with women,264 and many internalize this sentiment.265 One popular view 
is that procuring sex is the aim toward which the man must proceed, and 
achieving sex is a victory, especially with an initially reluctant 
woman.266 Researchers note that peer pressure plays a large role in this 
construction of gender relations.267 As a result, many young men are 
conditioned to use subtle coercion, or at least intense persuasion, and are 
                                                     
261. See Patriarchy and Inequality, supra note 259, at 21 (asserting that in recent times feminist 
progress “seems to be at a snail’s pace”). 
262. See Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1353, 1378 (2005) (observing 
that the Kobe Bryant case “gave new life to myths about accusers’ mendacity and promiscuity”). 
See also Dowd, supra note 259. 
263. Let me add a caveat here: The statements in this section are generalizations about some 
commonly publicized beliefs about gender that are held by some people. Far from being an 
empirical study on specific norms in given communities, this discussion of gender norms is based 
on anecdote, expert opinion, and existing empirical studies, which, taken together, provide a surface 
sketch of prevailing gender views. Moreover, because date rape is largely a phenomenon of the 
young, much of the research cited involves studies of college students and other young adults. 
264. See Motivational Evidence, supra note 100, at 603 (observing that young men “are 
bombarded by a culture” that “comodifies women’s sexuality”). Stephen Schulhoffer puts the 
sentiment bluntly, “Real men want to ‘score.’” UNWANTED SEX, supra note 6, at 262. 
265. See Forgetting Freud, supra note 77, at 154 (stating that “men structure their understanding 
of women” through the metaphor of sex achievement). 
266. See Bogle, supra note 78, at 106 (quoting male college student as stating that “[g]uys . . . 
want to steer away from girls that do it all the time . . . [and] go for the trophy ones that hook up 
with people seldomly”); Motivational Evidence, supra note 100, at 600 (asserting that young boys 
are “cast by culture into the role of pursuer”); Pillsbury, supra note 57, at 865 (noting that “the man 
pursues a single aim of sexual conquest”). 
267. See Bogle, supra note 78, at 104 (finding that “men are congratulated by their male peers for 
sexual conquests” and “[s]tigmatization occurs only for men who cannot ‘get any’”); Steven I. 
Friedland, Date Rape and the Culture of Acceptance, 43 FLA. L. REV. 487, 492 (1991) (contending 
that “the male’s pursuit of sexual relations becomes a competitive venture . . . to win by ‘achieving’ 
sexual relations”). Studies reveal that date rapists are not more angry or violent than non-date 
rapists, but are more sexually active and attuned to “closing the deal” on sex. See, e.g., Eugene J. 
Kanin, Date Rapists: Differential Sexual Socialization and Relative Deprivation, 14 ARCH. SEXUAL 
BEHAV. 219, 222–23 (1985); R. Lance Shotland, A Theory of the Causes of Courtship Rape: Part 2, 
48 J. SOC. ISSUES 127, 130 (1992). 
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sensitized to hear and believe cues indicating consent while 
downplaying signs of reluctance.268 
In addition, the cultural pressure on women to obscure their real 
feelings toward sex creates an omnipresent and substantial risk that 
communications will be imperfect.269 Many women believe that even if 
they want sex, they should appear reluctant, which may lead to displays 
of token resistance.270 In turn, these isolated occasions of token 
resistance provide grounds to believe that “no means yes.”271 This belief, 
together with the goal-oriented mindset, can cause men to discount 
certain signs of resistance altogether.272 Alternatively, a woman’s 
internalization of the view that only men should engage in open sexual 
communication may lead her to remain silent about her ambivalence273 
and just “go through” with sex to avoid an uncomfortable 
confrontation.274 Today, the deeply-entrenched cultural paradigm of a 
                                                     
268. See Forgetting Freud, supra note 77, at 145 (noting that date rapists “engage in cognitive 
strategies to block their conscious minds from learning the truth”); see also Lani Anne Remick, 
Comment, Read Her Lips: An Argument for a Verbal Consent Standard in Rape, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 
1103, 1145 (1993) (observing that men interpret courtship behavior on basis of conquest-oriented 
assumptions); cf. Angela J. Jacques-Tiura et al., Why Do Some Men Misperceive Women’s Sexual 
Intentions More Frequently Than Others Do? An Application of the Confluence Model, 33 
PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1467, 1468–69 (2007) (finding that hostile masculinity is 
correlated to men’s false belief that women have given a sexual cue). 
269. See Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls Into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape 
Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 18 n.18 (1994) (stating that teen magazines and television 
“urge[] girls to embrace and perfect the coy, passive-aggressive sex role”). 
270. See, e.g., Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Lisa C. Hollabaugh, Do Women Sometimes Say No 
When They Mean Yes? The Prevalence and Correlates of Women’s Token Resistance to Sex, 54 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 872, 875 (1988) (citing finding that women’s fear of appearing 
promiscuous leads to token resistance); Pillsbury, supra note 57, at 948 (maintaining that “[f]ear of 
the slut label can inspire illusory sexual refusals”). 
271. See Pillard, supra note 259, at 952 (“If women are taught to deny their desire, their ‘no’s’ 
appear ambiguous, making it easier for men to believe that ‘no means yes’ . . . .”); Pillsbury, supra 
note 57, at 948 (observing that “feigned refusals feed the dangerous perception among both sexes 
that women do not mean it when they say no”). 
272. See No Bad Men, supra note 73, at 680 (contending that “conceptualization of sex as feigned 
struggle leads to a tolerance of coerced sex”). 
273. See Pillsbury, supra note 57, at 950 (asserting that gender norms “encourage[] girls and 
women to enter romantic relationships with only vague ideas of what they want sexually, making it 
difficult for them to . . . express their desires clearly”). 
274. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 177 (1989) 
(arguing that “women are socialized to passive receptivity” and “may prefer [acquiescence] to the 
escalated risk of injury”); UNWANTED SEX, supra note 6, at 269 (observing that a woman’s silence 
may be explained by confusion or ambivalence). 
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sex-goal-oriented man and a coy, reticent woman continues to influence 
basic notions of maleness275 and femaleness.276 
Furthermore, some feminists have noted the phenomenon of 
retrograde values taking over the “modern” woman in her quest for a 
relationship.277 Many women order their dating and sexual conduct by 
the socially interposed belief that emotional and economic well-being is 
dependent on “catching” a man.278 New York Times columnist Maureen 
Dowd laments, “I knew things were changing because a succession of 
my single girlfriends had called, sounding sheepish, to ask if they could 
borrow my out-of-print copy of ‘How to Catch and Hold a Man.’”279 In 
the enterprise of obtaining men, women are told they are buyers in a 
seller’s market and their main currency is sexual mystique. As a result, 
catching a man depends on behaving and communicating in a way that is 
optimally geared toward male appreciation.280 Since mystique is the 
touchstone, open and free sexual communication is suboptimal 
behavior.281 It is often considered unromantic to be frank, and the 
woman runs the risk of being thought of as oversexed if she expresses 
sexual desire, or as a tease or prude if she communicates reluctance.282 
                                                     
275. See Sexy Dressing, supra note 52, at 1332 (observing that “men and women eroticize the 
relationship of [male] domination so that it is sustained by (socially constructed) desire”). There is 
also the tendency of society to condemn male effeminacy in general. See Mary Anne C. Case, 
Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and 
Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1995) (arguing that “[t]he man who exhibits feminine 
qualities is doubly despised, for manifesting the disfavored qualities and for descending from his 
masculine gender privilege”). 
276. See Tammy R. Pettinato, Transforming Marriage: The Transformation of Intimacy and the 
Democratizing Potential of Love, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 101, 116 (2007) (observing that little girls 
are taught to “avoid[] sexual aggressiveness and general self-assertion and/or cultivat[e] an ideal 
image of femininity”). 
277. See, e.g., Dowd, supra note 259, at 52. 
278. See Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking “Welfare Dependency” from a Different Ground, 
81 GEO. L.J. 1961, 1986–87 (1993) (observing conservative efforts to characterize man-catching as 
a solution to women’s poverty). 
279. Dowd, supra note 259, at 52. 
280. Id. (observing that “[i]n this retro world, a woman must play hard to get but stay soft as a 
kitten”). 
281. See Cheryl B. Preston, Baby Spice: Lost Between Feminine and Feminist, 9 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 541, 594 (2001) (observing how “powerful dynamics push women into 
conformity with, or at least acquiescence in, the woman-child model” (coyness, passivity, and thinly 
veiled sexuality)). 
282. One teenage rape victim explained, “It amazes me to think of the powerful and double-edged 
fear of not being accepted or of being a prude or of being a ‘slut’.” Pillsbury, supra note 57, at 947 
(quoting LEORA TANENBAUM, SLUT! GROWING UP FEMALE WITH A BAD REPUTATION 165–66 
(1999) (quoting a high school student)). 
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Today, more than ever, women appear to revel in sexual object 
status.283 Many women suffer astonishing amounts of psychological pain 
and anxiety,284 wear uncomfortable and dangerous apparel,285 forego 
basic sustenance,286 and some even undergo painful plastic surgery with 
foreign-object implantation to achieve the idealized sexually 
exaggerated appearance.287 One might argue that this signifies a 
burgeoning trend towards women’s embrace of sexual agency.288 Third-
wave feminists,289 for example, contend that maintaining a sexually 
provocative appearance empowers women by allowing them to own 
their sexuality.290 It is true that today women can obtain various 
psychological, social, and economic benefits from appearing sexy.291 
                                                     
283. See Fashion Magazines and Violence, supra note 148, at 7 (observing that, despite 
feminism, “women are willing to self-style themselves in counterproductive ways in exchange for 
being fashionable or, more likely, desirable to men”); Dowd, supra note 259, at 55 (noting that 
“women have moved from fighting objectification to seeking it”). 
284. See Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1040 (2009) 
(noting “the ridicule, shame, guilt, and discrimination that social pressures [over appearance] 
impose”). 
285. See Marc Linder, Smart Women, Stupid Shoes, and Cynical Employers: The Unlawfulness 
and Adverse Health Consequences of Sexually Discriminatory Workplace Footwear Requirements 
for Female Employees, 22 J. CORP. L. 295, 296–98 (1997) (discussing health consequences of 
wearing high heel shoes). 
286. See Patriarchy and Inequality, supra note 259, at 22 (“Women, particularly young women, 
are more obsessed than in earlier eras with weight and physical appearance as measures of merit.”). 
287. See id.; see also MEGAN SEELY, FIGHT LIKE A GIRL: HOW TO BE A FEARLESS FEMINIST 124 
(2007) (attributing this to the powerful cultural message that authentic women “are not good 
enough”). The construction of beauty also has a distinctly racial element. See Race and 
Essentialism, supra note 25, at 597 (“Beauty is whiteness itself . . . .”). These beauty standards may 
also contribute to women’s economic subordination. See Rhode, supra note 284, at 1034 (“[O]ur 
global investment in appearance totals over $200 billion a year.”). 
288. Cf. Sexy Dressing, supra note 52, at 1386 (asserting possibility that sexy dress “eroticiz[es] 
female autonomy” and “undermine[s] not only the structure that opposes Madonna and whore but 
also that which opposes straight white bourgeois vanilla sexuality to the (imagined) kinky, animal, 
androgynous sexuality of the margins”). 
289.  “Third-wave feminism” is an umbrella label used to describe the various feminist theories 
developed after and largely in response to second-wave feminism. Although cultural feminism, 
post-feminism, and critical race feminism all fall temporally within the third wave, the term “third-
wave feminism” has come to be most closely associated with a set of less theorized ideas about 
womanhood. Third-wave feminists are seen as embracing “girliness,” that is, appearing feminine 
and sexy, centralizing sexual pleasure, and embracing the power of feminine mystique. See 
generally Crawford, supra note 112. 
290. See id. at 120–22 (discussing third-wave feminism’s embrace of sexy femininity); see, e.g., 
Paglia, supra note 160, at A39 (calling pop star Madonna “the true feminist” who “shows girls how 
to be attractive, sensual, energetic, ambitious, aggressive and funny—all at the same time”). 
291. See Sexy Dressing, supra note 52, at 1348 (noting possibility that social construction of self-
esteem compels women to dress sexily). 
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However, society’s approval of seductive-looking women does not 
necessarily translate into women’s empowerment to communicate 
openly about and freely initiate or reject sex.292 While appearing 
seductive brings certain benefits, it also sends signals, intended or not, 
about availability for sex.293 Without a paradigm of open communication 
and sexual freedom accompanying the sexy dress phenomenon, a 
woman’s seductive appearance can be just one more factor upon which a 
goal-oriented man selectively relies in concluding there is consent.294 
Given widespread gender stereotypes and even retrogression of 
gender roles, realist reforms faced a significant challenge.295 Simply, 
average people do not wish to be “hard shoved,” in Kahan’s terms, into 
convicting men who have sex with “loose” women and men who fail to 
obtain “technical” permission before sex.296 In the affirmative consent 
context, popular opinion appears to be that requiring a “yes” before 
intercourse is totally inappropriate and unfair.297 Recall the 1993 media 
storm that surrounded the now-infamous Antioch College code of 
student conduct requiring unequivocal permission before every stage of 
sexual relations.298 In the public eye, the Antioch code became the very 
epitome of the ridiculousness of feminism, with both men and women 
                                                     
292. See Special Issues, supra note 27, at 1588 (“Although to modern ears the requirement of 
chastity seems obsolete, the tendency to blame victims for ‘asking for it’ (by flirting, taking a man 
to her room, or drinking), or to believe that the victim was lying to cover an indiscretion or to gain 
revenge, still rings true.”). 
293. See supra note 78 (popular opinions on seductive dress and rape). 
294. Under these conditions, sexy dressing is the ultimate protection for male sexual license. 
Women are given various incentives for dressing sexily with only the small tax of the potential for 
rape and disability from claiming rape. This tax will not overcome women’s incentives, and their 
sexy dress will provide cover for any man wishing to engage in sex of questionable consensual 
status. 
295. See Angela Harris, Forcible Rape, Date Rape, and Communicative Sexuality: A Legal 
Perspective, in DATE RAPE: FEMINISM, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE LAW 52 (Leslie Francis, ed. 1996) 
[hereinafter Forcible Rape] (arguing “[f]or date rape to be taken truly seriously as a crime, 
communicative sexuality must be a social as well as a legal norm”). 
296. Kahan, supra note 252, at 607; see UNWANTED SEX, supra note 6, at 57–58 (observing that 
policies that apparently conflate rape and ordinary sex produce “a potent cultural backlash”). 
297. See Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663, 689 (1999) [hereinafter 
Sex, Rape, and Shame] (noting “[t]he popular rejection of verbal communication in the sexual 
context”). Interestingly, another set of messages sent by affirmative consent, that men should take 
the lead in sexual relations and women should be passive, fits very well with prevailing cultural 
beliefs. See supra notes 267–68 and accompanying text. 
298. Antioch’s Sexual Offense Policy, which among other things required that “[t]he request for 
consent must be specific to each act,” remained in effect from 1993 until the College’s closing in 
2008. Although Antioch’s website is no longer online, a copy of the policy is available at 
http://www.mit.edu/activities/safe/data/other/antioch-code. 
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laughing at the idea of a sex “contract.”299 Today, affirmative consent 
appears less popular than ever, as both men and women reject the notion 
of a linguistic prerequisite to sex.300 
Regarding rape shield laws, feminist supporters hoped the laws would 
further female sexual subjectivity by sending the message that a woman 
can have a very sexually active past and still retain the ability to refuse 
sex and have legal remedies for rape.301 However, some scholars point 
out that, to the contrary, rape shield laws can actually reinforce the idea 
that a woman’s sexuality should be hidden.302 An examination of the 
history of rape shield laws reveals two major justifications for them, one 
of which reinforces patriarchal norms. Initially, some politicians lobbied 
for reform by analogizing past sexual conduct evidence to inadmissible 
prior bad acts evidence.303 They argued that defense attorneys would 
capitalize on victims’ past promiscuous (wrongful) behavior to prejudice 
juries and embarrass victims.304 The idea was not so much that the chaste 
woman/sex object paradigm should be abandoned, but rather that 
                                                     
299. The Antioch Policy engendered many “vitriolic criticisms”: 
Time Magazine called it “extreme.” George Will worried that “hormonal heat [would] be 
chilled by Antioch’s grim seasoning of sex with semicolons.” Saturday Night Live parodied 
the gender differences that arguably make the policy necessary, and Newsweek, in a cover 
story article, complained that the Antioch Policy “seem[s] to stultify relationships between 
men and women on the cusp of adulthood.” 
Sex, Rape, and Shame, supra note 297, at 687 (footnotes omitted). 
300. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, GIRL, Fight!, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 254, 257 
(2007) (reviewing MEGAN SEELY, FIGHT LIKE A GIRL: HOW TO BE A FEARLESS FEMINIST (2007)) 
(observing that today’s young women “easily blind themselves to the barriers generally faced by 
women” and see their choices as free despite the fact that they “are arguably influenced heavily by 
gendered stereotypes and expectations”). Even academics continue to adhere to antiquated rape 
beliefs. See, e.g., Subotnik, supra note 87, at 864 (asserting that women’s rejection of affirmative 
consent is explained by “women’s weaknesses” in wanting male pursuers and the fact that women 
“for 10,000 years . . . have enjoyed men begging for sex”). I remember student sentiment regarding 
the Antioch policy from my days in law school, and in 2009, after teaching rape law for several 
years, it seems to me that anti-affirmative consent sentiment has increased. Students are exceedingly 
reluctant to defend the requirement of an unambiguous yes. 
301. See Cristina Carmody Tilley, A Feminist Repudiation of the Rape Shield Laws, 51 DRAKE L. 
REV. 45, 57 (2002) (observing that rape shield “proponents hoped that Congress could influence 
public opinion about gender equality by permitting women to be as sexually active as men without 
forfeiting legal protections when victimized”). 
302. See, e.g., id. at 74–80 (2002) (asserting that rape shield laws prevent meaningful juror 
discussion of female sexuality). 
303. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
304. See, e.g., Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act, 124 CONG. REC. 36,256 (Oct. 12, 1978) 
(Statement of Sen. Biden) (“The enactment of this legislation will eliminate the traditional defense 
strategy . . . of placing the victim and her reputation on trial . . . .”). 
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evidence revealing a woman for the sex object she is biases the trial. 
Such a justification supports rather than counters the view that female 
sexuality should be kept secret and even condemned.305 
There is also, however, a more feminist justification of rape shield 
laws: They are not intended to keep female sexuality a secret, but to 
make it irrelevant to consent.306 Shield laws, properly understood, 
communicate that even the most extensive sexual history has no bearing 
on whether a woman can refuse sex.307 Unfortunately, reformers may 
have miscalculated the ultimate cultural impact of rape shields when 
filtered through the prism of existing norms.308 When one speaks of rape 
shields, the conversation often centers on victims’ all-important 
privacy.309 The common belief is that a woman’s very sense of well-
being is intimately intertwined with her ability to hide her sexuality.310 
Consequently, while not denying that victims value sexual secrecy in a 
world that impugns female sexuality, the dialectic of privacy proves a 
very real obstacle to changing norms about women’s sexual freedom.311 
                                                     
305. See Chastity Requirement, supra note 22, at 94 (“Instead of championing women’s sexual 
autonomy, drafters concentrated on how degrading and embarrassing it was for women to have to 
discuss publicly their private sexual affairs.”). 
306. Id. at 147 (“What women need is the right to say ‘yes’ to sexual behavior, to say ‘no’ to 
sexual behavior, to change their minds either way, and to have the law honor each of those 
decisions . . . .”). 
307. See, e.g., id. at 141 (proposing that broader shield laws protect woman’s prerogative to be 
promiscuous); Sakthi Murthy, Comment, Rejecting Unreasonable Sexual Expectations: Limits On 
Using A Rape Victim’s Sexual History To Show The Defendant’s Mistaken Belief In Consent, 79 
CAL. L. REV. 541, 552 (1991) (observing that rape shield laws protect “a woman’s choice of sexual 
lifestyle”). 
308. Cf. Sex Wars Redux, supra note 135, at 316 (discussing argument that “the discovery and 
iteration of a complex and highly individuated women’s sexuality” is not “likely to be implemented 
by direct legal effort”). 
309. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape Victims and Prosecutors: The Inevitable Ethical Conflict 
of De Facto Client/Attorney Relationships, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 695, 713 (2007) [hereinafter Rape 
Victims and Prosecutors] (“The first need of rape victims, both personal and legal, is privacy.”); 
Seideman & Vickers, supra note 243, at 473 (stating that “[f]or most sexual assault victims, privacy 
is like oxygen; it is a pervasive, consistent need”). 
310. See Chastity Requirement, supra note 22, at 93–94 (arguing that concept of sexual privacy 
“implies an appropriate sexual modesty”); see also Anita L. Allen, Taking Liberties: Privacy, 
Private Choice, and Social Contract Theory, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 461, 471 (1987) (“Conventions of 
female chastity and modesty have shielded women in a mantle of privacy at a high cost to sexual 
choice and self-expression.”). In addition, one scholar argues that rape shield laws reinforce the 
view that rape victims are fundamentally different from “real” victims and therefore require a 
special legal regime. Tracey A. Berry, Prior Untruthful Allegations Under Wisconsin’s Rape Shield 
Law: Will Those Words Come Back to Haunt You?, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1237, 1240. 
311. See Harris, supra note 196, at 1577–78 (warning that dialectic of “privacy rights” has 
tendency to turn focus away from larger transformations of socio-economic structures). 
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Thus, “anyone who takes up the weapon of privacy in the cause of 
women’s equality must be aware that it is a double-edged weapon.”312 
2.  Prevailing Criminality Discourse Thwarts Rape Reform’s Norming 
Potential 
The sociological messages sent by the current criminal system also 
create serious impediments to realist reforms’ norming capability. First, 
the general discourse of American criminal justice effectively prevents 
members of society from hearing the message to “take date rape 
seriously,” even as they ardently support other sex offender laws. 
Second, the political reality of the criminal system limits feminists’ 
ability to send transformative messages about gender through the 
criminal rape law. Turning to the first effect, one might initially think 
any law that puts more criminals in jail and “protects” victims would 
thrive in the current political climate. Yet tougher date rape laws never 
engendered the widespread public support of tough drug laws and anti-
pedophile measures.313 The reason is that reforms aimed at countering 
racial and gender stereotypes within the criminal system have very little 
purchase among those who advocate retribution and victims’ rights.314 
Some “feminist” reforms fit well within the victims’ rights paradigm. 
After the O.J. Simpson trial, society had no problem putting batterers in 
the category of irredeemable, evil criminal.315 Although there is certainly 
a distinct caricature of a minority abuser,316 through movies like The 
Burning Bed, society could even see white men as repulsive batterers, so 
                                                     
312. Martha C. Nussbaum, Is Privacy Bad for Women?, BOSTON REV., Apr./May 2000, 
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR25.2/nussbaum.html; see also Larry Catá Backer, Exposing the 
Perversions of Toleration: The Decriminalization of Private Sexual Conduct, the Model Penal 
Code, and the Oxymoron of Liberal Toleration, 45 FLA. L. REV. 755, 796 (1993) (asserting that 
toleration and protection of private sexuality came at expense of sexual equality). 
313. See supra notes 295–300 and accompanying text (discussing unpopularity of date rape 
reforms). 
314. See Feminist War, supra note 17, at 775 (characterizing victim’s rights movement as 
example of “powerful privileged groups using stereotypes to affect policy in a way that expressly 
decreases the rights of the worst-off and legitimizes, rather than challenges, subordinating 
institutions”). 
315. See G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the 
Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 238 (2005) (“With the 
death of Nicole Brown, politicians raced to the state house to invoke domestic violence laws, 
jumping on the ‘zero tolerance’ bandwagon.”). 
316. See Rashmi Goel, Can I Call Kimura Crazy? Ethical Tensions in the Cultural Defense, 3 
SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 443, 454 (2004) (noting the “strong stereotype[] that Latino males are macho 
and hot tempered”). 
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long as they committed atrocious crimes against their innocent white 
wives.317 Concurrent with the image of the horrible batterer was the 
helpless, infantile, emotionally fragile wife in desperate need of 
government intervention.318 Domestic violence reforms incorporating 
these bipolar images, such as forced separation and mandatory 
prosecution, enjoy wide-spread popularity.319 Even the most 
conservative political players have characterized abusers as horrific 
criminals at whom the state needs to “throw the book.”320 
Similarly, paradigmatic rape victims, especially children, and their 
hideous violators, are the very archetypes around which many modern-
day narratives of victimhood and criminality are constructed.321 Society 
largely demands the highest and most severe forms of punishment for 
paradigmatic rapists.322 Over the past several years, politicians bolstered 
                                                     
317. See Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and Poor 
Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1028–29 (2000) (observing battered women’s 
movement’s primary focus on white women); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered 
Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1991) (asserting that the 
movie The Burning Bed, which included a white male antagonist, helped build the cultural image of 
weak battered women subjected to terrorism-like violence). 
318. See Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence on 
Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1086 (1991) (contending that domestic violence 
reformers stereotype battered women as helpless and defective); Miccio, supra note 315, at 242 
(maintaining that mandatory policies “reify[] the cultural stereotypes of the incapacitated and 
irrational woman”). See generally Feminist War, supra note 17, at 801–20 (criticizing domestic 
violence criminalization for objectifying women). 
319. One need only browse the internet for a minute to find ultimate contempt for batterers. A 
post on Yahoo Answers (U.S.) asks, “What is your opinion on men who hit women??” The replies 
from (apparently) men include: “i [sic] personally think they are the lowest of form of the human 
race,” and “Subhuman. Lowlives [sic]. Beneath contempt.” Yahoo! Answers, What Is Your Opinion 
on Men Who Hit Women?, http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20070405135336AANy 
POJ&show=7 (last visited Sept. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Yahoo Abuse Answers]. 
320. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, President Bush Proclaims October Domestic Violence 
Awareness Month: Remarks by the President on Domestic Violence Prevention (Oct. 8, 2003), 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031008-5.html (declaring 
“fight against domestic violence” and prescribing “faith based programs” as solution). 
321. See 148 CONG. REC. H916 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2002) (remarks of Rep. Green). Experts note 
that characterizing rapists as abnormal has historical roots. See Wells & Motley, supra note 59, at 
154 (noting that early twentieth century psychiatrists described “sex offenders as mental deviants 
with little ability to control their behavior”). 
322. See Nora V. Demleitner, First Peoples, First Principles: The Sentencing Commission’s 
Obligation to Reject False Images of Criminal Offenders, 87 IOWA L. REV. 563, 567–68 (2002) 
(observing how publicity of such cases elevated crime against women and children to “national 
crises”); see also Simon, Megan’s Law, supra note 238, at 1135 (discussing “moral panic” 
surrounding child rape cases). The “predator” category gives the public some certainty in what is 
perceived as a world of random ubiquitous criminality. See Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous 
Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 884 
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by victims’ rights allies have proposed newer and better ways of making 
sex offenders suffer, testing the very limits of constitutionality.323 
Prosecutors defended such policies all the way up to the Supreme Court, 
which in turn put its stamp of approval on public registration and 
indefinite detention of sex offenders.324 Far from being archaic 
constructions from days past, images of paradigmatic rapists as 
unscrupulous minorities325 or predatory sickos hanging out in the 
shadows are as popular as ever.326 
Although throwing the book at sexual predators is a surefire rhetorical 
ace for the savvy politician, few find it politically expedient to be 
“tough” on date rape.327 Despite an embarrassing history of sex offenses 
on American university campuses,328 the date rape issue, with its 
                                                     
(2000) [hereinafter Monstrous Offenders] (“The sexual predator of children provides ‘a vision of 
crime that lawmakers fervently want to believe: a place where . . . the evil lurking in the land can be 
corralled and eliminated . . . .’” (quoting Matthew Stadler, Stalking the Predator, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
7, 1995, at A23)). 
323. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing harsh sex offender policies). 
324. See, e.g., Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) (finding that placing sex 
offender on public registry without hearing complied with procedural due process); Kansas v. 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (holding indefinite civil commitment of “sexually violent 
predators” with mental “abnormalities” constitutional, despite fact that detention was not for the 
purpose of treatment).  
325. See N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial 
Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1345 (2004) (noting continued characterization of black 
men as sexually predatory); see also Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape as a Badge of Slavery: The Legal 
History of, and Remedies for, Prosecutorial Race-of-Victim Charging Disparities, 7 NEV. L.J. 1, 1, 
40–43 (2006) (citing studies demonstrating that the “rape meta-narrative of a stranger who is a 
Black man violently assaulting a White woman continues to infect prosecutorial decisions”). 
326. See Stevi Jackson, The Social Context of Rape: Sexual Scripts and Motivation, in RAPE & 
SOC’Y 16 (Patricia Searles & Ronald J. Berger eds., 1995) (noting lingering image of rapists as 
“psychopaths lurking in dark alleys waiting to pounce on any likely victim and inflict their 
uncontrollable desires”). 
327. In a telling article, the Boulder Daily Camera reports district attorney candidates’ responses 
to the question of how they would treat a date rape allegation. Christopher Anderson, DA 
Candidates Voice Views on Date Rape, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, May 14, 2000, at 1B. In stark 
contrast to typical political rhetoric about sexual predators, each DA candidate emphasized the 
importance of investigating the complainant’s credibility. Id. Compare this to political stances on 
sex offenders generally. See Emily Ramshaw, Child Sex Bills Raising Concern: Victims’ Groups 
Think Death Penalty, Other Ideas Could Backfire, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 5, 2007, at 2A 
(reporting that “[s]ex offenders were a hot topic during the 2006 [Texas] governor’s race, with all 
four contenders . . . open to the death sentence”). 
328. See CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUST., CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT 
(CSA) STUDY, FINAL REPORT 64 (2007), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/ 
221153.pdf (finding that over thirteen percent of university student respondents indicated they had 
been raped); Crime on College Campuses: Institutional Liability for Acquaintance Rape, 
Association of Trial Lawyers of America Annual Convention Reference Materials, 1 Ann.2004 
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descriptive nuance, has little political appeal.329 The narratives justifying 
sex offender registration, civil commitment, residency requirements, and 
harsh punishments paint a picture of criminals that look nothing like the 
average college date rapist.330 For this reason, the concept that date 
rapists have to register as sex offenders causes even the most 
conservative anti-crime supporters to question whether registration is 
over-inclusive.331 Today, hatred of criminals is dependent on criminals 
being wholly unlike average persons and therefore disentitled to 
empathy, sympathy, compassion, or humane treatment.332 The language 
used by politicians and victims’ rights advocates describing sex 
offenders as monsters and predators had much to do with dehumanizing 
criminals in the eyes of the public.333 To the extent that rape reformers 
supported the victims’ rights movement and its construction of rapists as 
inhuman and abnormal,334 they planted the seeds of realist reform’s 
                                                     
ATLA-CLE 499 (2004) (concluding that women in college are more likely to be raped than women 
in same age group not attending college); Carmody, supra note 301, at A1 (reporting that “officials 
say rape has surpassed theft as the principal security concern at colleges and universities”). 
329. Cf. Judith Resnik, Reconstructing Equality: Of Justice, Justicia, and the Gender of 
Jurisdiction, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 393, 404 (2002) (attributing support for the Violence 
Against Women Act partly to the press’ characterization of the Act as a statute “about ‘rape’ rather 
than about [women’s] ‘civil rights’”). 
330. See No Bad Men, supra note 73, at 678 (observing the American cultural paradigm that 
“‘nice’ (well educated, white, middle class, employed) men do not rape” (footnote omitted)); see, 
e.g., Duncan, supra note 255, at 1112 (asserting that men engaging in nonconsensual sex should not 
be punished as “rapists” because “society regards rapists as some of its worst criminals”). 
331. See Wells & Motley, supra note 59, at 164 (noting that “[s]ociety may tolerate the 
questionable aspects of registration and notification laws as long as the defendant appears 
monstrous,” but not when offender is “a college student convicted of raping a young woman at a 
fraternity party”); see, e.g., Kathleen Parker, When Date Rape is a Life Sentence, TOWNHALL.COM, 
May 10, 2006, http://www.townhall.com/columnists/KathleenParker/2006/05/10/when_date_rape_ 
is_a_life_sentence (“In our justifiable repulsion in the face of monsters . . . we have used too broad 
a brush.”). 
332. See Trouble with Trials, supra note 178, at 852 (describing the tough-on-crime “view of the 
criminal offender [as] someone hostile to civilized values, devoid of human sensibilities, utterly 
‘other’”). 
333. See Terrence Stutz, Dewhurst Focuses on Program to Fight Child Sexual Predators: 
Inaugural Address also Mentions Immigration, Environment, Education, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 
Jan. 17, 2007, at 9A (reporting that Texas Lt. Governor David Dewhurst supported harsher sex-
offender legislation “to bring justice to these monsters,” adding “we’ll show you what Texas tough 
means”); see also 142 CONG. REC. 10,312 (May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep. Schumer) (discussing 
sex offenders’ “restless and unrelenting prowl for children”). 
334. Feminists have often been supportive of or agnostic to the victim’s rights movement. See, 
e.g., Alice Koskela, Note, Victim’s Rights Amendments: An Irresistible Political Force Transforms 
the Criminal Justice System, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 157, 163 (1997) (tracing victims’ rights movement 
in part to feminist criminal law efforts); Martin, supra note 1, at 159 (noting intertwining of victims’ 
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demise.335 How can a white, clean-cut college boy who did no more than 
assume when the girl said “no” she was playing coy be considered a 
horrible monster?336 
In addition, a date rape victim is often not an idealized victim like the 
innocent child subject to a brutal violent attack.337 Date rape victims do 
not always readily appear weak or perpetually damaged,338 and the 
circumstance of being on a date itself conveys a certain level of sexual 
agency.339 As a result, in the minds of jurors and the public, college date 
rape complainants are not “real” victims,340 the preferred victim often 
being the “unjustly accused” defendant.341 The absurd result of hysteria 
over pedophilia in a Girls Gone Wild world is that a fifteen-year-old girl 
has absolutely no ability to consent to sex,342 although three years later 
as a sexy co-ed, she has absolutely no ability to refuse.343 
                                                     
rights and feminist law reform); Wells & Motley, supra note 59, at 189–90 (criticizing feminist’s 
lackluster response to tough sex-offender legislation). Of course, this does not mean that all 
feminists supporting rape laws espouse binary views of criminality and victimhood. Nonetheless, 
the feminist argument that date rapists are “bad” like “other” rapists and should be punished 
accordingly seems at odds with a feminist deconstruction of the prevailing essentialist discourse of 
criminality and victimhood. 
335. See Motivational Evidence, supra note 100, at 597 (criticizing rape “measures that exploit 
white fear of the minority rapist and perpetuate myths of its prevalence”). 
336. One juror explained an acquittal, stating that because the defendant was “[a] nice-looking 
young fellow,” “[n]ice[ly] dressed, like a college boy” with a “[n]eat haircut,” she “couldn’t believe 
he would be capable of something like this.” GARY LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 219 (1989) (quoting rape juror); see also No Bad 
Men, supra note 73, at 677–78 (noting that jurors expect a rapist to be “a sex-crazed, deviant 
sociopath” or “a ‘loser’ who has no girlfriend”). 
337. See Feminist War, supra note 17, at 775 (noting victims’ rights movement’s characterization 
of victims as “weak, innocent, and helpless”). 
338. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 15, at 1272 n.487 (citing C. Neil MacRae & John W. 
Shephard, Sex Differences in the Perception of Rape Victims, 4 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 278, 
284 tbl. 2 (1989), which reports that mock jurors rated defendants more culpable for raping virgins 
because of increased psychological damage); Seidman & Vickers, supra note 243, at 469 (noting 
that jurors want victims to act like “someone who has really suffered the trauma of assault”). 
339. See No Bad Men, supra note 73, at 681 (asserting that jurors disbelieve “[w]omen who push 
the limits of their sex roles”). 
340. See supra notes 76–82 and accompanying text (discussing rape stereotypes). In fact, it is 
extremely difficult for rape victims to ever claim “real” victimhood: “The married woman assumes 
the risk of rape because she is married. The single woman assumes the risk of rape because she is 
single and on a date. The loose woman assumes the risk of rape because she is loose. The virgin is 
assumed to be fabricating rape charges to protect her virginity. Arguably, assumption of risk of 
rape, in its most basic form, attaches not to any external behavior but to womanhood.” Pink 
Elephants, supra note 101, at 249–50. 
341. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
342. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West 1999 & Supp. 2006) (statutory rape law); OHIO 
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Feminists trusted realist reforms to send society a message that 
coerced sex and sex in the absence of unambiguous permission 
(seemingly “normal” behavior) are grave wrongs.344 However, as 
currently constructed, criminal law conveys the general position that 
criminals are pathological deviants who engage in wholly aberrant 
conduct. The beliefs and behaviors predicating date rape, including male 
goal-orientation and female coyness, are clearly sexist but they are far 
from deviant.345 Experts note that date rapists are really no more than 
men who take very seriously the goal of sex and their roles as 
aggressors.346 Even without indulging slut and shrew stereotypes, people 
reject criminalizing date rape because they view the conduct simply as 
an imperfect sexual encounter347 or in some cases successful 
seduction.348 Indeed, nonparadigmatic rape is something which, like 
more subtle forms of domestic control, society cannot condemn without 
a re-evaluation of entrenched gender norms. Taking date rape 
“seriously” requires people to believe that a wrong can occur in the 
absence of social, racial, or psychological divergence and to critically 
reexamine “normal” male sexual aggression and female passivity. These 
are Herculean demands to put on jurors in the context of a criminal trial. 
                                                     
REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.04 (West 1997 & Supp. 2005) (same); see also David P. Bryden, Reason 
and Guesswork in the Definition of Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 585, 586 (2000) (asserting that 
harsh statutory rape laws “are due to the unique horror with which we view pedophiles”). 
343. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
344. See Katharine K. Baker, Gender and Emotion in Criminal Law, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 
447, 454 (2005) [hereinafter Gender and Emotion] (asserting that rape reform sends “a clear 
message” that sex must be “voluntarily given”). 
345. See Judith Lewis Herman, Considering Sex Offenders: A Model of Addiction, in RAPE & 
SOC’Y 74, 77 (Patricia Searles & Ronald J. Berger, eds., 1995) (observing that “young rapists in 
college-student surveys [are] demonstrably sexist, but not demonstrably ‘sick’”); Megan R. Yost & 
Eileen L. Zurbriggen, Gender Differences in the Enactment of Sociosexuality: An Examination of 
Implicit Social Motives, Sexual Fantasies, Coercive Sexual Attitudes, and Aggressive Sexual 
Behavior, 43 J. SEX RES. 163, 163 (2006), available at https://www.sexscience.org/uploads/ 
media/JSR-articleYost.pdf (finding that male “sociosexuality,” which means “a person’s willingness 
to engage in sexual activity with a variety of partners outside of a romantic relationship” is linked to 
“higher levels of rape myth acceptance and adversarial sexual beliefs; more conservative attitudes 
toward women; higher levels of power motivation and lower levels of affiliation-intimacy 
motivation; and past use of sexual aggression”). 
346. See Sex, Rape, and Shame, supra note 297, at 688 (concluding that sex and masculinity 
norms account for date rapists’ inclination to bypass consent). 
347. See REAL RAPE, supra note 89, at 13 (noting that “many young women believe that sexual 
pressure, including physical pressure, is simply not aberrant or illegal behavior if it takes place in a 
dating situation”). 
348. See Sex, Rape, and Shame, supra note 297, at 684–85 (citing studies finding that men often 
believe sexually coercive behavior is normal successful seduction). 
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It is no wonder that experts believe affirmative consent “invites jury 
nullification.”349 
The nonparadigmatic rape convictions that do occur, moreover, will 
be filtered through the lens of prevailing social narratives.350 Juries are 
more likely to convict only those date rapists who have displayed 
behavior consistent with paradigmatic rape.351 Moreover, it is probable 
that society at large simply assumes that the majority of convicted 
rapists did engage in conduct divergent from noncriminal courtship 
behavior. It comes as no surprise, then, that the media and public have 
largely interpreted the anti-date-rape message as simply a tough-on-
prototypical-rape message, rather than a caution against gender 
stereotypes.352 In this sense, the criminal justice system has not furthered 
a feminist agenda. Rather, feminism has furthered criminal justice’s 
agenda. Additionally, addressing the date rape problem by jailing a few 
“bad” rapists obscures the reality that date rape’s cultural and socio-
economic predicates are widespread and seemingly ordinary.353 In sum, 
features of current American criminal law and gender norms render the 
transformative potential of realist rape reform a paltry pay-off given the 
inconsistency of feminist philosophy with current American criminal 
justice politics. 
                                                     
349. Dressler, supra note 95, at 423; see also After Rape Law, supra note 106, at 958. 
350. See Lise Gotell, Rethinking Affirmative Consent in Canadian Sexual Assault Law: 
Neoliberal Sexual Subjects and Risky Women, 41 AKRON L. REV. 865, 884 (2008) (observing that 
neoliberalism constructs “violence enacted on the bodies of vulnerable women [as] personalized and 
individualized”). 
351. See Bryden, supra note 95, at 418–26 (asserting that reforms have little empirical effect 
because jurors continue to look for signs of resistance, force, nonconsent, and corroboration). 
352. See Monstrous Offenders, supra note 322, at 876–78 (noting that conservatives were more 
successful at characterizing rape as problem of street predators than feminists were at characterizing 
rape as inequality); see also Kosse, supra note 80, at 276 (conducting study of media reports of 
Duke Lacrosse rape case and finding that reporting largely ignored “underlying causes of rape 
including sexism and misogyny” and instead focused on “the facts of the event which promotes the 
idea that the crime is rare and thus newsworthy”). 
353. See Sexy Dressing, supra note 52, at 1321 (asserting that deviance discourse allows people 
to “live in a universe where legal rules about sexual abuse are irrelevant because the relations 
between men and women, however, screwed up they may be . . . are basically pacific and friendly”); 
see also Rape Panel, supra note 21, at 156 (recognizing that focus on criminal law “may distort 
rather than enlighten our understanding of harms done to women by men in our routine, normal, 
day-to-day heterosexual transactions”). 
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B. Rape Reform Does Not Substantially Benefit Victims 
One more question must be addressed before definitively concluding 
that feminists should disengage from criminal law, and this question is 
generally singularly important to on-the-ground reformers: Do the laws 
improve the lives of individual rape victims? Many rape reformers 
account for the apparent failure of realist rape laws by asserting they 
have not been implemented as widely or strictly as necessary.354 These 
reformers stress that society needs stricter criminal laws and more 
exacting prosecutions.355 The contention that rape victims will benefit 
from more restrictive and uniform rape shield and affirmative consent 
laws rests on two basic assumptions. First, it assumes that if realist 
reforms are broader and more regularly implemented, they will make 
trials fairer and increase reporting rates. Second, it assumes that 
encouraging reporting and prosecution of date rapes, in the reformed 
criminal system, is in fact best for women victims. The next two 
subsections analyze these assumptions in turn. 
1. Broader Date Rape Criminalization Will Not Solve the Problem 
Today, all states and the federal government have implemented some 
form of rape shield law.356 Reformers accordingly praise the broad 
adoption of shield laws, but complain that they contain too many 
exceptions.357 They assert eliminating such exceptions will rid rape trials 
of sexist myths and increase convictions and reporting.358 However, it 
seems feminists underestimated the multitude of ways in which rape 
myths infect the criminal system. First, shield laws only protect against 
embarrassment and prejudice at the trial level. Other institutional actors, 
from police to prosecutors, are free to act on the basis of stereotypes.359 
                                                     
354. See Chastity Requirement, supra note 22, at 96 (criticizing shield laws for containing too 
many exceptions). 
355. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rape in the Twilight Zone: When Sex is Unwanted But Not 
Illegal, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 415, 416–17 (2005) (arguing for wider adoption and stricter 
application of affirmative consent); Seidman & Vickers, supra note 243, at 484–90 (calling for 
uniform adoption of affirmative consent). 
356. See Chastity Requirement, supra note 22 (citing cases and statutes); see supra notes 96–97 
and accompanying text. 
357. See, e.g., Chastity Requirement, supra note 22, at 96 (advocating stricter rape shield law). 
358. See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text. 
359. See SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 55, at 116 (finding rape reforms ineffective “because they 
failed to alter officials’ evaluations of rape cases and rape victims”); Chastity Requirement, supra 
note 22, at 95–96 (noting that rape stereotypes are likely most operational at pretrial stages); 
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The continued use of rape mythology by these state actors has the effect 
of discouraging victim reporting and participation.360 In addition, 
prosecutors are culturally oriented toward winning trials, which may 
lead them to dismiss cases involving nonparadigmatic victims because 
the chances of victory are low.361 Experts also note that some rape 
complainants, like Kobe Bryant’s accuser,362 can be traumatized by 
actions of purely non-state actors.363 
Moreover, during trial, the very fact of an accusation of acquaintance 
rape can trigger sex object and vindictive shrew narratives.364 Even when 
the court fully shields the jury from particular evidence that the victim is 
“loose” or lying, stereotypes and heuristics continue to operate.365 
Looking at it hermeneutically, the rape trial proceeds on a backdrop of 
narratives surrounding all the players involved—from police, to 
defendants, to victims.366 The background narrative of the date rape 
victim necessarily integrates the lingering image of the slut or shrew.367 
                                                     
Seidman & Vickers, supra note 243, at 468 (contending that state actors and jurors continue to be 
hostile to rape claims). 
360. See Andrea A. Curcio, The Georgia Roundtable Discussion Model: Another Way to 
Approach Reforming Rape Laws, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 565, 570 (2004) (noting that “scholars 
believe that the rape victims’ unwillingness to prosecute cases is, at least in part, the result of poor 
treatment by the police and the prosecutors”). 
361. Sarah Goodrum, Victims’ Rights, Victims’ Expectations, and Law Enforcement Workers’ 
Constraints in Cases of Murder, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 725, 730 (2007) (observing that in rape 
context prosecutors’ “responsibility to build a strong case for the state” requires them to “hold a 
‘downstream [or end result] orientation’”); Nicholas J. Little, From No Means No to Only Yes 
Means Yes: The Rational Results of an Affirmative Consent Standard in Rape Law, 58 VAND. L. 
REV. 1321, 1326 (2005) (observing that “prosecutors seek the ‘ideal’ rape victim to maximize their 
chance of achieving a conviction”). 
362. See supra note 79 (discussing Kobe Bryant case). 
363. See Special Issues, supra note 27, at 1600. 
364. See Douglas D. Koski, Jury Decisionmaking in Rape Trials: A Review & Empirical 
Assessment, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 21, 128 (2002) (study finding that jurors who are forced to reach 
consensus “converge[] on whatever stereotypic-consistent imagery and information is available”). 
365. See Ann Althouse, Thelma and Louise and the Law: Do Rape Shield Rules Matter?, 25 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 757, 764 (1992) (cataloging ways gendered narratives enter trial, despite shield laws); 
see also Rayburn, supra note 6, at 460–65 (noting that “performances” within rape trial, from 
defense questions to victim’s manner, trigger stereotypes); Seidman & Vickers, supra note 243, at 
485. 
366. See Coombs, supra note 50, at 291 (asserting that “cultural scripts that the jurors bring to the 
court indirectly influence the stories they will be told”); No Bad Men, supra note 73, at 682 
(observing that criminal prosecutions proceed against a backdrop of “the patriarchal tale of rape that 
our culture inculcates and that we use to measure the credibility of any given charge of rape”). 
367. See Special Issues, supra note 27, at 1592 (noting “cultural atmosphere” supporting rape 
myths). 
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Thus, total elimination of such myths from the trial through legal reform 
is a practical impossibility.368 As a consequence, notwithstanding rape 
shield laws, date rape conviction rates remain low, not only because 
myths creep into the trial, but also because shields do not prevent jurors 
from focusing on other aspects of nonparadigmatic rapes (like whether 
she was voluntarily in his bedroom, whether she said “no,” etc.).369 So 
long as conviction rates remain low, rape victims, police, and 
prosecutors will continue to be reluctant to pursue date rape cases 
through trial. 
Perhaps, then, affirmative consent laws can fill the gap by decisively 
forcing juries to focus on the sole question of whether the victim said 
“yes.” Reformers certainly argue that date rape prosecutions would be 
far more frequent and successful if affirmative consent laws were 
adopted in every jurisdiction.370 However, given the “sticky norms” 
problem identified by Dan Kahan, and the widespread popular rejection 
of an objective linguistic prerequisite to sex, one could expect that 
widespread adoption of affirmative consent laws would likely lead to 
widespread jury nullification.371 Alternatively, defendants will simply 
argue that there was affirmative consent.372 In questionable cases of 
affirmative consent, jurors will continue to fit the law to their preexisting 
beliefs about rape by defining affirmative consent to include things like 
foreplay or other verbal and nonverbal cues.373 
But let us assume arguendo that jurors and judges did take affirmative 
consent laws very seriously and put a large number of young men in jail 
for date rape under such laws. One might think that this state of affairs 
would be beneficial for victims and potential victims because it would 
force men to procure a “yes” before sexual intercourse. Upon further 
                                                     
368. See Forgetting Freud, supra note 77, at 154–55 (observing that subtle word choices trigger 
metaphors used by jurors as “epistemology filters”). 
369. See also Friedland, supra note 267, at 519 (noting that shield laws do not address jurors’ 
acceptance of defendants’ claims of nonverbal consent). 
370. See supra note 355 (articles calling for uniform application of affirmative consent). 
371. See Kahan, supra note 252, at 623 (observing that in jurisdictions that have adopted 
affirmative consent “prosecutors are no more likely to charge men who disregard a woman’s verbal 
protestations, and juries no more likely to convict them, than are prosecutors and juries in other 
states”). 
372. See Bryden, supra note 95, at 425 (contending that accused rapists will simply “testify that 
the victim affirmatively expressed her consent”). 
373. See id. at 409 (stating that in the “absence of some sort of physical or at least verbal 
resistance by the woman few observers would say that the man’s conduct was so unusual and 
immoral that it warrants the extreme sanction of imprisonment”). 
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reflection, however, one is left to wonder whether inserting affirmative 
consent into the botched sex equation will affect a real change.374 
Women would continue to believe they must play coy, and men would 
still be goal-oriented toward sex,375 just with “getting to yes” inserted 
into the effort. Men would continue to pressure women in order to 
procure a “yes,” and women would say “yes” out of fear or aversion to 
confrontation.376 In the end, the “fix” of affirmative consent is no more 
than an ineffective insertion of language into a highly psychologically 
and culturally ordered scenario.377 
2.  Encouraging Punitiveness May Harm Victims 
The next assumption that reformers make is that rape victims are best 
served by engaging the criminal justice system. For now, let us put aside 
the argument that all women are harmed by the neoliberal order, 
including individual rape victims. General feminist objections to the 
criminal justice system’s macro-philosophy are unlikely to persuade a 
victim that prosecuting the rapist is not the best course of action. Thus, 
the question is whether feminist reformers are correct in assuming that 
encouraging the prosecutorial route best serves victims’ interests.378 Of 
course, what is best for a victim depends on the specific circumstances 
of the case and her life. Nonetheless, with the caveat that each person 
has innumerable individual interests, one can make some general 
observations on the effect of the push toward prosecution. 
This issue has arisen with some urgency in the domestic violence 
context. Many jurisdictions have adopted “hard no-drop” policies that 
mandate prosecution of abusers, even if the victims do not wish to 
                                                     
374. See Barrie Bondurant & Patricia L. N. Donat, Perceptions of Women’s Sexual Interest and 
Acquaintance Rape: The Role of Sexual Overperception and Affective Attitudes, 23 PSYCH. OF 
WOMEN Q. 691, 700 (1999) (finding that certain mens’ pre-existing rape-supportive attitudes lead to 
date rape). 
375. See supra notes 269–71 and accompanying text. 
376. See supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
377. See Bryden, supra note 95, at 425; Dan Subotnik, “Hands Off”: Sex, Feminism, Affirmative 
Consent, and the Law of Foreplay, 16 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 249, 294 (2007) (arguing that 
affirmative consent “will not induce the male to make himself ‘a more agreeable companion’”). 
378. See Seideman & Vickers, supra note 243, at 473 (cataloging rape victims’ needs, including 
privacy, immigration status, medical benefits, education, employment, and safe housing, and 
concluding that criminal prosecution “does not meet [victims’] primary needs at the time it is 
offered, and does not protect them from the most traumatic and devastating consequences to their 
well-being after the assault”). 
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proceed.379 Several feminist scholars, including this Author, argue that 
such policies often inure to the great detriment of abuse survivors.380 
Because of mandatory policies, women victims are arrested by resentful 
officers as mutual combatants,381 jailed as material witnesses,382 and 
otherwise prosecuted by the very system to which they turned for 
relief.383 Moreover, mandatory prosecution causes women to suffer loss 
of economic support,384 immigration problems,385 denial of public 
benefits,386 broken families, and emotional trauma.387 Finally, some 
experts assert that mandatory arrest and prosecution create more, not 
less, danger for certain victims.388 
                                                     
379. See generally Hanna, supra note 154 (describing mandatory domestic violence policies); 
Feminist War, supra note 17, at 760 n.90 (citing mandatory prosecution statutes). 
380. See, e.g., Feminist War, supra note 17, at 801−20; Miccio, supra note 315, at 293−320; Suk, 
supra note 128, at 42−66. 
381. See L. Kevin Hamberger & Theresa Potente, Counseling Heterosexual Women Arrested for 
Domestic Violence: Implications for Theory and Practice, 9 VICTIMS & VIOLENCE 125, 126 (1994) 
(finding that Wisconsin mandatory arrest law resulted in twelve-fold increase in arrests of women 
compared to two-fold increase for men); see also Andrea D. Lyon, Be Careful What You Wish For: 
An Examination of Arrest and Prosecution Patterns of Domestic Violence Cases in Two Cities in 
Michigan, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253, 298 (1999) (asserting that police “inevitably become 
resentful and may end up ‘retaliating’ by arresting a battered woman who returns to her batterer”); 
James O. Clifford, Domestic Case Arrests of Women Rise, AP WIRE, Nov. 24, 1999, 
http://www.fact.on.ca/newpaper/ap99112a.htm (observing that after California mandatory arrest 
policy was instituted total domestic violence arrests decreased but percentage of women domestic 
arrestees rose from five to sixteen percent). 
382. See Hanna, supra note 154, at 1866 (discussing Maudie Wall case). 
383. See Coker, supra note 317, at 1044 n.144 (discussing arrests of battered women for child 
abuse and neglect). 
384. See id. at 1017–18 (examining economic burdens of separation). 
385. See Feminist War, supra note 17, at 806 (“Immigrant victims were torn between reporting 
domestic violence, which may result in deportation . . . and cause emotional and financial hardship, 
and allowing abuse to continue.”). See generally Hannah R. Shapiro, Battered Immigrant Women 
Caught in the Intersection of U.S. Criminal and Immigration Laws: Consequences and Remedies, 
16 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 27, 28 (2002) (discussing adverse impact of mandatory domestic 
violence policies on immigrants). 
386. See, e.g., Lenora M. Lapidus, Doubly Victimized: Housing Discrimination Against Victims 
of Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 377, 378–82 (2003) (citing an 
administrative proceeding in which a domestic violence victim was evicted from public housing 
under “zero-tolerance” policy, Alvera v. Creekside Village Apts., HUD ALJ No. 10-99-0538-8 
(U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Portland, Or., Oct. 22, 1999)). 
387. See Judith G. Greenberg, Domestic Violence and the Danger of Joint Custody Presumptions, 
25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 403, 415 (2005) (discussing numerous reasons, including “desire to keep the 
family unit intact,” for victim reluctance to prosecute). 
388. Compare Sack, supra note 181, at 1673–74 (asserting that no-drop policies increase 
convictions and lower recidivism), with Deborah Epstein et al., Transforming Aggressive 
Prosecution Policies: Prioritizing Victims’ Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic 
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Similarly, rape reform and its general goal of encouraging date rape 
reporting to trigger the operation of the criminal system may have 
negative repercussions on the very victims they are meant to serve. 
Pushing rape victims toward prosecution, even in a “reformed” system, 
may lead them to enter unwittingly into an ultimately traumatizing 
process.389 Believing that rape shield and affirmative consent laws will 
protect her, a woman may be unprepared for the way she is treated by 
institutional actors and others.390 Reporting to police and prosecutors 
standing alone may be extremely distressing depending on how the state 
actors treat the victim and whether they pursue her case.391 The victim 
may also be damaged by the operation of subtle sexism within the trial 
and upset by an eventual acquittal.392 Thus, one significant problem is 
that realist reformers seek to shuttle women into a system that is 
structurally, philosophically, and culturally adverse to them.393 
Realist reforms, furthermore, can harm victims by pushing a 
retributive model over other modes of addressing crime victimhood.394 
Experts argue that true closure does not come through vengeance and 
                                                     
Violence Cases, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 465, 469 (2003) (arguing mandatory 
policies endanger women). There is also conflicting empirical evidence on whether mandatory 
arrest and prosecution laws create more danger for victims. Compare Lawrence Sherman and 
Richard Ber, The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, in MILLER & WRIGHT, CRIM. PROC. 
299–303 (2d ed. 2000) (finding mandatory arrest lowered short-term re-arrest rates), with Lawrence 
W. Sherman et al, Crime, Punishment, and Stake in Conformity: Legal and Informal Control of 
Domestic Violence, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 680, 686 (1992) (finding that among unmarried and 
unemployed batterers, arrest increased subsequent violence). 
389. See Rape Victims and Prosecutors, supra note 309, at 713–15 (listing ways in which a 
criminal prosecution can traumatize rape victims). 
390. Philadelphia rape victims were likely unprepared to deal with the sex crime investigator who 
called his department the “Lying Bitches Unit.” See Craig R. McCoy, From Old Report, 4 New 
Charges, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, June 23, 2003, at A1. 
391. See Goodrum, supra note 361, at 730 (“Detectives and prosecutors view their role, the 
victim’s role, and criminal cases from a perspective that conflicts with and may even harm 
victims.”). 
392. See supra notes 366–69 and accompanying text. 
393. See supra notes 175–77 and accompanying text (discussing criminal trial’s structural 
disconnect with feminism); Cahn, supra note 117, at 821 (observing ways in which criminal system 
is unsupportive of women’s issue and rests on “nonneutral” assumptions); cf. Tom Lininger, Is it 
Wrong to Sue for Rape?, 57 DUKE L.J. 1557, 1559 n.1 (2008) (noting how after Kobe Bryant case 
publicized harms of engaging criminal system, rape victims became reluctant to report (citing Cathy 
Maestri & Ben Goad, Activists Decry Bryant Decision, PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), Sept. 
3, 2004, at A1)). 
394. Martin, supra note 1, at 155–56 (1998) (criticizing “ubiquitous” concept that “the criminal 
trial, and the punishment that it justifies, [is] an occasion of healing and closure”). 
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punishment.395 Victims are benefitted by engaging in forgiveness and 
understanding the contextuality of the crime, including their own role in 
it.396 Victims may also end up so engaged in the prosecutorial aspects of 
their criminal cases that they fail to explore therapy and other avenues of 
healing.397 In addition, an exclusive focus on criminal punishment can 
deflect attention from other social circumstances that contributed to the 
crime.398 By viewing a rape solely as an event between two individuals, 
the criminal system ignores that the victim may have various 
psychological, social, and economic needs that made her particularly 
vulnerable to rape.399 Finally, the more criminal rape law becomes 
associated with pro-woman reform, the more rape victims may be 
stigmatized or denigrated as lying shrews when they decline to engage 
the criminal system or when their cases result in acquittals.400 This puts 
date rape victims in the precarious position of either having to go 
through a process that continues to be hostile or forego that process and 
be disbelieved about the rape because society thinks that the law now 
takes date rape seriously. 
 
Consequently, realist rape reform has had questionable empirical 
effect on rape reporting and conviction rates. Its norming potential, 
moreover, is severely limited by the prevalence of culturally embedded 
sexism and the conflicting messages sent by criminal law in general. The 
state of gender norms and the criminal system also lessens rape law’s 
                                                     
395. See, e.g., Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 966 
(1985) (asserting that when the criminal system focuses on “blame and denial, [it] proceeds on the 
basis of mistaken normative assumptions about victims”). 
396. See id. at 998 (“Forgiveness alone retains the uncontested authorship essential to 
responsibility and resolution. Forgiveness, rather than vengeance may, therefore, be the act that 
eventually frees the victim from the event, the means by which the victim may put the experience 
behind her.”). 
397. See Seideman & Vickers, supra note 243, at 472–81 (providing laundry list of rape victims’ 
needs which are unaddressed by the criminal system). 
398. See Lea VanderVelde, The Legal Ways of Seduction, 48 STAN. L. REV. 817, 842–46 (1996) 
(criticizing legal regimes that “provide rape victims only with vengeance . . . rather than 
compensation that would improve their lives”). 
399. See Gotell, supra note 350, at 863–64 (2008) (noting how neoliberal philosophy obscures 
social realities of “risky” rape victims); cf. Feminist War, supra note 17, 818–19 (arguing that focus 
on domestic violence criminalization has left battered women’s needs unaddressed). 
400. Deborah M. Weissman, Gender-Based Violence as Judicial Anomaly: Between “The Truly 
National and the Truly Local,” 42 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1133–34 (2001) (stating in domestic violence 
context that “attention to criminal remedies actually contributes to skepticism that battered women 
continue to face difficulties in the courts” and “a view that women have undeserved advantages”). 
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ability to benefit individual victims. Further, the little protection victims 
can obtain from realist reforms at trial must be weighed against possible 
negative consequences, including luring victims into a traumatic process, 
obscuring other methods of healing, denying social contextuality, and 
stigmatizing unsuccessful or reluctant victims. In the end, realist reform 
produces marginal gain to individual women and little change in public 
opinion. Moreover, by spending academic, political, and financial capital 
pushing for tougher date rape laws, the feminist movement has bolstered 
a criminal system that operates in a manner highly antithetical to 
feminism generally. 
V.  FEMINISTS SHOULD DISENGAGE FROM RAPE REFORMS 
THAT STRENGTHEN THE PENAL STATE 
This Article has waded into what Elizabeth Schneider calls the 
“murky middle ground” between women’s desperate desire for liberation 
from bonds of gender violence and the problems of engaging coercive 
state penal authority.401 No answers here are easy precisely because the 
very inchoateness and ubiquity of female subordination within law and 
society create a world in which women are at the mercy of individual 
male abusers or the patriarchal state. However, while neither the 
abandonment of criminal law nor continued engagement is ideal, they 
are not equally situated. At this particular moment, feminists ought to be 
consistent in critiquing the enormity and inhumanity of our criminal 
justice system, as well as its flawed premises.402 Women should not 
“walk the halls of power”403 in the criminal justice system but should 
rather begin the complicated process of disentangling feminism and its 
important anti-sexual coercion stance from a hierarchy-reinforcing 
criminal system that is unable to produce social justice.404 
                                                     
401. Schneider, supra note 229, at 196. 
402. See Feminist War, supra note 17, at 824 (“Feminists should not be channeling their efforts 
into helping the government find new, better, and easier ways to incarcerate people.”); see also 
supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text (discussing punitive nature of American criminal system). 
403. See SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 165, at 20–21 (criticizing “governance” feminists who 
“walk the halls of [mainstream] power”). 
404. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 848 (1990) 
(contending that feminists should engage in a “deeper inquiry into the consequences of overlapping 
forms of oppression”); Martin, supra note 1, at 160 (stating that “[t]he criminal justice apparatus is 
about order and its reproduction, and about maintaining the existing hierarchy of status and 
privilege”). 
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Even feminists persuaded that the criminal route is ideologically and 
materially flawed might nevertheless have some lingering doubt about 
receding from the criminal law. First, they might worry that feminist exit 
from criminal law will signal that sexual violence, particularly date rape, 
is not a pressing social problem.405 Minority scholars often feel 
compelled to show no weakness by perpetually supporting the strategic 
and philosophical positions of the group and avoiding internal 
critique.406 Indeed, there is always the risk that “attacks on liberal 
legalism” from the left “ultimately will do more to advance right-wing 
anti-liberal legalism and less to advance progressive alternatives.”407 Yet 
it is highly unlikely that sexists will premise or justify their views of date 
rape on progressives’ internal critique,408 especially if feminists make 
clear that the problem is with the criminal justice system and not with 
the concept that coerced and unconsensual sex is wrongful.409 Further, 
                                                     
405. I, myself, have been disturbed to see bits and pieces of Feminist War, an article I wrote 
setting forth a progressive argument against mandatory domestic violence policies, placed 
prominently on uber-conservative and so-called men’s rights websites and blogs as prima facie 
evidence that the “feminazis” have “gone wild.” See, e.g., Carey Roberts, Harsh Domestic Violence 
Laws Recall Jim Crow Abuses, RENEW AMERICA (Mar. 10, 2008), http://www.renewamerica.us/ 
columns/roberts/080310 (last visited Sept. 27, 2009). Apparently, Mr. Robert’s article is reprinted 
on a number of conservative and men’s rights sites. See, e.g., Postings to Yahoo Answers, 
Feminists: Would You Defend VAWA if it were VAMA Instead? (2008), 
http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20080607184301AAfKz1b (last visited Sept. 27, 
2009) (stating that “[t]he domestic violence laws are prejudiced against men because they were 
promoted by feminists (see Prof [sic] Gruber’s paper),” and “Professor Aya Gruber’s research (2007 
isn’t too long ago) proves that VAWA was a sexist law”). Interestingly, Feminist War does not 
address VAWA. 
406. For example, progressives who criticize certain African American groups for ignoring the 
interests of black women or gays fear that they might fuel racists’ claims that black men are sexist 
and homophobic. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Beyond the Rhetoric of “Dirty Laundry”: 
Examining the Value of Internal Criticism Within Progressive Social Movements and Oppressed 
Communities, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 185, 195 (1999) (noting argument that internal criticism 
“exacerbate[s] the negative construction of oppressed individuals”). Internal critique is also seen as 
somewhat traitorous. See Feminist War, supra note 17, at 819 (observing that some pro-prosecution 
feminists characterize theorists who criticize gender crime enforcement as “allies of batterers and 
pseudofeminists . . . who wish to send the women’s movement back twenty years”). 
407. Martha T. McCluskey, Thinking with Wolves: Left Legal Theory After the Right’s Rise, 54 
BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1196 (2007). 
408. Cf. Navigating Diverse Identities, supra note 186, at 1225 (observing that “those who wish 
to marginalize and stereotype minorities will find a way to do so” and will not likely rely on critical 
scholarship); Angela Onwuachi-Willig et al., Cracking the Egg: Which Came First—Stigma or 
Affirmative Action?, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1299 (2008) (study demonstrating that affirmative action does 
not cause racial bias, pre-existing racial bias causes people to stigmatize blacks as unfair recipients 
of affirmative action).  
409. See Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 626 (1990) 
(observing that “factors that divide [feminists] can also be a basis for enriching our theoretical 
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many critical scholars recognize that internal critique’s costs are far 
outweighed by its aptitude for “confronting complex subordination.”410 
Second, the turn away from criminal law may leave feminists feeling 
defeated because doing “something,” even if within criminal law, is 
better than doing nothing. However, continuing to engage in punitive 
discourse and pro-prosecution reform is arguably more damaging to all 
subordinated groups, including women, than doing nothing. Moreover, 
this Article is more hopeful than many critical projects because it does 
not take the position that law can never be a mechanism of true feminist 
progress.411 Critical, feminist, and minority scholars have long objected 
to the singular reliance on positive law to achieve social justice ends.412 
Drawing on insights about the limits of legal rules from Critical Legal 
Studies, many minority theorists have concluded that legal proposals 
provide limited potential for securing group justice because American 
law manifests primarily in a liberal form.413 Feminist scholars in 
particular have suggested that legal proposals inevitably reinforce 
patriarchy because “women are cast as requiring protection from the 
world of male violence while the superior status of men is secured by 
their supposed ability to offer such protection.”414 
By contrast, this Article leaves open the possibility that changes in 
labor and employment law, public benefits law, immigration law, and 
                                                     
perspectives and expanding our political alliances”). 
410. Hutchinson, supra note 406, at 197. 
411. Indeed, many recognize the great progressive promise of law. Cornel West, Reassessing the 
Critical Legal Studies Movement, in KEEPING FAITH: PHILOSOPHY AND RACE IN AMERICA 195, 203 
(1993) (noting “the creative ways in which oppressed and marginalized persons have forged 
traditions of resistance by appropriating aspects of liberalism for democratic and egalitarian ends”). 
But see Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1384 (1984) (asserting that “the 
pragmatic argument to which defenders of rights retreat when pressed is much less powerful than 
they normally think”). 
412. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice 
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 679 (1995) (making racial case for non-enforcement of criminal laws); 
cf. Tushnet, supra note 411, at 1392–93 (“By abstracting from real experiences and reifying the idea 
of rights, [liberal discourse] creates a sphere of autonomy stripped of any social context and 
counterposes to it a sphere of social life stripped of any content.”). 
413. See Audre Lorde, The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House, in SISTER 
OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 110, 112 (1984) (asserting that the master’s tools “may allow us 
temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring about genuine 
change”). 
414. Man in the State, supra note 2, at 25 (interpreting MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 
357–59 (1978)). See also Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 
AM. J. INT’L L. 613, 634 (1991) (noting feminist critique of liberalism that “continuing to focus on 
the acquisition of rights may not be beneficial to women”). 
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the construction of educational, vocational, and other programs could, in 
fact, lead to women’s economic and social empowerment and have a 
positive effect on curbing sexual violence.415 There is even a possibility 
that under different political conditions, criminal law could be part of a 
feminist agenda.416 Thus, this Article is not a call for decriminalization 
of date rape. Civil libertarians and others suggest that nonconsensual sex 
or sex in the absence of affirmative consent should be punished as a 
minor misdemeanor,417 diverted into mediation programs,418 or subject to 
minimally punitive shaming punishments.419 These proposals, however, 
tend to make the problematic assumption that date rapes are not as 
“serious” as “normal” crimes.420 Constructions of “serious” criminality 
                                                     
415. Many argue that legal strategies should not be written off. See, e.g., Patricia J. Williams, 
Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: 
THE CUTTING EDGE 84, 89 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995) (“The argument that rights are disutile, 
even harmful, trivializes [the experience] . . . of any person or group whose genuine vulnerability 
has been protected by that measure of actual entitlement which rights provide.”). 
416. Cf. Sally Engle Merry, Wife Battering and the Ambiguities of Rights, in IDENTITIES, 
POLITICS, AND RIGHTS 271, 275 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1995) (discussing study of 
domestic violence court in Hawaii that proved empowering to women victims and, as such, was a 
place “women [could] turn [to] for protection rather than a place that reinforces male authority”). 
417. See Ian Ayres & Katharine K. Baker, A Separate Crime of Reckless Sex, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 
599, 599 (2005) (proposing a misdemeanor crime of first-time sex without a condom); Dressler, 
supra note 95, at 423 (maintaining that the law should not treat “the rapist who jumps out from the 
bushes with a knife” like “the teenage boy who has ordinary intercourse . . . without obtaining 
permission”); Duncan, supra note 255, at 1112 (contending that acquaintance rape should be a 
lesser crime). 
418. See, e.g., Kerry M. Hodak, Note, Court Sanctioned Mediation in Cases of Acquaintance 
Rape: A Beneficial Alternative to Traditional Prosecution, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1089 
(2004) (proposing mediation in cases of acquaintance rape); Ingram, supra note 51, at 35 (1993) 
(suggesting use of mediation in date rape). 
419. See Sex, Rape, and Shame, supra note 297, at 695–714 (noting “[t]he popular rejection of 
verbal communication in the sexual context” and prescribing shaming punishments in school 
disciplinary proceedings); Kahan, supra note 252, at 625 (endorsing the proposal for shaming 
punishments in school disciplinary proceedings). 
420. It is one thing to recognize date rape as a “real” problem but argue that decriminalization is a 
rational strategy of increasing prosecution levels and shaping norms. It is wholly another thing to 
single out date rape as the crime which somehow best represents the unfair exercise of state punitive 
authority. Moreover, to the extent that law reform can send a message, active decriminalization of 
nonparadigmatic rape is not necessarily the right one. A visible and vocal feminist call for reversing 
date rape reform would likely reinforce prevailing beliefs that courtship norms are as they should 
be, that gender subordinating sexual practices are normal and desirable, and that the feminist effort 
against date rape was just a regrettable instance of “feminazi” judgmentalism. See Kimberly Kessler 
Ferzan, A Reckless Response to Rape: A Reply to Ayres and Baker, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 637, 667 
(2006) (“Slight punishments may gradually affect the norm so that our society becomes more 
willing to punish acquaintance rape, but such punishments may also reinforce the view that 
acquaintance rapes are not real rapes.”). 
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and “true” victimhood are not neutral, but products of specific social and 
political belief systems.421 Date rape is a phenomenon intimately 
entwined with gender inequality and, as such, is properly a matter of 
serious feminist concern.422 Further, in this age of massive 
overcriminalization, it appears both unfair and gender biased to select 
date rape, out of all other crimes that are overprosecuted and 
overpunished, for decriminalization.423 
The argument here is not that date rape is not a “real” crime, but 
rather that addressing sexualized violence through increasing the 
prosecutorial power of the state is an endeavor in which, at this 
particular moment, feminists should no longer enlist.424 Activists should 
turn their attention to investigating methods of addressing rape and 
gender inequality425 outside of a system that carries so much political 
                                                     
421. See Toward a Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 3, at 645 (observing that objective 
epistemology “ensures that the law will most reinforce existing distributions of power when it most 
closely adheres to its own highest ideal of fairness”). 
422. In addition, although many of these proposals minimize the invasiveness of criminal 
intervention, they often serve to broaden the reach of the problematic penal system. 
423. See Rape, supra note 62, at 1141–42 (asserting that men argue for date rape 
decriminalization out of a pervasive but empirically unsupported “nightmare” involving lying 
complainants, overzealous prosecutors, and bumbling judges and juries, resulting in wrongful rape 
convictions). 
424. This might lead one to ask, “If feminists should stop talking about date rape as a crime, even 
though date rape conduct is arguably criminal, should they stop talking about all forms of rapes and 
all crimes?” In answering, let me clarify that my position is not that gender crimes are not “harms.” 
In fact it is just the opposite—these crimes are not only harms of individual criminality, they are 
also problems of social structure. Feminist concern arises precisely because certain “harms” are 
linked to gender inequality. The feminist agenda is not aimed broadly at countering all “bad” 
conduct, and thus feminists should not prioritize, say, ending wild animal poaching. This does not 
imply, however, that feminists should say or think poaching is good. To bring it back to stranger 
rape, society is in a moment when support for punishing stranger rapists is greater than that for most 
other criminals. When a particular stranger rapist is acquitted, it does not necessarily raise a 
“feminist” issue because it is unlikely a product of a social tolerance for stranger rape. If anything, 
feminists should worry about the overpunishment of paradigmatic rapists and the objectifying and 
tunnel-visioned views implicated by it. As a consequence, feminists need not and do not really 
involve themselves in advocating greater punishment of paradigmatic rape—that terrain is now 
amply occupied by conservative politicians, many of whom are male. Date rape is different, 
however, because it is an issue that continues to reflect a deep gender divide and both stems from 
and reifies gender hierarchy. Thus, feminists do and should fight against this form of sexual 
coercion. My argument is that, given the exact moment in our political history and the current 
characteristics of criminal law, feminists should not seek to remedy this gender problem through the 
criminal system. 
425. See Ann E. Freedman, Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence Cases: Secondary 
Traumatic Stress and the Need for Compassionate Witnesses, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & 
L. 567, 588–89 (2003) (asserting that criminalization is easier than social restructuring). 
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and practical baggage.426 However, those proposing non-criminal anti-
rape projects should be wary that other strategies “come complete with 
their own perpetual perils.”427 Any feminist policy could pose theoretical 
problems or have unintended negative consequences and, as such, would 
likely benefit from the rigorous balancing analysis to which this Article 
subjects criminal rape reform.428 
Nevertheless, the possibilities for feminist exploration outside 
criminal law appear extensive and exciting. Feminists can undertake to 
shape norms through political activism and legal scholarship expressly 
directed toward dispelling stereotypes and sexist practices. Engaging in 
scholarly, social, and political efforts to encourage unity between 
women could go far in changing the cultural preconditions of date 
rape.429 Feminists can also counteract the rape-permissive gender norms 
                                                     
426. See Sharon Marcus, Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory and Politics of Rape 
Prevention, in GENDER STRUGGLES: PRACTICAL APPROACHES TO CONTEMPORARY FEMINISM 167, 
169 (Constance L. Mui & Julien S. Murphy, eds. 2002) (noting that the “almost exclusive insistence 
on equitable reparation and vindication in the courts has [had] limited effectiveness for a politics of 
rape intervention”); Miccio, supra note 315, at 290 (asserting that feminist focus on criminal 
strategies has diverted resources from violence prevention, education, and economic security 
programs); see also Feminist War, supra note 17, at 758 (arguing that criminal system is “infested 
with racial, socioeconomic, and gender biases that manifest[] every time criminal enforcement [i]s 
increased”). 
427. Lobel, supra note 187, at 974. 
428. For example, one intervention that is advocated often and believed to significantly impact 
norms is education. Education proposals range from teaching rape awareness in primary and 
secondary schools, see, e.g., Sarah Gill, Essay, Dismantling Gender and Race Stereotypes: Using 
Education to Prevent Date Rape, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 27, 70 (1996) (proposing rape education 
programs for teenagers), to special programs that train criminal justice officials on dealing with rape 
myths, see, e.g., Curcio, supra note 360, at 595–96 (advocating such education of judges, 
prosecutors, and police). However, depending on the messages educators send, the ideas students 
hear, and other aspects of the educational environment, rape awareness programs could possibly 
cause more problems than they remedy. In a conservative school system, for example, the anti-rape 
message might simply be given as an anti-sexuality abstinence message. See Pillard, supra note 259, 
at 947 (observing the popularity of abstinence-only education). Education of criminal justice actors 
may end up entrenching the belief that date rape prosecutions are “top prosecutorial priority” to be 
pursued at all costs, regardless of nuances of the case. See Feminist War, supra note 17, at 823, 
n.352 (observing that “educated” domestic violence judges believed that “men were guilty, the 
women scared or incapacitated, and release of the men would lead to an eventual murder”); see also 
Mary Becker, Keynote Address, Symposium, Domestic Violence and Victimizing the Victim: Relief, 
Results, Reform, 23 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 477, 488 (2003) (“Education is not necessarily effective and 
can reinforce stereotypes and actually do harm.”). 
429. Of course, one should not make judgments about the world based solely on bathroom 
graffiti, but I cannot help recounting this experience. I first encountered the word “womyn” as a 
seventeen-year-old freshman at Berkeley in 1989. I was absolutely engrossed by the extensive stall 
writings declaring a “womyn’s revolution,” “pussy power,” and “♀♀.” Recently, I was in a heavily 
graffitied bathroom stall at a local college bar at the University of Iowa, except this time, the wall 
 
Rape, Crime, and Feminism 
657 
largely enforced by women instead of relentlessly focusing on the 
criminality of men.430 In addition, reformers may turn their attention to 
publicizing how sexist cultural attitudes harmfully construct male 
sexuality and masculinity.431 But in order to begin a dialogue with men, 
especially young men, about their interests in dismantling the behavioral 
and cultural predicates of date rape, feminists must talk to them as 
people, not just seek to incarcerate them as criminals.432 
CONCLUSION 
At this moment of punitive excess, at this “time we will look back on 
in shame,”433 and in this era of devolved gender norms, feminists should 
turn away from prosecutorial power and toward the principles of 
solidarity and distributive equality Catharine MacKinnon espoused over 
a quarter century ago. Of course, all the inspired reformers who have 
worked tirelessly for rape reform within the criminal law are true 
feminist heroes. Their story is a thread in the larger tapestry of the 
women’s movement, and its constitutive importance cannot be denied. 
                                                     
proclaimed sentiments like “Drunk bitches watch out,” and “Sluts stay away from my man.” In less 
than two decades, college women had transformed from allies into bitter enemies in the sex war. 
Moreover, women sometimes adopt methodologies for catching men, including coyness, sexual 
reticence, and promiscuous dress, that put them at greater risk of rape. See supra notes 277–94 and 
accompanying text. 
430. Women themselves can reify stereotypes that underlie rape myths. When a sexy woman 
appears popular to men, it is often other women who whisper that she is a “slut” who has sex with 
anyone and has no right to complain about being raped. Moreover, women, not men, publish “the 
rules” that counsel sexual flirtation combined with sexual reticence as the methodology for 
obtaining a relationship. See Pettinato, supra note 276, at 116. 
431. See Bartlett, supra note 404, at 841 (asserting that male gender roles harm men by 
“construct[ing] sexuality in limiting and dangerous ways” and cataloging other ways men are 
harmed by assumption of aggression) (internal quotations omitted). Indeed, experts attribute men’s 
goal-oriented attitude toward sex, not to biological or internal psychological needs, but to peer 
pressure. See John Tierney, The Whys of Mating: 237 Reasons and Counting, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 
2007, at F1 (citing study at University of Texas revealing that men are more likely to have sex for 
“status” reasons than women). 
432. See Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction of Maleness, 43 
UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1079–90 (1996) (urging feminists to abandon the “retributive approach” to 
men and suggesting consciousness-raising methodologies for dismantling patriarchy); cf. John 
Foubert & Jonathan T. Newberry, Effects of Two Versions of an Empathy-Based Rape Prevention 
Program on Fraternity Men’s Survivor Empathy, Attitudes, and Behavioral Intent to Commit Rape 
or Sexual Assault, 47 J. C. STUDENT DEV. 133 (2006) (describing rape education program for men 
that resulted in significant increases in participants’ self-described empathy for rape victims and 
discrediting of rape myths when compared to control group). 
433. Smith, supra note 10, at 396 (critiquing this “extraordinarily harsh and punitive time”). 
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Feminists, however, have reached the limit of that effort, and the current 
criminal law no longer provides a meaningful avenue for transformation. 
The lonely voice of women’s empowerment cannot and will not be 
heard above the sound and fury of the criminal system’s other 
messages—messages that reinforce stereotypes, construct racial and 
socio-economic binaries, and unmoor crime from issues of social justice. 
Now is the time for us to step back, change directions, and reclaim the 
feminist movement from the hands of mainstream power and 
conservative ideology. It is time for feminists to leave the halls of 
criminal power and return to the streets where violence occurs, roll up 
our sleeves, and begin the process of formulating the next wave of 
feminist intervention. 
 
